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Equality, an ideal that like should be treated alike, lies at the heart of most 
national constitutions and all international human rights instruments.  Despite 
its ancient origins, however, this principle is far from being achieved in 
practice. Hence, in the search for full substantive equality, critical legal 
scholars put forward a theory and accompanying analytical framework of 
intersectionality.  Using South Africa as an example, this thesis examines the 
realisation of the constitutional promise of equality for those who have been 
traditionally marginalised by reason of their intersecting race and gender 
identities. 
The process of navigating this identity intersection is complicated by 
the cultural diversity that is a feature of South African society.  The 
Constitution nevertheless, encourages such diversity, and goes even further 
to give equal recognition to the coexisting systems of common and 
customary law that are rooted in Western and post-colonial African cultures, 
respectively.  It follows that a full understanding of the different legal and 
social contexts in which a rights claimant lives is critical to the achievement 
of substantive equality. 
In order to simplify the investigation of context, the thesis proposes an 
acronym: GRACE.  This term stands for a South African girl child, who lives 
through the intersecting identities of Gender, Race, Age and Culture in her 
search for Equality.  She serves not only as an embodiment of these 
identities, but also as an analytical tool for those required to undertake an 
equality analysis. 
This thesis therefore presents an opportunity for the reader to observe 
GRACE’s journey, and along the way, to note how the rights of female 
litigants have been developed.  The milestones of the journey are marked by 
the High Court case of Mabena v Letsoala (1998)1 as well as the 
																																																								
1
 1998 2 SA 1068 (T). 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






Constitutional Court cases of Bhe v Magistrate Khayelitsha (2005)2, 
Shilubana v Nwamitwa (2008)3, and Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Another 
(2013)4, all of which focus on the legal agency of women in areas that had 
formerly been the purview of senior males.  On the basis of these decisions, 
a hypothetical case of seduction is then presented so as to demonstrate how 
both the customary and common law can be interpreted to improve equality 
rights and develop the relevant conflicting laws. 
As the argument in the thesis develops, the GRACE model of analysis 
emerges as a useful device for assisting the judiciary to fulfil its constitutional 
mandate to “develop” rather than abolish laws that infringe the Bill of Rights.  
Such an approach is especially appropriate when dealing with customary 





 Bhe and Others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole; South African Human 
Rights Commission v President Republic of South Africa 2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
3
 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC). 
4
 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC). 
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1. Introduction: Intersecting Identity and the Quest for Equality 
 
Broadly speaking, this thesis is a discussion of how best to achieve equality.1  
Equality is a principle that is the foundation of democratic societies.2  Its 
prevalence and sustainability is a key objective against which human 
interaction is measured.3  This thesis advocates for equality, not to alleviate 
gender, cultural or other distinctions, but to celebrate and respect them.  The 
argument advanced is that any relevant differences between individuals that 
would affect their access to substantive equality are contextual and not 
merely superficially visible.  Hence, substantive equality focuses on aspects 
that lie within the marrow of identity, not simply on the surface. 
Equality is not so much an end result as a process, a framework for 
interaction and social growth. This thesis considers the process as it relates 
																																																								
1
 By definition, a “discussion” requires two or more people.  This thesis is referred to as a 
discussion because it incorporates the views of not only several people, but also different 
systems of law.  The notion of mediating the discussion refers to negotiating the way through 
texts and ideas with which I am only vaguely familiar, but still passionately interested, as 
they function to enhance the broader understanding of equality.  Moreover, without being 
paternalistic, this thesis is a discussion (from an outsider’s perspective) of the considerations 
related to access to equality for a South African girl child subject to customary law, as 
opposed to a discussion by a South African girl child herself as to what she sees as the 
influences in her life. 
2
 See K S Sastry “Equality, Basic Needs and Democratic Constitution” (2002) 3 Perspectives 
available at 
http://www.oycf.net/web.archive.org/web/20101218084208/http_/oycf.org/Perspectives2/17_
063002/contents.html (last accessed April 2015). 
3
 Equality for the present purposes is not a state of absolute homogeneity among all the 
citizens (which is impossible, anyway) but a condition in which the extent of inequality 
among citizens is not such that individual liberty is compromised. See J Scott Poverty and 
Wealth: Citizenship, Deprivation and Privilege (1994) 146. 
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to the girl child subject to customary law in South Africa.4  In mapping out the 
quest for equality, the thesis explores the concept of equality, as well as 
various aspects of the identity of the girl child and the South African 
landscape of legal pluralism.  Identity, for present purposes, is concerned 
primarily with gender, race, age, and their intersection within a particular 
cultural context.5  The quest for equality includes construction of a tool to 
address inequality, which is presented as a tool to assist the judiciary in 
providing remedies for the inequalities that have been experienced by the girl 
child living under customary law in South Africa. 
The focus of the thesis was inspired by the case of Bhe v Khayelitsha 
Magistrate6 and its discussion of the equality rights that apply to a South 
African girl child subject to the customary law rules of succession. The 
discussion is mediated by the perspective of one who is neither a product of 
South African culture nor subject to the customary laws of the country.  In 
this way, the thesis lacks a personal experiential perspective on the subject 
matter.  Nevertheless, the work attempts to achieve an objectivity that is 
often only possible from one who is located outside of the system that is the 
subject of examination. 
Legal perspectives are often communicated and reflected through 
stories and storytelling.7 These are methods of repackaging theory and 
																																																								
4
 The phrases “contemporary South Africa”, “today’s South Africa”, “the new South Africa” 
and “post-Apartheid” South Africa are used interchangeably in this thesis to describe the era 
ushered in by the 1993 Interim Constitution and solidified by the 1994 multi-party elections.  
This current period, which formally began in 1993 (although informally as early as 1990 with 
the release of Nelson Mandela from prison) is one characterised by constitutional 
commitments to equality and full embrace of democracy including the end of discrimination 
on the basis of race, culture, gender, language and religion.  See Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996, Chapter 1, Founding Provisions, and Chapter 2, 
Bill of Rights. 
5
 Note that the aspects of identity to be focused on differ according to context and the nature 
of the discussion at hand. 
6
 Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC).  
7
 One of the themes of Critical Race Theory (CRT) analysis proposed by R Delgado in his 
bibliography of CRT writings is storytelling /counter-storytelling and “naming one’s own 
reality”.  To a certain extent this is about telling the story of one’s experience – essentially a 
legal narrative form the perspective of the litigant.  Note that storytelling, as discussed in 
Critical Race Theory, carries no specific reference to the technical meaning attributed to the 
term in anthropological literature. 
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doctrine to be more palatable for the intended audience.  Stories are more 
accessible – both to the reader and the storyteller – than the typical genres of 
legal theory.  Particularly in the context of rights entitlement, the style of 
storytelling provides certain insight into the life perspective of a rights seeker.  
The notion of counter-storytelling emerges as a form to be juxtaposed 
against the traditional perception (story) of the law and its impact on the 
equality rights of marginalised peoples.  The common law and the customary 
law within South Africa can very easily serve as examples of a story and 
counter-story.8 
The thesis is the story of GRACE.  This is the name given to the 
subject of the research: a South African girl child subject to customary law.  
GRACE is not one individual, but rather an entity that signifies the 
composition of identities that are at the root of the research.  The acronym 
GRACE indicates that Gender, Race, Age and Culture affect one’s 
experience of Equality.9 
GRACE is a fictional character, an analytical construct created to 
contextualise the discussion of equality rights.  Thus, where we have a 
fictional character, a “story” cannot be far behind.  GRACE is used as a tool 
																																																																																																																																																													
See R Delgado & J Stefancic “Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography” (1993) 79 
Virginia Law Review 462-463.  The literature in this bibliography is categorised into the 
following ten themes: 
1. Critique of liberalism 
2. Storytelling/counter-storytelling and “naming one’s own reality” 
3. Revisionist interpretations of American civil rights law and progress 
4. A greater understanding of the underpinnings of race and racism 
5. Structural determinism 
6. Race, sex, class and their intersections 
7. Essentialism and anti-essentialism 
8. Cultural nationalism/separatism 
9. Legal institutions, Critical pedagogy, and minorities in the bar 
10. Criticism and self-criticism; responses. 
8
 But note that the characterisation of story and counter-story should not be taken to imply a 
hierarchy in which the common law takes precedence over customary law. See J M Modiri 
“The Colour of Law, Power and Knowledge: Introducing Critical Race Theory in 
(Post)Apartheid South Africa” (2012) 3 South African Journal on Human Rights 405-436. 
9
 For a discussion of the development and application of the GRACE model to certain human 
rights issues, see J Amoah “The World on her Shoulders: The Rights of the Girl-Child in the 
Context of Culture and Identity” (2007) 4 Essex Human Rights Law Review 2, available at 
http://projects.essex.ac.uk/ehrr/V4N2/amoah.pdf (last accessed August 2015). 
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to reify and essentialise10 the experience of the girl child under customary 
law.  In this context, essentialism does not have the negative implication of 
reducing people to the least common denominator in order to form a single 
group whose experiences and realities can be discussed en masse.11  
Rather, by proposing GRACE as the essentialist representative of the girl 
child subject to customary law, the thesis can give voice and features to 
members of a vulnerable and disempowered group which has been 
marginalised and devalued, and has been considered incapable of 
experiencing certain critical realities worth analysing.  The story of GRACE 
represents the story of every girl child who has been subject to discrimination 
and inequality by virtue of her intersecting identity.12 
While this thesis is a story about GRACE, it is also a story for GRACE, 
in that it presents her perceived reality in the effort to enhance her 
experience of equality as meted out by the courts.  Written from an outsider’s 
perspective, the story is able to disentangle itself from the common trappings 
that occur when one writes about one’s self, a subject that is often too close 




 Essentialism refers to a broad, static definition of identity that is applied to all persons 
classified as manifesting or reflecting an identity trait in the same way.  For example, to 
essentialise gender is to assume that all women experience womanhood in the same way, 
and such essentialism does not provide any scope for how age, culture, race, religion, 
marital or family status may create a very different experience of womanhood for each 
woman.  See A K Wing (ed) “Essentialism and Anti-Essentialism: Ain’t I a Woman?” in A K 
Wing Critical Race Feminism: A Reader 2 ed (2003) 7; J Wong “The Anti-Essentialism v 
Essentialism Debate in Feminist Legal Theory: The Debate and Beyond” (1999) 5 William 
and Mary Journal of Women and the Law 273.  See also the following works which critically 
analyse essentialism as it relates to the intersection of race and gender:  A P Harris “Race 
and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (1989-1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 581; A 
Parashar “Essentialism or Pluralism: The Future of Legal Feminism “ (1993) 6 Canadian 
Journal of Women and the Law 328; T Grillo “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools 
to Dismantle the Master's House” (1995) 10 Berkeley Women's Law Journal 16; T E Higgins 
“Anti-Essentialism, Relativism, and Human Rights” (1996) 19 Harvard Women's Law Journal 
89; E Spelman Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (1988). 
11
 But see Chapter Three, part 3(a) for a discussion of the negative context of essentialism. 
12
 Refer to Chapter Three, which introduces GRACE and explains the notion of intersecting 
identities. 
13
 For a discussion of the notion of storytelling in legal analysis, see R Delgado, “Storytelling 
for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative (1999) 87 Michigan Law Review 2411; D 
Farber & S Sherry “Telling Stories out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives” (1992-1993) 
45 Stanford Law Review 807-856.   Storytelling in the context of this thesis is more than 
recounting factual occurrences, but also includes contextualising and analysing the details of 
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Foremost amongst these dangers are questions of legitimacy that 
come with writing about an experience that is not one’s own.  There is also 
the challenge of ensuring that the arbiter of equality (i.e. a member of the 
judiciary) is able to successfully apply the cultural insights necessary to 
understand and convey the reality of the subject.  This application is primarily 
about adopting the relevant cultural tools, and not appropriating them to be 
reconfigured in the framework of another, or trying to adjust the culture of the 
rights claimant to the cultural framework of the arbiter or even the academic 
observer who writes about this process.  All this being said, storytelling is not 
an easy task.  Nevertheless, it is a useful tool to facilitate understanding, and, 
in the present context, storytelling facilitates understanding of GRACE’s 
experience of equality. 
GRACE’S story is not an account of her entire life.  Instead, it is a 
snapshot of a moment of her young existence in a rural community in South 
Africa, where customary law influences many aspects of life.  Although the 
focal point of the story is GRACE’s quest for equality, it is much broader than 
she is.  At its broadest, most general sense, the story is about equality.  
GRACE is just an example of the way in which equality is or is not reflected 
within a particular cultural context.   
As the discussion of equality becomes more specialised and 
contextual, the thesis moves to a consideration of the South African 
Constitution,14 and its provision not only of equality rights generally, but 
specifically of the equal recognition of common and customary law.15  In 
many respects, this is the core issue to be resolved: where equal recognition 
is guaranteed to two normative systems, what happens when these systems 
have different approaches to equality?  Should one take precedence?  And 
which system’s tools and framework of analysis should be employed?   
																																																																																																																																																													
these occurrences.  Storytelling involves truth-telling, truth interpretation and truth 
construction. 
14
 Act 108 of 1996. 
15
 Provision for the equal recognition of the common law and customary law can be 
interpreted from the following sections in the Constitution: section 30, section 31 subsection 
39(2) and subsection 211(3).  See Chapter Four for a fulsome discussion of legal Pluralism 
and the coexistence of the common law and customary law. 
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2. Legal Pluralism and the Context of Identity 
 
Legal pluralism, or the coexistence of multiple normative orders 
involves the common law and the customary law that operate within South 
Africa.  Although pluralism can also include religious laws, this issue is not 
explored here.16  Nor does the thesis distinguish or identify the various 
different customary laws operating within South Africa.17  The exploration of 
the concept of equality for girls subject to customary law is framed not only 
by a pathway that includes certain topics, but also by the landscape of the 
many topics that are excluded.  In this way, the discussion does not purport 
to be exhaustive, but it does seek to carve out a new route along which the 
journey to equality may be more easily traversed. 
Refining the issue even further: to get closer to GRACE’s situational 
reality in a rural South African environment, the thesis focuses primarily on 
customary law18.  Customary law, as considered for the purposes of this 
thesis, has at least two clear branches: “official” and “living” law.  Although 
each purports to reflect the same reality, they are often quite different.  
																																																								
16
 For a broad, contemporary discussion of religious diversity and religious pluralism in South 
Africa with particular reference to Islam, see C Rautenbach “The Modern-Day Impact of 
Cultural and Religious Diversity: ‘Managing Family Justice in Diverse Societies’” (2014) 17 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 520-552; Waheeda Amien “Overcoming the Conflict 
Between the Right to Freedom of Religion and Women’s Rights to Equality: A South African 
Case Study of Muslim Marriages” (2006) 28 Human Rights Quarterly 729-754; and E Moosa, 
“Prospects for Muslim Law in South Africa: A History and Recent Developments” (1996) 3 
Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 130-155; N M Nyaundi “African Traditional 
Religion in Pluralistic Africa: A Case of Relevance, Resilience and Pragmatism” in T W 
Bennett (ed) Traditional Religions in South African Law, (2011) 1-18; L du Plessis, “The 
Constitutional Framework for the Protection of Religious and Related Rights in South Africa” 
in T W Bennett (ed) Traditional Religions in South African Law, (2011) 90-111.   
17
 Section 6(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa provides that the 11 official 
languages are Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, 
English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa and isiZulu.  For more information on language distribution and 
cultural populations throughout the country, see: 
http://www.southafrica.info/about/people/language.htm#.VODxxULE1Ck (accessed February 
2015).  See also, Statistics South Africa, Census 2011, available at: 
http://www.statssa.gov.za/census2011/Products/Census_2011_Census_in_brief.pdf 
(accessed February 2015). 
18
 This focus assumes that the only (primary) system of law relevant to GRACE’s reality is 
customary law.  This may or may not actually be the case – in fact, it greatly depends on the 
particular aspect that one focuses.  Note that for the purposes of the thesis, “customary law” 
is treated as a block of laws, but it is recognised that customary law differs from one cultural 
community to the next. 
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Official customary law is that which has been interpreted and transcribed by 
those living outside of the system in question;19 it is their perception of the 
specific content of certain customary law rules.  It must be emphasised, that 
official customary law is written and applied largely, by people who are not 
members of the communities in which it is practised.  The exception to this 
rule would be where traditional leaders apply certain aspects of official law, 
such as provisions in the Black Administration Act.  Living customary law, by 
contrast, is by its very definition an oral expression of the normative customs 
and traditions currently practised by members of a community.20  It is 
(potentially at least) constantly changing to reflect changing social issues and 
attitudes.  The fact that it is generally unwritten means that it is not rigidified 
by official codes, precedents and texts.   
Chapters Two, Three and Four set the definitional framework of the 
thesis by discussing the concepts of equality, intersectionality and legal 
pluralism, respectively.  These concepts and their particular application to the 
cultural and legal position of the South African girl child living subject to 
customary law are the focus of Chapter Five.  Chapter Six builds upon the 
definitional framework and contemporary application, and offers the 
construction of the GRACE analytical framework as a means to actualise the 
equality entitlement for the girl child.  This is further demonstrated in Chapter 
Seven by application of the GRACE model to customary law cases 
addressed by the Constitutional Court in the past decade.  Chapter Eight 
presents a hypothetical set of facts against which to test the application of 
the GRACE model in both a common and customary law context.  Chapter 
Nine concludes with an emphasis on the importance of culture as a key 




 See T W Bennett, Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 5-8. 
20
 Ibid 13-23.  See also, C Himonga “The Future of Living Customary law in African Legal 
Systems in the Twenty-First Century and Beyond, with Special Reference to South Africa” in 
J Fenrich P Galizzi & T E Higgins (eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2011) 33-50. 
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3. Background to the Application of the GRACE Model 
 
The GRACE model builds upon and expands existing equality rights case 
law involving race and gender.21  Moreover, the model seeks to encompass 
customary law cases within this spectrum of South African equality rights 
analysis.  Using the 2005 decision of the South African Constitutional Court in 
Bhe v Khayelitsha22 as a launching point, this thesis will show how 
application of the GRACE model of analysis could have enhanced the 
Court’s decision on female succession – specifically property inheritance – in 
a customary law context. 
The cases discussed herein involve a challenge to the application of 
the constitutional right to equality in a customary law context, and present an 
opportunity for the judiciary to apply intersectionality theory to effect a fairer 






 This expansion is focussed on four Constitutional Court cases, over the past decade, 
beginning with Bhe v Khayelitsha Magistrate (n 6) and ending with Mayelane v Ngwenyama 
and Another 2013 (4) SA 415, as well as the 1998 High Court case of Mabena v Letsoala. 
1998 (2) SA 1068 (T). 
22
 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (Commissioner for Gender Equality 
as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission 
and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (n 6). 
23
 As indicated earlier, customary law represents culture as an identity facet, as customary 
law and culture are intertwined.  Similarly the identity facet of race is also embedded within 
customary law, as in the South African context, customary law is only applicable to those 
whose racial identity is “Black African”.  The collapsing of race and culture into customary 
law does not alter the significance or applicability of the GRACE model. The crude marker of 
culture throughout Africa is still race, both because of colonial and apartheid traditions and 
because of ease of determination.  In contemporary South Africa race is now an unspoken 
factor in deciding culture.  This raises its own problematic, which is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  
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4. Applying GRACE 
 
Although inspired by the Bhe case and the issue of property inheritance 
under customary law, this thesis involves the hypothetical journey of GRACE, 
a young woman who is impacted by various challenges of life and also 
considers the complications that arise for the judiciary in fashioning a remedy 
for her in the new constitutional era.  GRACE’s journey takes her to 
destinations of succession to property and political office, negotiation of 
marriage contracts and a hypothetical delict of seduction.  Although the 
thesis focuses on these particular customary law issues of analysis, the 
applicable scope of the GRACE analytical tool is potentially boundless. 
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Equality is a foundational value and organizing principle of the new 
democracy.1 
 
The process for reaching an equal society is in reality a complex and difficult 
struggle between those who wish to retain inequality for their own perceived 
benefit and those committed to its eradication.
2
 
It is an empirical fact that human beings are unequal in almost every way.  
They are of different shapes, sizes, sexes, different genetic endowments, and 
different abilities. …  Yet, it is one of the basic tenets of almost all 
contemporary moral and political theories that humans are essentially equal, 
of equal worth, and should have this ideal reflected in the economic, social 






 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 249. 
2
 Justice Z Yacoob “Some Perspectives on the Movement Towards and the Struggle for 
Equality in Our Context” 2001) Acta Juridica 3. 
3
 L P Pojman & R Westmoreland “Introduction: The Nature and Value of Equality” in L P 
Pojman & R Westmoreland (eds) Equality: Selected Readings (1997) 1. 
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This chapter presents a historical review of the concept of equality and in so 
doing, establishes a baseline understanding of the purpose of GRACE’s journey.4  
In reviewing the development of the concept of equality5 in Western legal 
philosophy and jurisprudence,6 this chapter begins with Plato’s conception of 
equality,7 and progresses to the contemporary definitions and analyses being 
employed by South Africa’s Constitutional Court.8   
2. History of Equality 
 




In the course of reviewing the historical development of equality, the argument put 
forward in this thesis maintains that “equality is a contested concept”,10 and 
although this chapter does not seek to resolve the contest, it posits what the 
																																																								
4
 As was discussed in Chapter One, GRACE represents an equality analysis framework that 
considers the intersecting identity aspects of gender, race, age and culture on one’s 
experience of equality. 
5
 For the purposes discussed herein, equality is a descriptive concept, rather than an 
evaluative one.  Equality refers to the result of the comparative assessment of two or more 
entities – be they groups or individuals.  Equality as discussed herein cannot exist in the 
absence of a comparator.  While this chapter discusses the nature and history of the concept 
of equality generally, the thesis overall functions to explore the nature of the entities and 
identities that feature in the comparative equality analysis. As the various conceptions of 
equality are discussed, it is important to bear in mind that, equality is completely dependent 
upon context; if it were not, it would have a clear fixed definition.  But instead, equality is 
defined by the context in which it is assessed. 
6
 The argument will be made that the meaning of substantive equality is culturally contextual 
and hence, a Western framework of equality (as derived from the ancient Greek conception 
of equality) may not be fully applicable to a South African customary law context.  The 
dominance and omnipresence of Western legal philosophy is discussed by J Murungi.  Even 
in the context of traditional and contemporary philosophical ideals and values, these are 
often presented in contradistinction to, or within the Western context as a point of reference.  
See J Murungi An Introduction to African Legal Philosophy (2013) 12.  
7
  Note that Plato’s conception of equality was elaborated upon by Aristotle and has 
conventionally come to be associated with him rather than Plato.  See Aristotle The Politics 
of Aristotle, Book III The Theory of Citizenship and Constitutions, chapter ix The Principles of 
Oligarchy and Democracy, and the Nature of Distributive Justice, 1280 a8-15; and Book III, 
chapter xii, 1282 b18-23.  
8
 The GRACE analytical model proposed in this thesis is intended to be a tool for the courts. 
9
 R Dworkin Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000) 1.  
10
 Ibid 2. 
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substantive content of equality ought to be, if it is to have any value and relevance 
for the South African girl child.11   
The contemporary nature of social interaction demands that discussions of 
equality move from being idealised in mere concept to being realised in life.12 This 
thesis is a journey from the ideal to the actual:  it begins with the idea of equality 
and ends with a prescriptive analytical template for the full enjoyment of equality 
rights for a girl child living subject to South African customary law. A successful 
completion of this journey will hopefully disprove the latter part of MacKinnon’s 
assertion that “equality is valued nearly everywhere but practised almost 
nowhere”.13  The journey ends where it can be seen that the “value” and the 
practice converge. 
In considering the origin and development of equality, it is not assumed 
that the fundamental meaning of equality has changed through the ages.  Instead, 
the historical review is concerned with changes to the relevant comparator,14 as 
well as the arbiter of equality – the one who determines whether or not equality 
has been attained.15  This determination is highly subjective, as each arbiter of 
equality may perceive things differently, and perception will vary depending upon 
context.  Given this connection between perception and the resultant equality, the 
GRACE analytical tool is presented for the benefit of the judiciary in order to 
broaden its vision, and ultimately, the perspective from which equality emerges. 
																																																								
11
 Recall from Chapter One that the primary concern with equality herein is for the purpose 
of securing rights for the girl child in customary law. 
12
 If equality, or the method of analysis thereof is to have any substantive meaning, then it 
must be considered beyond mere theory, to practical terms.  This is after all, the goal of 
equality rights litigation.  Note that Chapter Eight discusses the application of the GRACE 
theoretical framework to a hypothetical situation and its legal pluralism complexities. 
13
 C A MacKinnon Women’s Lives Men’s Laws (2005) 44.  
14
 Equality is a comparative concept between two or more entities.  The idea of equality 
comparators will be further developed in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven, where the GRACE 
model is applied to South African cases. 
15
 Generally, law uses the standard of the “reasonable person” when an arbiter is required in 
the abstract.  The typical reasonable person will not be used here, as it is contended in this 
thesis that the determination of equality (and the fashioning of a remedy to alleviate 
inequality) are context specific, and that this familiarisation with particular contexts may go 
beyond the capabilities of the mythical reasonable person.  The arbiter is also one who 
prescribes a remedy when equality has been denied.  See S v Ngema, 1992 (2) SACR 651 
(D) for a discussion of certain contextual factors to enhance the specificity of the “reasonable 
person under discussion.  
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(a) Conceptions of Equality 
 
The Western concept of equality has been a factor in human relationships since 
antiquity.  Although its precise nature and content have been constantly 
debated16, it is certain that “no value is more thoroughly entrenched in Western 
culture than is the notion of equality”.17 
As Westen states,  
The study of equality begins with Plato and Aristotle, 
…Aristotle, building on the work of Plato said two things 
about equality that have dominated Western thought 
ever since: 
1. Equality in morals means this: things that are alike 
should be treated alike, while things that are unalike 
should be treated unalike in proportion to their 
unalikeness. 
2. Equality and justice are synonymous: to be just is to be 
equal, to be unjust is to be unequal.18 
This ancient Greek conception of equality dominates contemporary Western 
and Western-inspired legal thought.  As Brown explains,  
…any survey of ideas that people have held about equality must begin 
with the Greeks.  Their city-states confronted them with the basic issues 
that still concern us.  The democracy of Athens achieved an equality of 
citizenship that has remained an archetype and an inspiration ever 
since.19   
Brown further notes that originally, 
… this equality obtained only in certain respects and 
within certain limits.  The Greeks distinguished sharply 
between different types of person, and thought it only 
																																																								
16
 Although it may seem strange that despite the pervasiveness and uniformity of Western 
thought that there would be such a contested range of opinions of the meaning of content of 
equality, this contest is due more to the variable nature of equality itself than to any inherent 
failings of Western thought. 
17
 E Chemerinsky “In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen” (1983) 81 Michigan 
Law Review 575.  
18
 P Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537 at 542. 
19
 H P Brown Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality (1988) 15.  
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right and proper to treat them differently.  This inequality 
of treatment they endorsed in the name of justice…20 
In requiring that like be treated alike, the criteria or bases on which likeness 
or unlikeness were determined, were not clear, or moreover, who was charged 
with the responsibility for making this determination was not clear.  This is where 
the problem begins, and it is a confusion that has persisted as the concept of 
equality has developed.  In spite of this confusion, 
[e]quality is one of the oldest and deepest elements in 
liberal thought, and is neither more nor less “natural” or 
“rational” than any other constituent in them.  Like all 
human ends it cannot itself be defended or justified, for it 
is itself that which justifies other acts – means taken 
towards its realisation.21 
 And so it seems that the lack of clarity or precision that arises from the 
absence of clear criteria as to what determines “likeness” came to be developed 
as a feature of equality itself.  This is in part what leads Westen to conclude that 
“equality is an empty concept” – implying that its definition tells us little more than 
its name.  Westen’s contention is that 
…equality is entirely “circular”.  It tells us to treat like 
people alike; but when we ask who “like people” are, we 
are told they are “people who should be treated alike.”  
Equality is an empty vessel with no substantive moral 
content of its own.  Without moral standards, equality 
remains meaningless...22 [footnotes omitted] 
Westen’s critique of equality is applicable to both contemporary and past 
times.  There is nothing in the historical review to suggest that equality had once 
been infused with meaning and substance that did not subsequently exist.  Even 
so, much has been written about the concept of equality, although not specifically 
about its content.  So, it is not as though something has been lost in translation 






 I Berlin “Equality” in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (1955-1956) 326. 
22
 Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (n 18) 547. 
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Westen seems to imply that the “emptiness” of equality inevitably causes 
problems with its application.  In response to this, Chemerinsky comments that, 
“there is nothing inherent in the principle of equality that makes its misuse 
inevitable”.23  But this statement may also be evidence of its emptiness, for how 
can one misuse or misapply something for which no substantive content has been 
given?  Former Canadian Supreme Court Justice, Claire L’Heureux-Dubé, echoes 
the problem of the emptiness when she says, “equality is a term that, standing 
alone, means nothing.  It has no universally recognised, inherent or intrinsic 
content.”24 
Further, Westen’s reference to equality as an “empty vessel” suggests that 
at its simplest level, equality is a comparative concept, drawing meaning and 
substance from the content of the two entities compared.25  But, before the 
comparison can take place, L’Heureux-Dubé cautions that the parameters or 
context within which it occurs must first be established: 
… it is helpful to conceive of equality as a language like every 
other: with rules of grammar and syntax, nuances, exceptions, 
and dialects.  After all, a language is more than a form of 
communication.  It is an embodiment of the norms, attitudes, 
and cultures that are expressed through that language.  
Learning a language and learning a culture go hand in hand.  
…[A]ll of us are already familiar with the basic vocabulary of 
equality.  … This language is new to us, because equality 
analysis does not fit easily into traditional legal discourses and 
concepts.  It is not easy to undertake an analysis of the multiple 
and overlapping manifestations of inequality in our society 
using traditional legal tests and tools.26 
The GRACE model recognises L’Heureux-Dubé’s call for novel or non-




 E Chemerinsky In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen” (n 17) 594. 
24
 C L’Hereux-Dubé “A Conversation About Equality” (2000) 29 Denver Journal of 
International Law and Policy 65 at 74.  See also C L’Heureux-Dubé “Making a Difference: 
The Pursuit of Equality and a Compassionate Justice” (1997) 13 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 335. 
25
 S Jagwanth “What is the Difference? Group Categorisation in Pretoria City Council v 
Walker 1998(2) SA 363 (CC)” (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights 201. 
26
 C L’Hereux-Dubé “A Conversation About Equality” (n 24) 74.    
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 (b) The Form, Substance and Function of Equality  
 
The term equality functions in several ways.  It may be used as a Principle in that 
it serves as a guideline for judging actions and results.  Equality may be a Rule in 
that it implies an obligation to abide by the Principle. It is a Notion or an Idea in the 
sense that it is abstract, but at the same time recognisably relevant.  Equality is 
also an Ideology in the way that it is a broad system of normative thinking about 
the relationship between the idea and practice of life.  Finally, and most 
importantly for the purposes of this thesis, equality is a Construct, in that it is 
something to be developed, redeveloped and varied according to the (social) 
context in which it operates.  All of these terms - Principle, Rule, Notion/Idea, 
Ideology and Construct - are examples of the various forms that equality may 
take.27 To this end, it should be noted that form dictates substance (and often 
function). 
No matter which formation equality takes, it does not operate on its own.  
Equality operates within or in conjunction with other systems or conceptual 
frameworks.  For example, it has traditionally been associated with the idea of 
justice, in the sense that justice is the broader ideology and the application and 
realisation of equality is a means of attaining the end goal of justice.  The full 
realisation of equality is a necessary precursor to the attainment of justice.  “For 
[Aristotle], as for many other theorists, the concept of equality is in some sense 






 See generally Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (n 18).  
28
 W von Leyden Aristotle on Equality and Justice: His Political Argument (1985) 108-109.  
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3. Contemporary Characterisation of Equality 
 
 
Having briefly discussed the general concept and functions of equality, this 
section considers its substance.  As was suggested earlier, discussions of 
equality have usually occurred in terms of two broad perspectives: either 
“equality” means something definitive and substantive for societal interactions, or 
it is too empty and vague to mean anything at all. This thesis begins from the 
perspective that, as it is presently constructed and applied, there is no 
substantively beneficial meaning of equality for the girl child living under 
customary law.  The purpose of further discussion, however, is to construct a 
concept of equality that once applied, will allow for the proper realisation of 
substantive equality rights for such girl child.   
 The crude rule of “treat[ing] likes alike” is essentially formal equality.  It 
maintains that those who are similar should receive similar treatment, and equality 
is thereby attained.  The understanding of equality in this form, however, is based 
on the fallacy that any two or more people can accurately be described as being 
“alike”.  Such a characterisation fails to consider the reality of human individuality, 
and consequently, is an affront to human dignity.29  The “alikeness” which is 
intended to justify equal or like treatment should only be taken to mean that 
people are alike in so far as they share a common “humanity,”30 and that any other 
																																																								
29
 In delivering the Bram Fischer Lecture on 26 May 2000 Laurie Ackermann, [then] Justice 
of the Constitutional Court of South Africa reflected that, “on the highest level, dignity is a 
quality of worth or excellence, and when used in the compound term ‘human dignity,’ it 
suggests all that for Kant is inherent in the human ‘personhood’ of every human being.” 
[footnotes omitted] 
See L W H Ackerman “Equality and the South African Constitution: The Role of Dignity” 60 
(2000) Heidelberg Journal of International Law 541. 
http://www.zaoerv.de/60_2000/60_2000_1_a_537_556.pdf [last accessed May 2015].  
30
 The reference to “humanity” here cannot be discussed in isolation of the notion of dignity.  
The relationship between equality and dignity is discussed as follows: 
For equality is not really about being treated the same, and it is not a mathematical 
equation waiting to be solved.  Rather, it is about equal human dignity, and full 
membership in society.  It is about promoting an equal sense of self-worth. It is about 
treating people with equal concern, equal respect and equal consideration.  
See T Lindberg [quoting L’Heureux-Dubé in “Conversations on Equality”] “Rooms with 
‘Traditional Views’: Justice L’Huereux-Dubé and the Expansion of Interpretive Principles 
Related to Equality in the Context of Indigenous Rights” in E Sheehy (ed) Adding Feminism 
to Law: The Contributions of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé (2004) 375. 
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basis for likeness is a convenient construction.  Equality is however, a 
comparative assessment of groups or individuals with regard to a particular 
aspect at a particular time.31  For example, equality between a male and a female 
worker exists where they are both paid the same amount for each widget they 
produce in an hour.  The two are not treated equally in terms of remuneration if 
the woman is paid 50 cents more per widget than the man.  This example 
demonstrates the difference between numerical and proportional equality.32 
Equality in the mathematical sense involves a precise understanding of 
quantity, where 2+2=4 or 1+1+2=4 or 3+1=4, and it is clear that what appears on 
the left side of the equal sign (=) has the same value as that on the right.  On the 
basis of the three equations above, it appears that equality is about sameness (of 
result).  Thus, no matter what components are used (2+2 or 1+1+2 or 3+1), the 
same result (4) is achieved.  As Gosepath explains, 
Proportional equality in the treatment and distribution of goods 
to persons involves at least the following concepts or variables: 
Two or more persons (P1, P2) and two or more allocations of 
goods to persons (G) and X and Y as the quantity in which 
individuals have the relevant normative equality E.33 
Hence, it is accepted that the amount of goods may differ from one person to 
the next, but the basis for this difference is understood to be contextually 
substantive, based on an appropriate determination of need, rather than an 
arbitrary allocation.  
																																																								
31
 As Westen explains, 
Statements of equality (or inequality) entail comparisons of two things or persons by 
reference to some external criterion that specifies the relevant aspect in which they 
are the same or different.  To say that an apple is “like” or “equal to” an orange means 
that, despite their many differences, they each possess the feature or features that are 
relevant to an external criterion, whether those features be weight, surface area or 
sugar content; to say that they are “unequal” means that they do not share the 
relevant feature, whether it be color, taste, or juice content.  ….  In each case, 
however, the comparison for purposes of equality simply spells out what it means to 
have tested both subjects by the controlling standard of relevance. 
See P Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (n 18) at 553.  
32
 Aristotle Nichomachean Ethics 1130b-1132b.  See S Gosepath "Equality" in The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition) Edward N Zalta (ed) 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/equality/, see section 2.2 Proportional 
Equality.   
33
 Ibid. 
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Westen explains that “equality” itself remains the same; it is the basis 
of comparison that differs.  In this way, the attainment of “[e]quality conceals 
the diverse nature of the normative standards it incorporates by reference, 
and, by masking them, becomes a “bottomless pit of complexities”.34  
Westen’s explanation is not to be taken as contradicting the contention in this 
thesis that equality is variable as opposed to being fixed.  It is the “standard 
of measurement” or the contextualisation of identities that varies.  This 
variance moves along a spectrum of equality, and often, for the sake of 
convenience, is collapsed to mean equality itself.  In any case, it can be said 
that the inclusion of social context into the equality analysis is an attempt to 
work with what Westen refers to as a “bottomless pit of complexities”.  
 The focus on equality in this thesis is not mathematical, but rather, 
centres around the conception of equality in a complex contextual sense.  
For members of the judiciary charged with addressing equality claims, 
equality should not be understood (and applied) strictly in the sense of 
sameness.  In order to attain and maintain true equality for the litigants, in the 
contemporary context of social interaction, equality must be about respect 
and value for individuality. 
Equality in the mathematical sense is devoid of the problems of 
precision and definition that plague it in the abstract philosophical sense.  
The reality is that “equality is such an easily understood concept in 
mathematics that we may not realise it is a bottomless pit of complexities 
anywhere else”.35  Unlike mathematical equality, where numbers speak for 
themselves - in that they are the values that they represent - any discussion 
of equality in the abstract sense must first establish a value for the two 
entities that are being compared.  This difference between abstract and 
mathematical concepts of equality is explained as follows: 
Except with abstract ideas, such as numbers, there is no such thing as 
pure equality….  Two objects are always different in some way or other 
– even two Ping-Pong balls are made up of different pieces of plastic 
																																																								
34
 P Westen “On ‘Confusing Ideas’: Reply” (1982) 91 Yale Law Journal 1165 [footnotes 
omitted].  
35
 Ibid 1153 [footnotes omitted]. 
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and exist in different places.  Two things A and B, if they are equal, are 
equal with respect to some specific property or properties. …  So 
statements of equality must always answer the question: Equal What?36 
 Equality as a substantive concept alters according to who is being 
compared with whom and on what basis.37  Context is not only about who 
one is, but also where one is situated, and who one is, relative to someone 
else.  This notion of relativity could be considered to be the “=” sign, or the 
demarcation point along which equality is determined.  In contextual equality, 
the relationship between the two entities being compared must always be a 
point of equality.  How this point is attained, however, is primarily dependent 
upon the perspective (including considerations of social context) from which 
the two entities are compared.38 
A conception of “equality“ that is not premised upon any true equality 
or sameness, (as we have come to understand it in the mathematical or 
numerical sense,) may be difficult to grasp.  Nonetheless, for the purposes of 
this chapter, what is referred to as social context equality is still essentially 
about balancing both sides of an equation.  In this instance, however, where 
each side is not a pure number (as is the case with a mathematical 
equation), but a human individual with his or her own identity, the “value” 
attached to the individuals may vary with perspective and contextual reality.  
Hence, a remedy must be fashioned to realise the rights of both individuals, 
each according to their own particular needs.  In short, social equality 
demands an interpretation more sensitive to context. 
																																																								
36
 “L P Pojman & R Westmoreland “Introduction: The Nature and Value of Equality” (n 3) 2. 
Note also that:  
In distinction to numerical identity, a judgment of equality presumes a difference 
between the things being compared.  According to this definition, the notion of 
‘complete’ or ‘absolute’ equality is self-contradictory.  Two non-identical objects are 
never completely equal; they are different at least in the spatiotemporal location.  If 
things do not differ they should not be called ‘equal’, but rather, more precisely, 
‘identical’.  
See S Gosepath, “Equality” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 
edition), E N Zalth (ed).  Accessed via http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality. 
37
 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 261. 
38
 See Peter Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (n 18) 553, where he explains the fallacy 
in the statement that an apple is “like” or “equal” to an orange. 
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In addition, whatever the criteria for discerning the individuals to be 
compared, they should be reasonably relevant to the purposes for which they 
are being compared (e.g. access to education, entitlement to inherit property, 
etc.); and once these criteria have been established, then other irrelevant 
identity factors (age, gender, etc.) should not form part of the analysis. But 
note that the identity factors must form part of the analysis that critiques a 
particular equality standard for not taking these contextual identity factors into 
account.  Therefore, one must be clear in explaining when and how context 
becomes relevant.  For instance, is it only relevant to remedy a situation 
where inequality has resulted because of lack of context?  Or should context 
always be relevant from the beginning of any equality analysis?  This would 
mean that context is a necessary component of the equality equation.  Where 
these factors of identity do become part of the analysis, they then become 
the basis for differential treatment and in turn the primary factor(s) to be 
considered in any remedy for the resultant inequality. 
 
  (a) The Nature of Equality  
 
Each of the various functions of the term “equality” reflects a contested 
concept.39  The contest revolves around whether equality is deemed to exist 
at any given time between two or more comparators.  The standard used for 
comparison varies, depending on the nature of the comparators, the purpose 
for which they are being compared, and the perspective of the arbiter. 
																																																								
39
 See http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality (accessed February 2015).    Here, Gosepath 
explains that the contested nature of equality is due to: 
• controversy concerning the precise notion of equality; 
• the relation of justice and equality (the principles of equality); 
• the material requirements and measure of the ideal of equality (equality of 
what?); 
• the extension of equality (equality among whom?); 
• the status of equality within a comprehensive (liberal) theory of justice (the 
value of equality). 
See generally, P Westen Speaking of Equality: An Analysis of the Rhetorical Force of 
‘Equality’ in Moral and Legal Discourse (1990) 61; and C MacKinnon Women’s Lives Men’s 
Laws (n 13) 47, where she explains that it is not the treating likes alike approach that has 
been challenged, but rather the application of such an approach that results in the 
inequitable distribution of resources, not on the basis of need, but arbitrarily on aspects of 
identity such as race or gender. 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






In other words, the meaning and content of equality vary with time and 
place.  As a result, the attainment of equality for a group or individual within a 
particular context does not mean that all aspects of their lives are infused 
with equality; it simply means that with regard to one particular circumstance, 
at a particular time, they may be equal.  Simply put, equality operates in 
snapshots: at one moment in time, the conditions are ideal for an individual to 
enjoy the same position or entitlement as another individual. 
It can also be said that equality is not sustainable, because the conditions 
or social context that characterise equality in one instance may change depending 
on time and place.  This should not be taken to mean that equality is beyond 
definition, but rather, that it is variable.  Variability must also be taken into account 
in another respect: 
[t]he notion of equality has matured significantly since its evocation a 
few thousand years ago. It has changed as we as a society became 
more self-conscious and self-aware, as we became increasingly 
cognisant of the fact that the constituent elements of society often did 
not conform to the white, male-dominated values and power structures 
to which these elements were expected to abide.40 
 
In this sense, not only does the nature of equality change for individuals within 
particular contexts, but the understanding of the concept also changes and 
evolves for society on the whole. 
 Sen suggests that, not much should rest on this “empty” construction of 
“equality”, because it is only an initial stage of the analysis.  The whole process of 
analysis must be completed, and all parts of the equation filled in, before one can 
see that, in view of the whole picture, the concept of equality is anything but 
empty.41  However, Sen also cautions that, “merely demanding equality without 
saying equality of what, cannot be seen as demanding anything specific. … Even 




 C L’Heureux-Dubé “Making a Difference: The Pursuit of Equality and a Compassionate 
Justice” (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 337. 
41
 A Sen Inequality Reexamined (1992) 24.  
42
 Ibid. 
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 (b) Equality: A Right or a Value? 
 
Before the discussion of equality can continue, and certainly before an analytical 
tool for the meting out of equality in a customary law context can be presented, 
we must establish whether we should continue to talk about equality as a right or 
a value.  Equality is a value in the sense that it is the lens through which we – 
paradoxically – embrace and celebrate difference;43 and it is a right in the sense 
that it promotes the collective belief that individuals may seek to have the right to 
equality enforced in their favour.    
This thesis takes the position that the constitutionalisation of equality rights 
is really the codification of an inherent human value that pervades all human 
relationships.44  Because equality is a comparative concept, it follows that any 
analysis concerns a relationship between people.  One cannot for example, 
compare a boy to a table for the purposes of determining a measure of relational 
equality.  But one can compare a boy to a man, and the relational characteristics 
could be anything from age to physical ability to intellect.  But the relevance of 
these characteristics depends on the purpose for which the two individuals are 
being compared.  The comparison is based on some notion of relationship – or 
group similarity.  For instance, the boy and the man who are the subject of the 
comparison may live in the same community; they may even share the same 
bloodline.  The point is that the nature of the relationship or association between 
the two entities under comparison helps in setting the context within which the 
equality analysis occurs. 
																																																								
43
 Yet, even in the context of our differences “humans are essentially equal, of equal worth, 
and should have this ideal reflected in the economic, social and political structures of 
society.” See L P Pojman & R Westmoreland “Introduction: The Nature and Value of 
Equality” (n 3) 1. 
44
 This constitutional codification is a covenant between citizens and government (vertical), 
as well as between citizens themselves (horizontal) to engage with one another in a manner 
that is fair, equitable and without discrimination.  Such tacit agreement reflects a 
commitment to substantive equality – recognising that sometimes it may be necessary to 
treat people slightly differently from one another in order to arrive at equality of result. See C 
L’Heureux-Dubé “Making a Difference: The Pursuit of Equality and a Compassionate 
Justice” (1997) 13 South African Journal on Human Rights 338-341 for a discussion of 
substantive equality. 
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The argument in favour of equality rights for the girl child in the context of 
customary law contends that full realisation of the value of equality ought to be 
made available to her. This is not about the creation of a right, for the right is 
inherent, but rather it is about improving access to certain outcomes, such as 
education or inheritance.  Also, it should be noted that equality of access is not 
intended to guarantee a particular result (i.e., acquisition of wealth or social 
status), for this is something that is largely left to the free market of social 
interactions.  Equality of access, or opportunity as advocated for in this thesis, 
does not seek a guarantee of result, but simply the availability of paths that are 
likely to lead to that desired result. 
In discussing the portrayal of equality as a value rather than a right, one 
must also mention the impact of codifying values in the Constitution.  All 
constitutions are in some respect a codification of values.  They represent a social 
contract between the citizens as to the parameters that will govern their 
interactions; the process for mediating disputes that may arise from alleged 
violations of this contract; and the delineation of the government’s role in 
administering a system that provides for realisation of these values as practical 
results.  As Albertyn and Goldblatt state with respect to (the “new”, post-apartheid) 
South Africa, “[e]quality is a foundational value and organising principle of the new 
democracy”.45  So, the value of equality is not simply an abstract concept, but one 
that is vital to the creation of a country with a particular character.  And the 
character of South Africa is not simply of one with lofty ideals for the structuring of 
human relationships, but rather of a country that requires the transformation of 




 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 249. 
46
 Note that Westen cautions against emphasising the nature of equality as a right: 
Rights are diverse; equality is singular. …  Rights are noncomparative in nature, 
having their source and their justification on a person’s individual well-being; equality 
is comparative, deriving its source and its limits from the treatment of others.  Rights 
are concerned with absolute deprivation; equality is concerned with relative 
deprivation.  Rights mean variety, creativity, differentiation; equality means uniformity.  
Rights are individualistic; equality is social. 
See P Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (n 18) 537.  
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The judiciary steps in when individual citizens do not have the wherewithal 
to accomplish this, and the government machinery is too large and unwieldy.  It 
should be clear that it is not the function of the judiciary to create a relationship of 
equality between individuals, for such a relationship is pre-existing in the ideal 
imaginings of human dignity.47  Rather, it is a judge’s function to interpret the 
relationship in such a way that enables the inherent equality to be realised (and if 
necessary, implemented through remedial award or action).  This interpretation 
involves the stripping away of irrelevant considerations, which have clouded or 
obscured the equality that was always present.  In light of this function, this thesis 
seeks to craft a tool to assist the judiciary in securing equality rights for the girl 
child under customary law.   
The stripping away of irrelevant considerations in order to give light to the 
character of equality as a right is necessary for the full realisation of human 
potential. The value of equality assumes that individuals interact within the context 
of society, and the level of interaction (or each person’s ability to participate in the 
interaction) ought not to be constrained by irrelevant considerations.  The principle 
of substantive equality does not require that all individuals participate in society at 
the same level, but simply that the participation of one person is not unfairly 
constrained by another. 
This check on participation is what helps to ensure that the value of 
equality is a practicably realisable right, thus reflecting a society that is able to put 
the theory of equality into practice.  Is this not after all why the value was 
constitutionally entrenched?  Again, it is necessary to refer to Albertyn and 
Goldblatt, who explain that 
Equality as a value and as a right is central to the task of 
transformation. …  As a value, equality gives substance to the 
vision of the Constitution.  As a right, it provides the 
																																																																																																																																																													
This is not a statement against the validity of rights, but rather a caution as to how and when 
to exert them. An assertion of a right is often asserted as a remedy for a denial of treatment 
of a particular entitlement.  In heeding Westen’s caution, the emphasis ought to be on 
applying an analytical tool that is reflective of the values espoused within South African 
society – and equality would be foremost amongst these, given its placement in the 
Constitution. 
47
 This pre-existence is rooted in universal societal values about the promotion and 
protection of the equality and dignity of citizens. 
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mechanism for achieving substantive equality, legally entitling 
groups and persons to claim the promise of the fundamental 
value and providing the means to achieve this.48 [emphasis 
added] 
 In essence then, the success of a transformative new democracy depends 
on the extent to which it is able to turn the value of equality into a tangible right.  In 
the course of this transformation, “equality…has to address the actual conditions 
of human life and not an abstract concept of identical treatment which is equally 
applicable to all, whether black or white, man or woman.”49  As Albertyn and 
Goldblatt state, “the fact that there is a relationship between value and right – the 
value is used to interpret and apply the right – means that the right is infused with 
the substantive content of the value.”50  Thus, on one level it is impossible to 
extract equality, the value, from equality, the right.  What is more, the 
entrenchment of the equality right in a national constitution suggests that the 
interpretation and application of that right is to be in accordance with the nation’s 
values. 
  
(c) Equality: Difference and Sameness – Meaningful in Absence 
 
Equality is only a subject for consideration when it is not present, or when it has 
been denied.  Denial is often due to the meting out of equality on the basis of 
irrelevant considerations.  Such a practice flies in the face of a theory that deems 
the essential similarity of persons to be of central concern, while at the same time 
acknowledging that exact sameness is neither possible nor desirable.  On the 
basis of this premise, substantive equality is really about an acceptance of 
difference.  Thus implicit in the value of equality is a potential celebration of 




 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 249. 
49
 Ibid 252. 
50
 Ibid 249.  
51
 Jagwanth explains that in the course of carrying out this interpretive exercise, “equality as 
a value may be used by courts even where the right is not invoked, allowing substantive 
equality principles to form the lens through which application of the law takes place.”  See S 
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In summary, one cannot speak about equality unless: one 
acknowledges and accepts difference and also appreciates that disregarding 
irrelevant considerations of difference is vital to the attainment of equality.  
The key then is how to determine when a particular aspect of difference is 
relevant.  Not all issues are relevant at the same time, or in the same way.  
The reference to “issues” here means aspects of identity – that which makes 
person “A” recognisably distinct from person “B”.  It is the improper 
consideration of aspects of identity that results in discrimination, and 
consequently inequality. 
 
 (d)  Equality and the Value of Difference 
 
The attainment of equality is premised upon a restructuring of the way in 
which difference is perceived – or an identification as to which aspect of 
difference is relevant in a particular context.  In this way it is seen that 
“disadvantage and difference become key characteristics of equality.  
Moreover, difference is understood as created rather than given.”52 Here 
Albertyn and Goldblatt explain that notions of difference (which essentially 
lead to inequality) are constructed, or interpreted rather than inherent.  And if 
that is the case, then a method of construction or interpretation that 
disregards contextually irrelevant differences can go a long way towards 
protecting equality.  Furthermore, they state that 
[D]ifference does not inhere in the individual or group but 
in the relationship between individuals and/or groups.  It 
is not the characteristics of the individual or the group 
that are the concern, but the social arrangements that 
make these matter.53 
 
Hence in the ever-evolving quest to protect and promote equality, we must be 
ever mindful of our interpretation of constructed relationships. 
																																																																																																																																																													
Jagwanth “Expanding Equality” in Advancing Women’s Rights: The First Decade of 
Democracy C Murray & M O’Sullivan (eds) (2005) 131.  
52
 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 253. 
53
 Ibid. 
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Bearing in mind the importance of relationships and relatedness in the 
broader scheme of equality analysis, it follows that “the terms ‘equal’ and 
‘equally’ signify a qualitative relationship.  ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies 
correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or 
circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not all 
respects.”54 Recognising this then, it follows that  
‘equality’ needs to be distinguished from ‘identity’ – this concept 
signifying that one and the same object corresponds to itself in all its 
features: an object that can be referred to through various individual 
terms, proper names, or descriptions.  For the same reason, it needs to 
be distinguished from ‘similarity’ – the concept of merely approximate 
correspondence.55  
 
Gosepath’s point here is essentially that inherent within equality are 
differences – recognising that the purpose of the equality analysis is not to 
compare identical entities.  However, the key to the equality analysis is being 
able to discern irrelevant differences and properly assess the impact that 
relevant considerations may have on the result of equality.  Equality is not 
about alleviating or denying differences, but rather about how best to factor in 
the differences in identity that may render the attainment of equality 
problematic. 
 
(e) The Universal Assumption of Equality 
 
This account of the origins of equality is founded on three assumptions.  
First, for the sake of convenience, it is assumed that the way in which the 
notion of equality is thought to have originated and developed in Western 
thinking is also an accurate reflection of how equality developed in non-
Western societies.56  The rationale behind this assumption is that equality is 




 S Gosepath "Equality" (n 32) 1.   
55
 Ibid.    
56
 See J Murungi An Introduction to African Legal Philosophy (n 6) 1-28. 
57
 Consider the comment of Isaiah Berlin that, 
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The second assumption flows from the first:  given the innate nature of 
equality, it could not have developed any another way.  The contemporary 
concern with the equality rights discourse is the effort to correct any 
deviations from the natural path of equality of result. 
The third assumption is that, although there is certainly a general 
ideological consensus on the existence and content of equality within 
different societies, this meaning varies with society and context.  Although 
the shell of equality remains the same – it stands as a basis of comparison of 
two entities – the desired end result is that superficial variations between 
these entities should not render them substantially different, or legally 
unequal.  The third assumption, which is a recurring theme throughout the 
thesis, is almost in direct contradiction to the first two.   
Hence, the cloak of equality is the same, but the precise content, 
application and momentary relevance of it must by necessity be determined by 
each society and each generation for itself.  In essence, it is not appropriate to 
take a Western notion of equality constructed in the 18th century and apply it to 
contemporary (21st century) non-Western societies.  The result will be a distortion 
of the substantive content of equality and a deep frustration for those who are 
being subjected to a foreign (both in terms of time and place) construction of 
equality, rather than taking on the community-building task of defining it for 
themselves. 
Although this chapter began by seeking to establish common notions of 
equality, it ends by saying that this commonality cannot readily be transposed 
between societies.  To do so is to require sameness, rather than an acceptance of 
difference.  Equality is not about sameness, but about ensuring that the two 
comparative entities are recognised for their difference, and not discriminated or 
disadvantaged in any way because of this. 
																																																																																																																																																													
Equality is one of the oldest and deepest elements in liberal thought, and is neither 
more nor less “natural” or “rational” than any other constituent in them.  Like all human 
ends it cannot itself be defended or justified, for it is itself that which justifies other acts 
– means taken towards its realisation. 
See I Berlin “Equality” (n 21) 326. 
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 (f) Contextualisation and Equality 
 
Equality is infused with meaning only when it is considered in context.  This thesis 
takes the position that the understanding of equality in one cultural context (one 
that is notionally subject to the common law) cannot be applied to another 
(notionally subject to customary law).  Or, put another way, the standards used for 
determining equality in one context cannot be used in another because the 
comparators are too different.  Not only are the indicators of equality different in 
each system, but also, the contextual content of equality is and must be different. 
Consequently, there is no universal standard of equality (as much as there 
may be universal regard for the principle of equality).  Certainly, there are 
consistent hallmarks as to what constitutes fair and just treatment, and there are 
similarities in impact such as the lack of dignity and the denial of justice that result 
from inequality; but the particular nuances of equality will vary and shift with 
culture, time and location.  To suppose that there is a universal form and content 
of equality is to be limited only to formal equality – and a superficial formal 
equality at that, as the concern will be only with surface appearances. 
Considerations of equality imply that there are gatekeepers of equality – 
those who are responsible for meting it out, as well as those who are charged with 
adjudicating or determining the presence and extent of equality.  This 
understanding assumes that equality is something to be created, interpreted, and 
assessed.  If this is the case, then it lends even more support to the argument that 
equality differs from one social context to the next, because it will be generally 
created and evaluated by particular members of a given society according to the 
parameters of that society.58  Young suggests that, 
[c]ritical theorists argue that the law must see human beings as 
rooted in their social context of concrete inequality and 
disadvantage.  The law should recognise the unequal life chances 
occasioned by race, gender, socio-economic status and a host of 
																																																								
58
 It is interesting that in South Africa that historically, “gate keepers” have predominantly 
been white middle class judges who are charged with fashioning equality rights remedies for 
Black South Africans within a context in which the judges have no familiarity.  The GRACE 
considerations are intended to be a tool for the judiciary to use to mitigate this contextual 
gap. 
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other factors, which affect a person’s ability to compete on an 
equal footing.59 [footnotes omitted] 
The challenge for South Africa is to realise that equality – as provided for in 
the Constitution – has different meanings and contexts when cases involve 
application of the common or customary law.  Because these systems reflect 
different cultures and values, there will be variation in the signifiers that each 
attaches to the notion of equality.  As Margot Young explains, in South Africa,  
[t]he historical consciousness of the Constitution as an instrument 
committed to social reconstruction, and the substantive equality vision 
that is part of reconstruction, are essential elements in this project of 
social transformation.  The challenge of such transformation lies in the 
eradication of systemic forms of domination and material 
disadvantage.  Equality, as both a value and a right in the Constitution, 
is central to the project of transformation and social reconstruction.  
This understanding of the role of the Constitution points to an equality 
jurisprudence that requires sensitivity to social context, to the “intricate 
and compounding nature of disadvantage” [footnotes omitted]60 
 
 Although this comment can be interpreted as attaching the appropriate 
significance to “historical consciousness”, one wonders how to ensure that, in the 
course of preserving it and working towards social transformation, the present 
contextual realities of human interactions are not neglected.  Further, it seems 
that, from Young’s comment, “equality” as it relates to social transformation, and 
as reflected in the Constitution, refers to the relative juxtaposition of each of two 
legal contexts that exist in South Africa (such as customary law and common law).  
Reference to “systemic forms of domination and material disadvantage” suggests 
that there is one context that is more readily associated with privilege, leaving the 






 M Young “Travels with Justice L’Heureux-Dubé: Equality Law Abroad” in E Sheehy (ed) 
Adding Feminism to Law: The Contributions of Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé (2004) 296. 
60
 Ibid 295.  See also C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: 
Difficulties in the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 249-253. 
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(g) Indicators of Inequality 
 
Talk of equality alerts one to the fact that one group or individual wields privilege 
and power in society and the others are disadvantaged and powerless.  The line 
dividing them is constantly being repositioned.  In this regard, consider that 
Eradication of these unequal life chances and conditions requires legal 
sensitivity to the individual in the context of her group, social, and 
economic circumstances. This sensitivity necessitates an equality 
analysis that focuses on “difference and disadvantage” that is based on 
a contextual analysis of the situation.61 [footnotes omitted] 
 
However, the factors of “race, gender, socio-economic status”62  determine the 
dividing line.  But beyond the suggestion of materiality, or economics, there is a 
sense of equality which goes further to focus on that counterpart  – dignity – which 
is not about things or status, but is about the self.63 
In any case, the line is there, and as impermanent as it may be, it clearly 
demarcates two separate camps: those who seek and those who bestow.  It is 
contended here that the whole focus of equality rights activism is to unify these 
two camps.  As Lindberg explains, 
Part of the difficulty is in acknowledging that there is an 
absolute difference between awarding someone rights of 
equality and having equality awarded to you.  There are 
different sites – those of empowered and disempowered, of 
namer and named, those who see that you are unequal and 
those who are deemed unequal.64 
 
In many ways, this “absolute difference” boils down to little else apart from 
which side of the line one falls.  In other respects, however, this line in the sand 
signifies a whole litany of truisms about the relationship between the groups of 
people on either side of it.  This signifying65 (or perhaps the understanding of the 
																																																								
61




 Ibid.  Arguably, dignity can be said to blur the line rather than define it clearly. 
64
 T Lindberg “Rooms with ‘Traditional Views’: Justice L’Huereux-Dubé and the Expansion of 
Interpretive Principles Related to Equality in the Context of Indigenous Rights” (n 30) 371. 
65
 For an explanation of the contextual use of the term “signifying”, see Henry Louis Gates Jr 
The Signifying Monkey: A Theory of African-American Literary Criticism (1988).  
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signifiers) is what stimulates efforts to combat inequality.  Lindberg stresses the 
importance of being able 
… to understand that the ability to name inequality and to 
adjudicate and assess the situations from which inequality results, 
without visiting or understanding the sites of the resultant 
oppression, prejudice and “isms” is an incomplete journey.66  
She continues to suggest that if the ultimate goal for citizens is to “identify unfair 
situations and have them resolved according to the standards of [their] community, 
then equality is just not accessible – it is achievable.”67 In speaking from the 
perspective of an Aboriginal woman about the experiences of her community with 
European settlers in Canada, Lindberg also describes the obstacles to be overcome 
in the establishment of a customary law notion of equality.   
Lindberg’s proposition is not really about a new or unique construction of 
equality, but about the struggle to have the assessment of equality in an indigenous 
law context made by those who are themselves products of that context.  There is 
no way that a (Western) common law framework of equality can be applied to a 
customary law context in the hope of arriving at an objective and balanced 
determination of the existence of equality.  Instead, for equality to have any 
meaning, it must be judged on the contextual merits of the cultural context in which 




 T Lindberg “Rooms with ‘Traditional Views’: Justice L’Huereux-Dubé and the Expansion of 
Interpretive Principles Related to Equality in the Context of Indigenous Rights” (n 30) 369. 
67
 Ibid. 
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4. Equality for the African Girl Child – The Importance of Context 
and Identity 
 
For the purposes of this thesis, we need to consider whether equality is best 
treated as a means or an end result, or perhaps even both.  In order to arrive at a 
generally understandable and applicable concept of equality, the importance of 
identity and context must be recognised.   
A comprehensive treatise on the concept of equality as it has been 
interpreted and applied throughout the ages is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
Even so, this chapter demonstrates that the notion of equality that will be applied 
to the rights of the African girl child is not a novel conception, but rather a 
clarification of the importance of multiple and diverse aspects of identity to 
realising substantive equality.   
The present concern with equality involves the South African girl child, and 
so we begin with the girl child herself, as the subject of the discussion of 
equality.68  By endowing the primary comparator in the equality equation with 
certain specific aspects of identity, the notion of social context is brought into the 
analysis from the very beginning.  Further, this means that the attainment of 
equality is contingent upon identity (or at least the package of identity rather than 
one aspect of identity), and it is seen that  
[w]hen the source of inequality is located in the individual …, there is a 
ready rationale for social inequality and limiting social entitlement.  … 
Because entitlement to social and economic benefits and the level of 
benefit is argued to be based on social conformity, the adjustment of 
the individual to the existing social system and paternalism 




 This section is based largely on readings from MacKinnon and Sen, which focus on the 
existence of inequality that persists along racial and gender lines.  The argument being 
made is to unpack traditional identity categories of race, sex (and age) and argue for a new 
interpretation of identity that results in equality rather than the conventional default of 
inequality.  See C A MacKinnon Women’s Lives Men’s Laws (n 13); and A Sen Inequality 
Reexamined (n 41). 
69
 M H Rioux “Towards a Concept of Equality of Well-being: Overcoming the Social and 
Legal Construction of Inequality” (1994) 7 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 131.  
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Here, Rioux takes issue with a distribution of equality that is based on 
identity.  Although this thesis contends that a contemporary equality analysis 
must factor identity into the equation, this inclusion of identity is ameliorative, 
and is intended to rectify a situation of inequality that resulted from failing to 
consider an individual’s identity more fully.  Rioux’s complaint, it seems, is 
rooted in situations where there is no rational connection between identity 
and the granting or denial of equality.  The remedy requires a conscious link 
to be made between identity and equality. 
Albertyn and Goldblatt acknowledge this relationship as they explain 
that, “systemic patterns of disadvantage are group based, meaning that their 
eradication requires an examination of the individual in the context of her 
group and social and economic conditions”.70  More than that is needed, 
however:  the elimination of the individual in the first instance will deconstruct 
the nature of her disadvantage, and the correlation of this disadvantage to 
the various aspects of her identity.  Albertyn and Goldblatt reflect the 
argument historically posed by critical race theorists, namely, that in the effort 
to analyse identity and disadvantage,  
we need to understand that complex forms of disadvantage based on, 
for example, race, gender and geographic location, form distinct 
categories of disadvantage which cannot be reduced to the sum of their 
parts.  The intersectional nature of disadvantage (based on more than 
one ground) is therefore complex, creating different and multiple forms 
of inequality which cannot be explained or understood simply by 
reference to one of the grounds, such as gender.71 
Particularly in the context of apartheid South Africa, where identity 
was relevant not only for appreciating the individual, but also for being able to 
categorise the individual within a group, access to equality was essentially 
based on racial group membership.  In a contemporary equality analysis 
relating to the girl child living in a customary law community72, the argument 
																																																								
70
 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 252.  
71
 Ibid 253. 
72
 A customary law community is one in which customary law is adhered to for personal, 
domestic issues.  The content of such law is defined by the community members themselves 
and is subject to change and development, in keeping with evolving social values. 
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is that the attainment of equality ought not to be circumscribed by the child’s 
overlapping membership in certain sex and age groups.  (Note that these 
groups are on their own generally “marginalised” groups, and so membership 
in one or more of them places the individual in a position of heightened 
marginality.)  Again on this point, reference is made to Albertyn and Goldblatt 
who explain that, 
…differences are only problematic where they perpetuate the 
subordination of disadvantaged groups, such as women or black 
people.  The evil is not located in difference, but rather, in any negative 
impact resulting from this differentiation.  The concern is not to 
eradicate differentiation, but to make the effects of this differentiation 
‘costless’.73 [footnotes omitted] 
Ideally, attainment of equality is not dependent on the eradication of 
difference (so as to create a society of similar or like individuals who would 
then be treated equally because of their sameness), but rather, the proposed 
construction of equality is one that renders certain differences irrelevant for 
the purposes of attaining equality. 
As noted earlier, what is required is a simple acknowledgement of the 
(intersecting) identities of a rights claimant, and the social context within 
which these identities operate.74  In the case of the South African girl child, 
this requires acknowledging that perspectives on her race, gender and 
culture have traditionally operated to place her in a position of inequality vis-
à-vis those who did not share her identities.  Similarly, these identities must 
be considered in a contemporary construction of the way in which they were 
interpreted to the child’s disadvantage, so as to avoid any one judicial result 
that would flow from a lack of consideration (as opposed to a negative 
consideration) of the intersecting identities. 
Context is a key component in any effective analytical construction of 
equality. Just as attention to context was key in developing an understanding 
																																																								
73
 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt, “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 252. 
74
 M Young “Travels with Justice L’Heureux-Dubé: Equality Law Abroad” (n 59) 296.    
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of the way in which inequality is manifested, context is similarly relevant to 
the application of any solution or remedy to address the inequality.   
Inequality does not happen in a vacuum.  Rather it is a reflection of a 
whole system of structures that collude to establish and perpetuate inequality 
on the basis of the way in which certain identities are perceived.  Hence, in 
order for the application of an equality analysis to have any substantive 




Women had no voice in contesting Aristotle’s formulation in his day and have 
had little institutional power in shaping its legal applications since.
76 
This chapter advocates for a comprehensive understanding of equality to be 
constructed, into which issues of identity and social context must be factored.  
This construction must strive towards substantive equality in keeping with “the 
Constitutional Court’s commitment to a transformative project and to the creation 
of an indigenous jurisprudence of transformation.”77 
 In promoting a substantive equality analysis, it is recognised that,  
contextual analysis is at the centre of substantive equality, shifting the 
legal enquiry from an abstract comparison of “similarly situated” 
individuals to an exploration of the actual impact of an alleged rights 
violation within the existing socio-economic circumstances.  It also 
requires an examination of the individual within, and outside of, 
different social groups.78 
																																																								
75
 According to Albertyn and Goldblatt,  
transformation require[s] a complete reconstruction of the state and society, including 
a redistribution of power and resources along egalitarian lines.  The challenge of 
achieving equality within this transformation project involves the eradication of 
systemic forms of domination and material disadvantage based on race, gender, class 
and other grounds of inequality.
75
 
See C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 249.  
76
 C A MacKinnon Women’s Lives Men’s Laws (n 13) 51. 
77
 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 250.   
78
 Ibid 260-1.  
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South Africa is in the process of developing transformative equality jurisprudence, 
where an appropriate contextual analysis must involve the following: 
1) an examination of the socio-economic conditions of the individuals and 
groups concerned; 
2) identification of the impact of the impugned law on social patterns and 
systemic forms of disadvantage; 
3) the complex and compound nature of group disadvantage and privilege 
must be understood by looking at grounds of discrimination in an 
intersectional manner; 
4) the historical context of the case must be fully appreciated and explored.79 
These four criteria of an equality analysis must be considered alongside the 
necessity of attaining equality.  According to Chemerinsky, the necessity of 
equality is explained by the following three purposes:  
(1) Equality is morally necessary because it compels us to care 
about how people are treated in relation to one another.   
(2) Equality is analytically necessary because it creates a 
presumption that people should be treated alike and puts the 
burden of proof on those who wish to discriminate.   
(3) Finally, the principle of equality is rhetorically necessary 
because it is a powerful symbol that helps to persuade people 
to safeguard rights that otherwise would go unprotected.80 
The GRACE analytical model proposed in this thesis meets these three 
necessities.  It contends that application of a robust intersectionality analysis 
within the context of an equality analysis to secure rights and enhanced 
social positioning of the South African girl child will facilitate the achievement 
of substantive equality.  
It is important to stress that “equality” is not the definitive answer, but 
rather, is a consideration that characterises any analysis that is aimed at securing 
and maintaining justice.  Despite its laudable attraction as a goal, we must be 
ever-mindful of the “empty idea” of equality cautioned by Westen.  Consider that, 
[a]s a source of entitlements, equality cannot produce substantive 
results unattainable under other forms of analysis, because, …, 
equality has no substantive content of its own.  As a form of 
analysis, equality confuses far more than it clarifies, for at least 
																																																								
79
 Ibid 261. 
80
 E Chemerinsky “In Defense of Equality: A Reply to Professor Westen” (n 17) 576.  
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four reasons: (1) by masquerading as an independent norm, 
equality conceals the real nature of the substantive rights it 
incorporates by reference; (2) by framing a person’s entitlements 
in terms of his equivalence to others, equality misleadingly 
suggests that one person’s rights vis-à-vis another’s are identical 
in all contexts; (3) by encouraging use of monolithic levels of 
judicial scrutiny undifferentiated by the importance of the 
underlying right, equality erroneously suggests that all questions 
of equality are to be scrutinised under a single (or sometimes, a 
two-tier) standard of justification; and (4) by emphasising that 
some issues of equality entail dual remedies, equality erroneously 
implies that it entails uniquely flexible remedies.81 
Hence, the challenge and the objective in developing a tool to secure 
equality rights for the South African girl child is to ensure that the comparison 
of relevant (identity) considerations in the equality analysis does not bring the 
principled value of the notion of equality itself into disrepute. 
As the general conception of equality is made relevant to the 
contextual realities of the South African girl child living subject to customary 
law, it is interesting to note the connection between the non-static nature of 
equality and living customary law.82  Both govern the relations between 
individuals in society, and both are understood to change and evolve with 
society.  It must also be clear that the pace of this evolution is anything but 
slow.  Especially in the “new” South Africa, which is in the throws of 
transformation, change has become part of the characteristic make-up of the 
nation, and so it is to be expected that the changing nature of equality will 
also be rapid.  The question then becomes when an expected point where a 
certain fundamental level of equality has been attained, such that the pace of 
change in what equality means will slow down, is this when the pace of 
transformation will correspondingly also slow down?  
This chapter on equality has sought to lay the groundwork for the 
argument that true, substantive equality must focus on the intersecting 
																																																								
81
 P Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (n 18) 579-80.  
82
 Himonga defines living customary law as “the unwritten practices observed and invested 
with binding authority, by the people whose customary law is under consideration.”  See C 
Himonga “The Future of Living Customary Law in African Legal Systems in the Twenty-First 
Century and Beyond with Special Reference to South Africa” in J Fenrich P Galizzi & T E 
Higgins (eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2011) 35. 
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identity of the rights claimant.  An equality analysis that does not factor 
intersectionality into account cannot result in true substantive equality 
because such an incomplete analysis has improperly characterised the 
entities that are to be compared in the analysis.  Further, the social context in 
which the individuals – who are the subject of the equality comparison – live 
is also a key aspect of the analysis.  As will be explored further in chapters 
three and five, context is what provides depth and substance to the particular 
aspects of identity that are relevant in each analysis.  Context also provides 
insight into what certain other identity aspects may be irrelevant.  The context 
serves as the background against which the various aspects of identity that 
factor into the analysis interact.  The interaction, or intersections of identities, 
will be explored in Chapter Three. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
The last decade of the twentieth century saw a proliferation of American legal 
academic writing in the genre of Critical Race Theory (CRT).  These writings 
focused on the intersection of race and sex, and the nature of the 
discrimination that is rooted in the intersection of these two aspects of 
identity.1  Certainly discrimination on the basis of either sex or race was not 
unique to that decade, but in the early 1990s the time was ripe to develop an 
analytical method for identifying and addressing concurrent discrimination 
along these two axes.  This method was known as intersectionality,2 the 
basic premise of which is that the world is experienced at the point where 
																																																								
1
 K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color” (1990-1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241”; K Crenshaw “Demarginalizing 
the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, 
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139; P M 
Caldwell “A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender” (1991) 40 
Duke Law Journal 365; T Grillo “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle 
the Master’s House” (1995) 10 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 16. 
2
 K Crenshaw popularised use the term intersectionality in Critical Race Theory.  See 
Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of 
Color” (n 1), and Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (n 
1). 
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aspects of identity meet or intersect.3  Intersectionality was initially, and is 
still, most commonly used to explain the fact that race and sex collectively 
impact upon one’s experience of the world, as well as the way one is 
perceived in the world.  In the three decades since the concept of 
intersectionality was proposed, critical writing examining identity and 
discrimination has done so within the framework of intersectionality.   
This thesis, concerned as it is with equality rights for the African girl 
child, seeks to apply intersectionality as an analytical framework.  The very 
subject of this equality inquiry is the embodiment of robust intersecting 
identities.  GRACE is at one and the same time, African, which brings race 
and culture into the equation4, female (specifically gendered as a girl, or 
culturally located as an African girl5), and her status as a child indicates that 
she is below the age of 18.6  
Having broadly explored the notion of equality in Chapter Two, 




 Ideally, this meeting point is an intersection, a crossing, with one avenue/axis running 
through another; and it is unnecessary and impossible to determine which of the two 
avenues is the primary one. 
4
 Within the context of South Africa, “African” is synonymous with the Back African majority 
population whose historical economic marginalisation by the white population during the 
Apartheid era has created a chasm of inequality and injustice that even now, two decades 
after the end of apartheid and the election of Nelson Mandela ushered in a constitutional era 
of democratic, non-racial, non-sexist South Africa, efforts are still under way to bridge this 
chasm and deliver on the promise of substantive equality for all citizens of South Africa. 
5
 This emphasis on cultural location suggests that the African girl child is different from the 
Asian, American, or European girl child.  This chapter seeks to demonstrate that this 
difference is a fundamental aspect of identity.  It is an aspect that influences who one is as 
well as how one is situated in relation to others.  Consider that culture is the arbiter of 
difference – both intra- and inter- cultural difference. 
6
 Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) defines a child as every human 
under the age of 18, unless the laws of a particular country set the age of majority lower.  GA 
Res 44/25, adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force on 2 November 1990.  For the 
purposes of a broader GRACE equality analysis, age is not necessarily the key 
determinative identity aspect.  It is relevant however, to generally understand how age in 
conjunction with other aspects of identity may function to heighten one’s relative degree of 
power or marginalisation.  Chapter Eight discusses the application of the GRACE analysis to 
a hypothetical situation involving a young woman who is over 18, yet her relative youth is still 
a factor of consideration in terms of her agency to litigate equality in her own right. 
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2. Overview & History of Intersectionality 
 
A review of the history of intersectionality indicates that the concept originally 
focussed on African-American women as being located at the intersection of 
race and gender.  Intersectionality is the convergence of two or more identity 
factors.  For the present purposes, these factors are aspects of identity such 
as age, race, gender7, etc.  The point at which they intersect8 is the point that 
locates a certain individual within a certain cultural and situational context at 
a certain point in time.9  In 1989, when Kimberlé Crenshaw first posited 
intersectionality as a method of anti-discrimination analysis10 in the (then) 
nascent field of Critical Race Theory (CRT), the primary concern was with the 
location of African-American women at the intersection of race and sex11.   
Crenshaw’s offering was not the first time that critical analysis focused 
on the heightened vulnerability experienced by racialised12 women, but it was 
the beginning of a method of analysis that shifted them from the margins of 
power (vis-à-vis those who located themselves at the centre) and instead 
																																																								
7
 In the quarter century since the dawn of the CRT movement the equality rights lexicon has 
evolved from its reference to “sex” to the use of “gender” which speaks to the social 
construction of identities beyond mere biological sex.   See: 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-gender/. See also E Spelman Inessential Woman: 
Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought (1998) and K Millett Sexual Politics (1970). 
8
 “Intersect” is a more appropriate term than “converge” because aspects of identity do not 
end at the point of meeting, but continue past the intersection.  A convergence seems to 
suggest a final meeting point. 
9
 See P Westen “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 537 at 553 as 
previously discussed in chapter 2, footnote 30. 
10
 See K Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (n 1) 167. 
11
 Advances in both feminist legal theory and critical race theory have contributed to 
considering the impact of “gender” rather than “sex” on one’s access to equality.  The 
thinking is that sex is simply a biological determination, whereas gender reflects a social 
construction of sex.  This social construction means that gender is also interpreted within a 
cultural and contextual framework. 
12
 The term “racialised” reflects a social construction of race or ethnicity.  The underpinnings 
of this social construction are that those who identify (or are identified) as non-white or not of 
European ethnic origin are marginalised simply because of this racial affiliation and are 
impacted by the institutions and policies of racism as a result. “Racialised” is the term used 
to reflect the process that has created disadvantage based on physical attributes.  This 
process creates categories that become socially significant for the purposes of exercising 
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positioned them at the centre of their individual intersecting identities.  As 
Martha Minow explains, intersectionality 
…refers to the way in which any particular individual stands at the 
crossroads of multiple groups. All women also have a race; all whites 
also have a gender; and the individuals stand in different places as 
gender and racial politics converge and diverge.  Moreover, the 
meanings of gender are inflected and informed by race, and the 
meanings of racial identity are similarly influenced by images of 
gender.13 
In this way, intersectionality acknowledges that a person has several different 
identities, or group memberships at any one time.  The relevance or 
dominance of one identity with respect to another depends on the context. 
 
(a)   Race and Gender: moving beyond the original intersections 
 
This section reviews the intersectionality analysis that began with 
Crenshaw’s work in 1989, and discusses how the initial intersectional 
framework of race and gender can be broadened to require that the 
intersection of race and gender be grounded in a cultural context.  
Additionally, this section considers the notion of the intersectional self, and 
explains the importance of self-identifying and locating one’s self in the 
relevant intersection. 
Critical race theory and critical race feminism14 were developed as a 
means of addressing the discrimination and oppression experienced by those 
																																																								
13 M Minow “Not Only For Myself: Identity, Politics and Law” (1996) 75 Oregon Law Review 
647. 
14
 In explaining the origins of critical race feminism and where it is situated in the broad field 
of critical legal studies, Crooms says that 
Critical race feminism, as a legal theoretical stance, not only has roots in the 
oppositional discourses of Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, and Feminist 
Legal Theory, but also represents an analysis that is, itself, oppositional within these 
discourses.  Its method includes multiple consciousness and a bottom-based focus, 
which illuminates the position of the ignored and disempowered to challenge the 
biases and privileges left unaddressed by Critical Legal Studies, Critical Race Theory, 
and Feminist Legal Theory. 
L A Crooms “Indivisible Rights and Intersectional Identities or “What do Women’s Human 
Rights Have to do with the Race Convention” (1997) 40 Howard Law Journal 620, footnote 
6. 
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whose racial identity – or racial identity along with gender – relegated them to 
the position of “other”.  This position is located at the margin, rather than the 
centre of society’s political, economic and social power.  The very mention of 
margin implies remoteness, a difference that is characterised by distance 
from the centre or norm.  Even where anti-discrimination theory recognised 
the detrimental impact of marginalisation based on the difference of race or 
sex, there was no immediate recognition of the heightened marginalisation 
that affects those whose identity of difference is based on both race and 
sex.15  The simple picture is that “because of their intersectional identity as 
both women and of colour within discourses that are shaped to respond to 
one or the other, women of colour are marginalised within both.”16   
It is not sufficient to say that this dual-basis of identity results in double 
or dual discrimination.  More accurately, the more ways in which one’s 
identity differs from the accepted, constructed norm, (i.e. white, middle-class, 
able-bodied, heterosexual male), the further one is removed from the centre 
and relegated to the margin.  The discrimination is not simply dual or 
additive, but is also compounded by the way the various identity aspects 
operate or intersect.17  This compound or intersecting discrimination reflects a 
depth and complexity to the experience of discrimination that is not fully 
appreciated in the two-dimensional depiction of sex and race discrimination.  
It follows that, if heightened discrimination results from the intersection of 
																																																								
15
 For example, Crenshaw’s criticism of the limited scope of feminist theory is that when it 
“attempts to describe women’s experiences through analyzing patriarchy, sexuality or 
separate spheres ideology, it often overlooks the role of race.”  See K Crenshaw 
“Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (n 1) 154. 
16
 K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color” (n 1) 1244.  In the last two decades since Crenshaw first theorised about 
the identity constructions of “women of colour”, this phrase has been replaced in 
contemporary academic and activist work by the term “racialised women”.  This reflects an 
acknowledgement of the impact of race on identity.  The impact itself may not have 
necessarily changed, but it is clear that “race”, “racialised” and “racialisation” hold more 
theoretical and analytical weight than “colour 
17
 As Crenshaw explains,  
…for Black women, the problem is that they can receive protection only to the extent 
that their experiences are recognizably similar to those whose experiences tend to be 
reflected in antidiscrimination doctrine. 
See K Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (n 1) 152. 
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identity factors, such as race and gender, then similarly, the redress or 
remedy for this discrimination must also reflect the intersection.18 
 As intersectionality rapidly caught on amongst critical race theorists, it 
became clear that the utility of this analytical method was not limited to 
remedying the discrimination that results when individuals are perceived and 
treated as possessing singular rather than intersectional identities.  
Intersectionality would also have a permanent, future role in influencing the 
way in which individuals are perceived, and appreciated as social actors.19  In 
this way, intersectionality is not simply a method of correcting identity, but 
becomes fundamental to identity itself and the understanding thereof.  It is 
this future function of intersectionality that Moran refers to as the challenge of 
intersectionality.  She explains it as 
[a] challenge to take what our oppression has given 
us and use it to create something new that is ours 
alone, to create a critique of what we have become 
																																																								
18
 See K Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist 
Critique of Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (n 1) 166-
167, where she discusses the limitations of both Black liberationist politics and feminist 
theory in failing to consider intersectionality.  Also, at page 167 Crenshaw explains that 
“placing those who are currently marginalised in the centre is the most effective way to resist 
efforts to compartmentalise experiences….” The point here is that experiences occur at the 
intersection of aspects of identity, so any method of assessing those experiences as being 
positive and self-reinforcing rather than discriminatory, must focus on that intersection and 
not merely on the compartments of experience and identity.  Further, even where a particular 
incident of discrimination may be based upon one identity ground, it is the entire person, 
located at the intersection of all aspects of identity that experiences it, and so it is at this 
entirety that redress and remedy, as well as future prevention efforts must be directed.  As 
Crenshaw states: 
Aiming to bring together the different aspects of an otherwise divided sensibility, an 
intersectional analysis argues that racial and sexual subordination are mutually 
reinforcing, that Black women are commonly marginalised by a politics of race alone 
or gender alone, and that a political response to each form of subordination must at 
the same time be a political response to both.  
K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color” (n 1) 1283. 
19
 A special edition of Signs Journal contains several articles to support the contention that 
intersectionality was not just a method to redress discrimination, but also a lens through 
which to analyse social actors.  See S Cho, K Crenshaw & L McCall “Toward a Field of 
Intersectionality Studies: Theory, Applications and Praxis” (2013) 38 Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society at 785-810; C A MacKinnon “Intersectionality as Method: A 
Note” (2013) 38 Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society at 1019-1030.   
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as a result of our oppression and a vision of what we 
can become when we leave behind our bondage.20 
Similarly, Crenshaw defines intersectionality as “a provisional concept 
linking contemporary politics with postmodern theory.”21  Further, she 
describes her vision for the use of the intersectionality analysis as a means to 
“disrupt tendencies to see race and gender as exclusive or separable.”22  
Although the primary intersections that are discussed in Crenshaw’s work, 
and that of her CRT contemporaries, involve race and gender, it is also 
acknowledged that intersectionality “can and should be expanded by 
factoring in issues such as class, sexual orientation, age and colo[u]r.”23 
Crenshaw’s vision here opens two doors.  First, there is a hint of the 
idea of “identity politics”, which she also discusses in “Mapping the 
Margins”.24  Second, although her work focuses on the intersection of race 
and sex in particular, she acknowledges that there are other aspects that are 
fundamental to identity and intersectionality.  This second theme, and the 
expansion of intersectionality into multiple dimensions will be discussed in 
part 3. 
When considering intersectionality and identity politics, it must first be 
understood that the latter deal with the politics of the self: the specific identity 
both of who one is and who one is perceived to be.  Intersectionality 
recognises that there are different aspects of the self that converge at a point 
to form “the self” within a particular context.  When this becomes linked with 
identity politics, then identity politics becomes an aspect of context that 
impacts upon intersecting identities.  Ideally the effect of this impact is to 
oblige society to recognise and accept differences from the social norm. 
																																																								
20
 B I Moran “Keynote Address Delivered for the Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 
Conference on the Future of Intersectionality and Critical Race Feminism” (2000-2001) 11 
Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 699. 
21
 K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence  






 Ibid1241.  
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






The following three subsections explore this notion of identity politics 
and consider cultural and social constructions of the self and the way in 
which this construction of self enables one to locate one’s self within a 
particular intersection. 
 
 (b) Cultural Constructions of Race and Gender 
 
If it is considered that culture is the overarching framework within which 
identity functions, then race and gender, and other relevant aspects of 
identity are each seen to be culturally constructed.25    
Crenshaw refers to “representational intersectionality” simply as the 
“cultural construction of [racialised] women.”26  This interpretation recognises 
that there is a particular way in which racialised women are constructed, or 
perceived within a particular cultural context by those who are located at 
different identity intersections from the racialised women they are 
constructing.27  It was mentioned earlier that an intersectionality analysis is a 
way of addressing the gap that either an antiracist analysis or a feminist 
analysis leaves in fully addressing the intersecting identities of a racialised 
woman.  To this it should be added that a racialised woman is a product of 
the cultural context in which she resides.28    
Consequently, a thorough intersectionality analysis will include 
consideration of the cultural backdrop against which the intersection takes 
place.  This is because the cultural context attaches a value or perspective to 
aspects of identity, such that these come to be sites of difference upon which 
																																																								
25
 A full discussion of culture as the core identity aspect in the intersectionality analysis is 
explored in Chapter Five. 
26
 K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color” (n 1) 1245. 
27
 Note that the relative disempowerment associated with racialisation is what locates 
racialised women in a situation where their identities and access to equality are constructed 
for them – rather than them having the agency to construct their own entitlement in the 
world.  
28
 It is acknowledged that in some instances, this cultural context is similar to the racial 
context, and in other instances, culture and race are merely incidental to one another. 
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discrimination is based.  Once the impact of the cultural context is fully 
appreciated, then it is seen that, 
Black women are the immediate, although not exclusive, physical and 
material representation of the intersection of race and gender.  Progress 
against racism and sexism requires in addition, therefore, not only an 
eradication of negative stereotypes about black womanhood and their 
associated behavioural consequences, but also a recognition that 
theories of legal protection that affect the material circumstances of 
black women are not marginal to theories regarding race or gender, but 
rather are central to both.29 
Caldwell’s reference here to stereotypes reflects subtle recognition of the 
impact of culture on identity.  Stereotype and myth are creations of culture.  
These creations operate to reinforce particular perceptions of identity, both 
by the subject of the stereotype as well as outsiders.  As Caldwell further 
explains, 
[t]hese stereotypes, and the culture of prejudice that sustains them, exist 
to define the social position of black women as subordinate on the basis 
of gender to all men, regardless of colo[u]r, and on the basis of race to 
all other women.  These negative images also are indispensable to the 
maintenance of an interlocking system of oppression based on race and 
gender that operates to the detriment of all women and all blacks.  
Stereotypical notions about white women and black men are not only 
developed by comparing them to white men, but also by setting them 
apart from black women.30 
 
Intersectionality cannot succeed as only a surface approach to 
equality and non-discrimination:  it must penetrate to the very cultural heart of 
society if there is any hope of effecting real, substantial and lasting change. 
Caldwell’s work looks at the importance of hair to cultural identity, and 
by extension, the identity of one’s self.  Culture may be more than just an 
intersecting aspect of identity in the way that race and sex are.  Culture is the 
backdrop against which the intersection occurs, which makes it even more 
difficult, if not impossible, to separate culture from identity.  This relationship 
is particularly important where the African girl child is concerned, an issue 
																																																								
29
 P M Caldwell “A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender” (n 1) 
372. 
30
 Ibid 376. 
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that will be elaborated upon in Chapter Five, where the implied oppositional 
perspective of the individual African girl child vis-à-vis the African community 
is discussed.31 
Much like representational intersectionality, the social construction of 
the categories of race and gender is culturally specific and culturally 
dependent.  This is positive in the sense that one knows where to go to find 
the myth and stereotypes that must be reconstructed in order to promote 
equality.  However, the negative aspect of this construction is that where an 
ideology is culturally created, it is very difficult to alter it without the 
community being suspicious of the motives for (cultural) interference and 
hence being resistant to any change.  Consequently, negative stereotypes 
must be identified as misconstructions, insofar as they are oppositional to a 
general notion of equality and fairness, which should be a pillar in all cultural 
creations.  This identification requires debunking “the assumption that non-
Western women are situated within cultural contexts that require their 
subordination, achieved by a discursive strategy that constructs gender 
subordination as integral to culture.”32 
Volpp makes the point here that within culture, there are constructions 
that value, or devalue individuals on the basis of identity.  All that is required 
is a change to the value system, so that what had been devalued is now 
valued.  This change in the value system is simply proof that “cultures 
undergo constant transformation and reshaping.”33  Furthermore, Volpp 
explains that “[c]ulture is constantly negotiated and is multiple and 
contradictory.  The culture one experiences within a particular community will 
be specific and affected by one’s age, gender, class, race, disability status, 
																																																								
31
 For a fulsome discussion of group versus individual, see Chapter 5, part 3(a) and part 5.  
See also Chapter 9, part 3(b). 
32
 L Volpp “Feminism versus Multiculturalism” (2001) 101 Columbia Law Review 1185. 
33
 Ibid 1192.  This change in value system reflects a change in societal attitudes.  In 
Chapters Six and Eight this change in societal values is discussed in the context of 
community-driven changes to living customary law. 
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and sexual orientation.”34  In this way not only does culture affect identity, but 
aspects of identity also impact on the perception and experience of culture. 
 
 (c) The Social Construction of Race and Gender in a Cultural 
Context 
 
Because race and gender are socially constructed it follows that, the 
intersection of race and gender, or specifically, the way one experiences this 
intersection is also socially constructed.  This intersection of race and gender 
has been so constructed as to relegate one to a diminished position of 
“other”.  As Volpp explains, 
[i]n the sameness/difference debate, the standard that is reified is what 
is male. …  Either what is different to the masculinist standard is 
reimagined as the same, man’s mirror image – or what is different is 
reduced to being man’s other.  One either seeks equal status, 
demanding the same rights as man, or one takes an oppositional 
stance, constructing an alternative discourse.35 
This thesis, through the GRACE model, argues for an “alternative 
discourse” with equal status to the reified male norm.  In so doing, intersecting 
identities are reinterpreted as something positive.  Reinterpretation also 
applies to the impact of culture itself.  Culture is not simply another aspect of 
intersecting identity, but rather, the backdrop, or the plane upon which the 
intersection occurs.  In this way, culture is the broader, shared common 
identity aspect of all members of a community.   
Much of the intersectionality analysis, as applicable to GRACE, will 
depend on whether culture is seen as the backdrop against which the 
intersection occurs, or whether culture is itself simply an axis of the 
intersection.  The answer to this question depends on the context in which 
the analysis takes place, or who or what the comparator is for the purposes 
of assessing equality – remembering that the quest to understand and attain 





 Ibid 1203-4. 
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place.  When the equality comparators both operate in the same cultural 
context, then culture will be the background of the intersection.  But when 
the comparators are situated in different cultural contexts, then culture 
becomes an aspect of the intersection, rather than the field of the 
intersection. 
 In a situation where culture is an aspect of identity, Volpp explains 
that, if this cultural identity is different from the equality comparator – the 
self-appointed “norm” - then the difference in culture is highlighted so that 
the difference precipitates marginalisation.  Consider that, 
[t]hose with power appear to have no culture; those without power are 
culturally endowed.  Western subjects are defined by their abilities to 
make choices, in contrast to Third World subjects, who are defined by 
their group-based determinism.  Because the Western definition of 
what makes one human depends on the notion of agency and the 
ability to make rational choices, to thrust some communities into a 
world where their actions are determined only by culture is deeply 
dehumanising.36 
In this way, culture becomes not only the marker of difference, but 
also the marker of disempowerment.  This powerlessness results in an 
inability to make choices, which often manifests as a basic inability to name 
one’s self for one’s self, because those who are powerless find that they are 
defined on the terms of others:  their marginalised position prevents them 






 Ibid 1192. 
37
 Dignity is itself provided for under the South African Constitution (section 10) and often an 
equality analysis is accompanied by reference to dignity. See S v Makwanyane and Another 
1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), where the right to life was intimately connected with the inherent right 
to dignity; and further, any attempt to dissociate these concepts would be considered a 
violation of equality rights.  See also L Ackermann Human Dignity: Lodestar for Equality in 
South Africa (2012); A Foster “The Role of Dignity in Canadian and South African Gender 
Equality Jurisprudence” (2008) 17 Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies 73-97. 
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(d) Locating the Intersectional Self 
 
The remaining preliminary aspect of intersecting identity examined in this 
chapter is the notion of the intersectional self, meaning, self-identifying and 
locating one’s self within the relevant intersection.  As was discussed above, 
when considering the social construction of intersectionality and the place of 
culture in this intersection, culture can operate as a marker of difference and 
powerlessness, preventing the subject of the intersection from self-identifying 
and locating herself within the intersection of her own identity.  The act of 
constructing one’s identity may result in an individual contributing to her own 
marginalisation, not because she does not value herself and her own identity 
enough to advocate for demarginalisation, but because she is powerless to 
change the identity intersection within which she is located.  The reality is 
that some aspects of identity have been socially constructed to exist only on 
the margins.  This construction is what Carbado and Gulati refer to as 
“identity performance”38 – and it is simply understood as the way in which 
identity operates or performs within a particular cultural context.   
The fact that the “identity performance” relegates the performer to the 
margin should not be interpreted as an inherent failing of the “performer” of 
identity, but rather as a failure of the framework within which identity has 
come to be socially constructed.  As Harris explains, 
Far more for black women than for white women, the 
experience of self is precisely that of being unable to 
disentangle the web of race and gender – of being enmeshed 
always in multiple, often contradictory, discourses of sexuality 
and colo[u]r.  The challenge to black women, has been the 
need to weave the fragments, our many selves, into an 
integral, though always changing and shifting, whole: a self 




 They explain that “the theory of identity performance is that a person’s experiences with 
and vulnerability to discrimination are based not just on a status marker of difference (call 
this a person’s status identity) but also on the choices that person makes about how to 
present her difference (call this a person’s performance identity).”  See D W Carbado & M 
Gulati “The Fifth Black Woman” (2001) 11 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues 701. 
39
 A P Harris “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (1989-1990) 42 Stanford 
Law Review 604. 
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Harris’ point here goes a long way towards strengthening the 
argument for intersectionality in that she describes the subject of 
intersectionality as being at once all of the aspects of her identity, and all of 
these aspects are central to her identity, with none taking precedence over 
the others.  The inability then to separate out aspects of identity is what 
makes the intersectional framework a reasonable way of constructing and 
interpreting identity. 
Harris’ work is nicely juxtaposed with that of Trina Grillo, who cautions 
that, although at any given moment the subject of identity may locate herself 
at an intersection of identity based on certain categories of identity, it should 
not be assumed that these categories will intersect in the same way for each 
subject, or even that each category represents the same cultural experience 
for each subject.  In this way, Grillo seeks to differentiate intersectionality 
from anti-essentialism.  She explains that, 
The basis of intersectionality and anti-essentialism is this: Each of 
us in the world sits at the intersection of many categories: She is 
Latina, woman, short, lesbian, mother, brown-eyed, long-haired, 
quick-witted, short-tempered, worker, stubborn.  At any one moment 
in time and in space, some of these categories are central to her 
being and her ability to act in the world.  Others matter not at all.  
Some categories such as race, gender, class and sexual 
orientation, are important most of the time.  Others are rarely 
important.  When something or someone highlights one of her 
categories and brings it to the fore, she may be a dominant person, 
an oppressor of others.  Other times, even most of the time, she 
may be oppressed herself.  She may take lessons she has learned 
while in a subordinated status and apply them for good or ill when 
her dominant categories are highlighted.  For example, having been 
mistreated as a child, she may be either a carefully respectful or 
abusive parent.40 
The challenge then is to find the balance between naming one’s own 
identity, based on simultaneous membership in certain identity groups 
(intersectionality) and assuming that others who share similar membership 
																																																								
40
 T Grillo “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House” (n 
1) 17, quoting unpublished manuscript: “Koosh Balls: Rendering Privilege Visible and Other 
Subversive Practices”. 
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would locate their experience at precisely the same intersection 
(essentialism).   
Advocacy around anti-essentialism is in many ways advocacy for the 
right to self-identify, and to locate one’s self at a particular intersection.  Even 
where one may share identity groups with another, the location of one’s self 
at the intersection of these identity groups is still very personal.41  
 
3.  Expanding Intersectionality to Multiple Dimensions 
 
…while Professor Crenshaw discusses a woman standing at 
the single intersection of race and gender, in fact we all stand at 




Aspects of identity not only intersect, but also intersect in various dimensions 
and various planes, thus creating a depth to intersectionality.  This 
intersection in multiple dimensions is referred to as multidimensionality (or 
multiplicity).  In describing the expansion of the intersectionality framework 
into multiple dimensions, the argument is made that the focus should not be 
on the intersection of two or more axes on a single plane; rather, 
intersectionality occurs simultaneously on many different levels and planes, 
and is in fact multidimensional, multi-layered and complex. 
The discussion differentiates between multidimensionality 
(intersectionality in multiple dimensions) and essentialism.  Although 
individuals may have multiple intersections in common, one individual cannot 
fully speak for another because no two people share the same 
multidimensional, intersecting identity.  Additionally, multiplicity may also lead 
to multiple systems of oppression.  The broader one’s membership in groups 
																																																								
41
 On this point, Coombs states: “We will understand the categories and their intersections 
better if we recognise that everyone exists at the intersection of categories, but everyone is 
also more than the intersection of categories.” See M Coombs “Review Essay: 
Interrogating Identity” (1996) 11 Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 247.  In this way, people 
may be identified by their location at a particular intersection.  But also, individual identity is 
more than where one is situated in the intersection. 
42
 T Grillo “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House” (n 
1) 18. 
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which are culturally constructed as different or “other”, then the more likely 
one is to experience discrimination at each of these sites of difference, and 
their multiple points of intersection. 
It is suggested that an individual’s intersecting identities function as a 
discrete package that influence the context and circumstances of one’s 
experience of the world.  Depending on where the intersection is situated on 
the global map, different avenues of the intersection may be more relevant 
than others, or the meeting point may be at different axes on the identity 
plane(s).  Reference is not generally made to “the intersection” where one 
is,43 but rather, the reference is to one’s own intersection – as in, “my 
intersection”.  This implies that the manner in which aspects of identity 
intersect, converge and impact is a subjective, personal experience, as 
opposed to an objectively identifiable and locatable position.44 
Although others may be located at various points along the same 
intersecting avenues, the precise intersection – and the way each person 
experiences it – is unique.  Again, this may present problems in terms of 
advocating for a Universalist approach to identity, intersectionality and 
human rights.  But the reality is that, even though the point of intersection is 
unique, the framework for understanding and addressing it can be general 
enough to be applicable to all.   
On the basis of Angela Harris’s claim that “differences are always 
relational rather than inherent”,45 what is particularly important is not only the 
identity of the equality seeker, but also that of the comparator as well as the 
arbiter of equality.  Identity is only relevant when there is something different 
																																																								
43
 Such a reference to “the intersection” implies that there is only one intersection, and a 
multitude of persons congregate at this “corner”. 
44
 For example, an eight-year old Xhosa girl living in the suburban community of Langa is 
located at the intersection of age, gender, race, culture, class and language – and these 
factors collectively and simultaneously will shape her experiences and interactions within 
various strata of South African society (i.e. school, community, ancestral home, etc.). 
45
 A P Harris “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (n 39) 608.  This is similar to 
the notion expressed in Chapter 2 that “equality is a comparative concept”.  Thus 
differences, or the determination of equality are only realised in relation to, or in comparison 
to something else.  This requirement of “relationality” or comparison suggests that equality 
and “difference” are both socially and/or constructed concepts, the determination of which 
depends upon what value is attributed to equality or difference in each particular context. 
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and separate with which to compare it.46  For example, black is a point of 
departure from white; female is a point of departure from male; child is a 
point of departure from adult, etc.  The more one departs from the (self-
appointed or socially constructed) “norm”, the more identity (or the root of ab-
normality) becomes relevant.  But these are only important because the 
arbiter of normalcy is generally the self-appointed (white, male, Western, 
heterosexual, middle-class) centre.  If the theoretical framework moves from 
one universally accepted and recognised centre to an appreciation of 
individuality, then what had previously been points of departure are now 
points of identity – and simply identity – with no inherent value attached.  And 
these various points of departure are seen as mere differences, rather than 
as oppositional differences. 
 
(a) Multiplicity vs. Essentialism  
 
Although multiplicity deals with the various levels of intersecting identity of a 
particular individual, it is also true that there is a commonality of the 
experience of intersectionality and multiplicity.  This commonality should not 
be mistaken to mean that the experience of each individual, as she locates 
herself within various intersections, is the same as other individuals, a notion 
that is known as essentialism.  As Grillo explains, “[e]ssentialism is the notion 
that there is a single woman’s or Black person’s or any other group’s, 
experience that can be described independently from other aspects of the 
person – that there is an ”essence” to that experience.”47  It should be noted 
that this independent ”essence” then means that the experiences of the 
group members render each one indistinguishable one from the next.  Such 
an interpretation is counter-intuitive to the recognition of individual identity 




 L P Pojman & R Westmoreland “Introduction: The Nature and Value of Equality” in L P 
Pojman & R Westmoreland (eds) Equality: Selected Readings (1997) 1. 
47
 T Grillo “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the Master’s House” (n 
1)19. 
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In her work critiquing the essentialism of race, as addressed in 
feminist legal theory, Angela Harris comments that 
The source of gender and racial essentialism (and all other essentialism, 
for the list of categories could be infinitely multiplied) is the second 
voice, the voice that claims to speak for all.  The result of essentialism is 
to reduce the lives of people who experience multiple forms of 
oppression to addition problems: “racism + sexism = straight black 
women’s experience” or “racism + sexism + homophobia = black lesbian 
experience.”  Thus, in an essentialist world, black women’s experience 
will always be forcibly fragmented before being subjected to analysis as 
those who are “only interested in race” and those who are “only 
interested in gender” take their separate slices of our lives.48  
 
Further, Harris argues that not only does essentialism function to 
fragment the experiences and identity of racialised women, but the harm in 
essentialism is that in emphasising the commonality of experiences of group 
members, it also ignores the experiences of some members, in that the 
particular is sacrificed for the general.  As is often the case with power 
dynamics, the particular is sacrificed for the general identity of racialised 
women.  Consequently, to de-race (or erase) the racially constructed 
experience of gender or femaleness is to present only half of the identity of 
individual racialised women.  In citing this as an inherent failure of feminist 
theory, Harris likens it to the way in which law and legal theory generally 
function to obliterate the experience of racialised women.  In Harris’ opinion, 
[j]ust as law itself, in trying to speak for all persons, ends up silencing 
those without power, feminist legal theory is in danger of silencing those 
who have traditionally been kept from speaking, or who have been 
ignored when they spoke, including black women.  The first step toward 
avoiding this danger is to give up the dream of gender essentialism.49 
 
The abandonment of the “dream of gender essentialism” is not 
necessarily a bad thing, as this will mean that a broader spectrum of female 
identity can be embraced in its stead.  This broad range includes the diverse 
experiences and cultural backgrounds of women.  In one respect, this broad 
spectrum can be seen to add depth to intersectionality, especially when 
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 A P Harris “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (n 39) 588-9. 
49 Ibid 585. 
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acknowledging that culture is one of the intersecting aspects of identity, 
because culture means a range of different things.50  On the other hand, the 
broad spectrum of diversity of feminist identity could also serve as a general 
basis of oppression for women of varying cultural backgrounds.  The 
question as to whether multiplicity might also lead to multiple systems of 
oppression is explored below. 
(b) Multiplicity and Multiple Oppressions 
 
The notion of multiplicity has been presented as an extension of the 
intersectionality thesis, and it seeks to demonstrate that not only does identity 
comprise the various aspects of identity that intersect on the surface plane, 
but that there are also intersections that take place at various levels and 
dimensions, which, although not always immediately visible, equally impact 
upon identity.  In this way, multiplicity is a method of discerning the entire 
scope of one’s identity.  This factor is intended to assist one in self-
identifying, or locating one’s self within various intersections and dimensions.   
Hutchinson however, addresses the notion of “multidimensionality” 
which, although similar to the connotation given to multiplicity in this chapter, 
focuses on the oppression that may be linked to various aspects of identity.  
In his analysis, the multiple dimensions of identity translate into multiple 
dimensions of inequality and oppression.  This seems to mean that the more 
precisely one can describe one’s identity location, then the more one is 
subject to oppression and inequality.  Hutchinson states that 
Multidimensionality recognise[s] the inherent complexity of systems of 
oppression … and the social identity categories around which social 
power and disempowerment are distributed.  Multidimensionality posits 
that the various forms of identity and oppression are “inextricably linked 
and forever intertwined” and that essentialist equality theories “invariably 
reflect the experiences of class – and race-privileged” individuals.  
																																																								
50
 These different things that define culture include “…a peoples’ store of knowledge, beliefs, 
arts, morals, laws and customs, in other words, everything that humans acquire by virtue of 
being members of society.”  T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 79. 
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Multidimensionality, therefore, arises out of and is informed by 
intersectionality theory.51  [footnotes omitted] 
A key issue for consideration is how to ensure that the 
acknowledgement of identity does not open the individual up to victimisation.  
It is not enough to be able to name and locate for one’s self where one is.  
What is required is a conceptual, cultural reconstruction that aims to 
specifically devalue certain identity intersectionalities.  As Volpp explains, 
[t]he tension believed to exist between feminism and multiculturalism, or 
universalism and cultural relativism, not only relies upon the assumption 
that minority cultures are more sexist, but also assumes that those 
cultures are frozen and static entities.  Within these discourses, only 
minority cultures are considered traditional, and made up of unchanging 
and longstanding practices that warrant submission to cultural dictates.  
Non-western people are assumed to be governed by cultural dictates, 
whereas the capacity to reason is thought to characterise the West.  
There appears to be an inverse correlation between full citizenship and 
cultural visibility.52 
 
The key to alleviating this tension rests in first acknowledging that 
one’s own identification with, and location in a particular culture comes with 
its own value system, and that it may be inappropriate to apply this culturally-
determined and dependent value system to assess another culture.  
Multiculturalism, in acknowledging the co-existence of (and equality) of 
various cultures, implicitly recognises the right of each culture to be 
evaluated according to its own cultural criteria.  Where this recognition fails 
to occur, the result is a (self-appointed) dominant culture, which determines 
on the basis of its own value system that another culture endorses 
discriminatory practices.  Take for example, the position of women within 
various cultures: 
The relative status of women across communities is still used to assess 
the progress of culture.  And the discourse of feminism versus 
multiculturalism assumes that women in minority communities require 
liberation into the “progressive” social customs of the West.  The idea 
that “other” women are subjected to extreme patriarchy is developed in 
																																																								
51
 D L Hutchinson “Identity Crisis: “Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the 
Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination” (2000-2001) 6 Michigan Journal of 
Race & Law 285 at 309-10. 
52
 L Volpp “Feminism Versus Multiculturalism” (n 32) 1190-1191. 
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relation to the vision of Western women as secular, liberated, and in 
total control of their lives.  But the assumption that Western women 
enjoy complete liberation is not grounded in material reality.  Rather, 
Western women’s liberation is a product of discursive self-
representation, which contrasts Western women’s enlightenment with 
the suffering of the “Third World women.”53 
 
The very act of being able to label cultures as being “progressive” or 
“Third World” operates from a Western self-appointed position of power and 
privilege.  This sense of power and privilege has constructed gender and 
gender equality within a particular framework and posits this framework as 
the ideal, without pausing to consider the impact of culture and cultural bias 
on the creation and application of this framework. 
As Volpp points out, not only does this Western framework unfairly 
judge non-Western cultures, but the framework, insofar as it is self-
appointing, also takes its own construction of gender as being the only 
correct one, and then simplifies this to mean that the Western construction of 
gender is the only one.  The result is that there is no room for a construction 
of gender by other cultures; so what we are left with is feminism on the one 
hand, and multiculturalism on the other.  This is far from a fair contest.   
The discussion then becomes not one of the way in which gender is 
constructed in different cultures, but rather one of gender (as constructed in 
the West) and of multiculturalism (as referring to non-Western cultures that 
are so primitive as to not even be able to develop an analytical framework for 
gender).  Volpp explains that 
In this discourse feminism also stands for “rights” and 
multiculturalism stands for “culture.”  In the universalism/cultural 
relativism or feminism/multiculturalism debates, the values of 
Western liberalism are reified, defined as the opposite of culture.  
….  With the discourse of feminism versus multiculturalism, each 
term is presumed to exclude the values of the other.  Feminism 
is presumed not to value the rights of minority cultures; 
multiculturalism is presumed not to value the rights of women.  
																																																								
53
 Ibid 1199. 
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Constructing feminism and multiculturalism as oppositional 
severely constricts how we think about difference.54 
 
Volpp’s assessment can be taken further to conclude that not only 
does the oppositional construction of feminism and multiculturalism constrict 
how we think about difference, but it also separates gender from culture in 
non-Western societies.  Such a separation has the consequence of not 
considering all aspects of intersecting identities of non-Western women.  
Such an incomplete intersectional analysis can only serve to further harm the 
experiences of racialised women.55 
 
The notion that multiplicity – specifically the particular delineation of all 
aspects of identity that intersect and the various levels and dimensions in 
which they intersect – is an idea born out of a Western world value system 
which dismisses non-Western cultures as being generally oppressive.  The 
result is what Volpp refers to as a battle between feminism and 
multiculturalism.56  The simple juxtaposition of feminism and multiculturalism 
is to pit gender against culture. 
Such an oppositional framework leaves no room for the idea of cultural 
constructions of feminism or feminist constructions of culture, both of which 
are attainable through intersectionality.  Where, however, intersectionality 
may require cultural considerations, Bond cautions that  
[m]isguided application of qualified universalism and international 
intersectionality may result in simplistic “additive” approaches to multiple 
																																																								
54
 Ibid 1203. 
55
 This harm is seen to be aggravated where, 
In the feminism versus multiculturalism discourse, “gender” and “race” are portrayed 
as oppositional, and thus mutually exclusive.  The separation of gender and race in 
this fashion reflects the use of a reductive framework that has been widely criticised.  
Opposing race with gender suggests that women of color may be better off if their 
cultures whither or become extinct.  Women of color will still be women; they just will 
not have a cultural identity anymore.  This suggestion relies upon two assumptions.  
First, it assumes that women of color gain nothing from their cultures – that cultures of 
color are largely oppressive and should be shed to eradicate gendered subordination.  
Second, the suggestion ignores the fact that race and gender are mutually constitutive 
of one another; one cannot simply separate them in this fashion.  Vectors of identity 
cannot be analysed as isolated phenomena.   
Ibid 1202. 
56
 See generally, L Volpp “Feminism versus Multiculturalism” (n 32). 
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systems of subordination, and overemphasis on victimisation, and the 
selective invocation of culture as a subordinating force.  These three 
problems, however, are not the result of a defect in the theory of 
international intersectionality itself but rather a product of the 
misapplication.57 
Thus, where culture generally is relevant to intersectionality, and 
where multiculturalism will impact upon the way in which culture operates 
within the intersectionality framework, caution must be applied when 
assessing the weight that is attributed to culture. 
 
 
4. Demonstrating the GRACE Intersections 
 
Before I am black     Because I am black 
Before I am woman     Because I am woman 
Before I am young     Because I am short 
Before I am African     Because I am young 
I am Human      Because I am African   
I am Human 58 
 
 
Having described the operation of intersectionality as well as multiplicity on 
the development and reflection of identity, the discussion now moves to the 
operation of this analytical framework to GRACE, the South African girl child 
living subject to customary law.  GRACE’s experience of the world is located 
at the intersection of gender, race, age and culture.  All of these aspects of 
identity converge at the point where GRACE lives.  Yet, GRACE’s position in 
the world is not static.  The points at which these aspects of identity intersect 
vary greatly with context.  Particularly with respect to GRACE, culture is 
discussed as the lens through which other avenues of identity and difference 
must pass. 
 
Intersectionality, as conceived of by Crenshaw and elaborated upon 
by Harris, Caldwell and others, sought to establish a framework wherein 
																																																								
57
 J E Bond “International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of 
Women’s International Human Rights Violations” (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 71 at 160. 
58
 Quoting D Farris “Before I am Black” Wild Seed, Wild Flower (1994) Columbia Records. 
See L A Crooms “Indivisible Rights and Intersectional Identities or “What do Women’s 
Human Rights Have to do with the Race Convention” (1997) 40 Howard Law Journal 619. 
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racialised women who have been victimised by their intersecting identities, 
could reclaim the construction of this identity for themselves and negotiate it 
in such a way that they could position themselves at a point in the 
intersection that is truly reflective of who they see themselves to be in the 
circumstances.  The application of the intersectionality framework to GRACE 
will be slightly different because, by virtue of her age and culturally 
constructed social position, GRACE, as a minor is not expected to have the 
agency to determine her own location within the intersection, much less given 
full control of her destiny. 
The application of the intersectionality framework is not so much a tool 
to be used by GRACE, as it is a tool that will be used by others to study and 
assist GRACE.  This tool will not only help in the broader understanding of 
how GRACE’s intersecting identities are constructed so as to ascribe her with 
victim status59, but also can be used in the deconstruction of identity so as to 
alleviate GRACE’s victim status.60  In this way, intersectionality is both a 
shield and a sword.  It is a shield against a myopic, singular understanding of 
identity, and it is a sword with which to carve out a new position of identity. 
The analysis of GRACE’s situation is noteworthy for the emphasis that 
it places on culture.  As was discussed earlier, culture can function as either 
the backdrop to the intersection, or an aspect of the intersection itself.  For 
present purposes, as well as for the expansion of intersectionality into the 
field of customary law, culture will be seen as the background or the context 
of GRACE’s identity.  Bearing in mind the notion of multiplicity, and the 
multiple dimensions on which the identity operates, it must be stated that 
culture is not a flat or stagnant background.  Rather, culture is broad and it is 
deep, and it is fluid.  Culture brings dynamism to the context of identity. 
GRACE, the African girl child is identified as such simply to distinguish 
her from a white, male, Western adult and not because there is any particular 
																																																								
59 See M Mutua “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42 
Harvard International Law Journal 201- 245. 
60
 See generally, M Pieterse “Finding for the Applicant? Individual Equality Plaintiffs and 
Group-Based-Disadvantage” (2008) South African Journal of Human Rights 399, 404-6. 
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worth or value inherently ascribed to any one, or the intersecting bundle of 
identities.  Within this framework, there is no normative standard of identity 
(and worth); each one becomes his or her own arbiter of normalcy and 
difference.  The difference then is not who one is, relative to others, but who 
one is relative to oneself (or who one could possibly be).61  This, however, is 
not actually the case.  So “differences are always relational”,62 and 
consequently identity and intersecting aspects of identity are ascribed a value 
based on a value system that is culturally constructed. 
The focus on intersectionality implicitly acknowledges that race-neutral 
approaches do not work – and in fact, may make things worse, since, to 
consider one’s self neutral is to imply that an integrated aspect of identity is 
irrelevant to (and readily severable from) a full and substantive equality 
analysis – this is a failure to fully acknowledge and appreciate the individual.  
Consequently, this failure also implies an inherent hierarchy of preference for 
the race that is neutralised. 
Essentialism, in the context of culture on the African continent,63 
operates on the assumption that all members have the same vision for the 
protection, propagation and promotion of their culture.  It makes no allowance 
for modern variations or developments in cultural practice that might mean 
different things for different persons.  This lack of consideration often 
translates to disadvantage and discrimination among certain members. 
Generally, African culture is more of a collective, integrative concept; 
thus, so too should the framework of identity within this culture be integrated, 
intersectional and unfragmented.  The integrated identity of the African girl 
																																																								
61
 See generally, A P Harris “Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory” (n 39) 594-
597, 608. 
62
 Ibid 608. 
63
 The phrase “culture in Africa” is used rather than “African culture” because the latter 
implies that there is one form of African culture. The former on the other hand, suggests 
what is closer to the reality, that there is a myriad of African cultures, just as there are 
several African communities within the continent.  However, what is consistent among 
African cultures and communities is the pride of place that they allocate to cultural or 
traditional values.  Although these may vary between the communities, there is a common 
understanding of cultural importance.  Note that culture can be law and culture can be 
religion – this suggests the overarching impact of the cultural umbrella – as well as various 
sources for culture. 
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child is emphasised so that she cannot say “but for my race”, or “but for my 
gender”, or “but for my culture, I would be treated differently in a particular 
context”, because, were it not for any of these characteristics, and particularly 
for their intersection, then she would not be who she is.  Thus, although the 
intersectionality analysis requires that the individual components of identity 
be taken into consideration, the remedy for any inequality requires that the 
composite whole of the intersecting identities be considered. 
It cannot be the case that if any aspect of GRACE’s identity is altered, 
she is still left intact. Critical race theorists typically have the analytical skills 
to criticise their own oppression and proffer a framework for remedy.  The girl 
child in contrast, on account of to her age, does not have this level of agency, 
insight, sophistication and analysis, so the framework of intersectionality 
must be developed for and applied to her.  But this must be done in a way 
that is not paternalistic, intrusive or oppressive – bearing in mind also that the 
cultural or customary law identity may imply an inferior status or lack of 
capacity for individual agency and decision-making. 
In “A Hair Piece”, Caldwell talks about not being able to dissociate hair 
from gender, race and culture.64  This is a link to the broader argument that 
aspects of identity cannot be separated.  In Caldwell’s argument, hair is 
social, political, cultural and emotional, and none of these aspects can be 
separated from the essence of hair.  Certainly, some may be more relevant in 
certain contexts than others, but they are all still present. 
In the American context, the struggles against racism, sexism and 
their interactions are based on efforts to combat negative stereotypes about 
race and sex that are held by members of the dominant power-wielding 
society.  Consider GRACE’s situation, however, where members of the same 
race, often gender, and certainly culture, determine her disadvantage.65  
																																																								
64
 P Caldwell “A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender” (n 1) 367. 
65
 The nature of this disadvantage of discriminatory treatment endured by GRACE within her 
own cultural context will be explored in Chapter Five.  It should be noted that GRACE’s 
experience may not have been definitively constructed as disadvantage or discriminatory, 
but this becomes the result when her experience is assessed against a cultural, political and 
social framework that is different from the indigenous cultural framework in which she exists.  
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GRACE’s story is also very much about combating discriminatory treatment 
from her own culture.  This situation is not like the American examples, 
where those who are discriminated against identify themselves and are 
identified as a cultural and/or racial group that is designated as “other” by 
those in the society who have the power to either confer or deny a benefit. 
In the western hemisphere, the concern with culture primarily relates 
to the protection of minority culture.  Conversely, it can be said that 
throughout the African continent, the concern with culture is for the 
preservation of the dominant, long-standing majority culture, against 
incursion from Western culture(s).  The question is: how does one develop 
an equality analysis framework that promotes equality and fairness within a 





This chapter has explored the development and application of 
intersectionality theory to equality considerations involving race, gender and 
culture.  The intention was not to present an exhaustive discussion of 
intersectionality.  In fact, the point was to demonstrate that intersectionality 
theory continues to evolve and expand in keeping with the dynamic and fluid 
pace of our understanding of identity and social positioning.66  Chapters Four 
and Five build upon the foundational understanding of intersectionality to 
demonstrate its utility as an analytical tool to discern the relationship between 
identity and equality. 
																																																																																																																																																													
The real issue to be explored is whether GRACE is similarly disadvantaged within the 
parameters of her own cultural framework as she is by the standard of a foreign framework. 
66
  See K Crenshaw “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence 
Against Women of Color” (n 1); Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and 
Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscriminatory Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics” (n 1); P M Caldwell “A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and 
Gender” (n 1); T Grillo “Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools to Dismantle the 
Master’s House” (n 1). 
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Intersectionality is not an end, or a tool in and of itself.  Instead, it is a 
frame of reference with which to apply tools of equality analysis.  
Intersectionality provides for a particular method and theoretical concept of 
viewing and identifying the individual, but this identification alone does not 
fully address the issue of any inequality that an individual may be 
experiencing.  Intersectionality is offered as an appropriate means for both 
individual and group assessment of the attainment of equality.  Moreover, 
intersectionality is not something that is particularly flexible – after all, 
identities are what they are.  There is flexibility in the ability to identify and 
consider all relevant aspects of identity in any particular situation.  
Intersectionality advocates for a broader consideration of the whole person, 
rather than a myopic approach that reduces people to arbitrary aspects of 
their identity. 
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This chapter explores the concept of legal pluralism in conjunction with 
intersectionality as an analytical means whereby members of the judiciary 
can better facilitate access to equality for the girl child. 
Legal pluralism refers to the coexistence of multiple normative orders 
within the same geographical and/or social context.1  In this chapter, the 
																																																								
1
 See J Griffiths“ What is Legal Pluralism?” (1986) 24 Journal of Legal Pluralism and 
Unofficial Law 1 at 3.  Griffiths suggests that plural normative “orderings” – such as those 
prescribed by the family, voluntary associations or economic organisations are all 
subordinate to state law, and he refers to this hierarchy as legal centralism.  For additional 
sources of definitions of legal pluralism, see note 4, below and accompanying text.  Legal 
pluralism also refers to various international laws that impact on domestic legal orders; 
however, international laws will not be thoroughly explored in this thesis. 
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plurality of normative orders in South Africa is described, as well as how 
these orders intersect and interact.  For the overall purposes of this thesis, 
pluralism and intersectionality are presented as two frameworks for analysing 
the most appropriate means for applying a right to equality.2  Although they 
are discussed as juxtapositional and distinct, it is contended that the two 
frameworks are a dyad in the sense that they are constituent parts of a full 
and substantive equality rights analysis, as is appropriate in contemporary 
South Africa, with its system of plural normative orders and the complex and 
intersecting identities. 
 
2. Definitional Framework of Legal Pluralism 
 
All states host a multitude of social and cultural groups.3  Although some 
such groups may live by their own normative orders, they are also subject to 
the national rules of the state within which they are found.  The existence of 
both state and non-state systems of regulation is referred to as legal 
pluralism, a term that may be better defined as: 
recognition of the existence of different semi-autonomous normative 
orders regulating the lives of individuals; these will inevitably at certain 
times overlap and thereby generate conflicting rights and obligations.4 
																																																								
2
 Recall that the entire thesis is an attempt to develop a tool for the courts to use in the 
course of constructing equality, or more precisely, constructing a remedy to address 
inequality. 
3
 See V C Suárez & F J Z Cabot “Reflections of Legal Pluralism in Multicultural Settings” 
ISSN: 1989-8787 (available at: http://e-
archivo.uc3m.es/bitstream/handle/10016/19318/reflections_camarero_zamora_PTD_2012.p
df?sequence=3) (last accessed February 2015).  See also C Rautenbach “Cultural Diversity 
and International Law”, in A Schwabach A J Cockfield (eds) International Law and 
Institutions (2011) (Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1788139) (last accessed 
July 2015).  See also I William & M Oke “Multiculturalism, Legal Pluralism and the 
Separability Thesis: A Postmodern Critique of “An African Case for Legal Positivism” 2008(2) 
Law, Social Justice & Global Development Journal (LGD) (available at: 
http://www.go.warwick.ac.uk/elj/lgd/2008_2/williamandoke ) (last accessed February 2015). 
4
 This definition is a collective restatement of definitions of legal pluralism reflected in 
numerous sources: John Griffiths “What is Legal Pluralism” (n 1) 3. See also S E Merry 
“Legal Pluralism” (1988) 22 Law & Society Review 870; M W Prinsloo “Pluralism or 
Unification in Family Law in South Africa”, (1990) XXIII Comparative & International Law 
Journal of Southern Africa 324; and for a broad canvass of definitions of legal pluralism that 
build upon Griffiths’ work, see G R Woodman, “Ideological Combat and Social Observation: 
Recent Debate About Legal Pluralism” (1998) 42 Journal of Legal Pluralism 21-41.  
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The potential for overlap is significant in two respects.  In the first 
place, it implies that individuals situated at the intersections of semi-
autonomous social fields have choices as to which rules they will invoke and 
abide by.  In the second place, it suggests that social fields do not function in 
isolation but in conjunction.5  As Merry noted, legal pluralism, “not only posits 
the existence of multiple legal spheres, but develops hypotheses concerning 
the relationships between them.  The existence of legal pluralism itself is of 
less interest than the dynamics of change and transformation.”6 
Normative orders constantly influence one another, either formally, as 
when a state court acknowledges and applies a new rule of customary law, 
or informally, as when a family council takes account of a state law.7  These 
dynamics happen to be particularly pronounced in the context of South 
Africa, where the contemporary development of customary law renders it 
immediately amenable to changing social and political contexts.8   
A pluralist perspective on law is valuable because it draws attention to 
the fact of normative multiplicity and invites a better-informed opinion on how 
courts, lawyers and legislators should respond to disputes and social 
problems.  Hence, the question considered in this chapter is: what use can 
be made of a pluralist perception of law in order to improve access to 
equality, for the individual litigant and thereby, their socio-legal standing? 
																																																																																																																																																													
Vanderlinden, in proposing an early definition and application of legal pluralism stated that it 
is “essentially a condition, thus a way of being, of existing.  It is the condition of the person 
who, in his daily life, is confronted in his behaviour with various, possibly conflicting, 
regulatory orders, be they legal or non-legal, emanating from the various social networks of 
which he is, voluntarily or not, a member.”  J Vanderlinden “Return to Legal Pluralism: 
Twenty Years Later” (1989) 28 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 153-4. 
5
 Intersectionality is also premised on the interaction and not isolation of aspects of identity.  
In this way, intersectionality and pluralism are similar for their method of considering the 
composite whole – whether this be of aspects of identity or legal systems. Acknowledging 
the existence of different aspects of identity or legal systems is only part of the issue – the 
most important thing is how these different components interact. 
6
 S E Merry “Legal Pluralism” (n 4) 879. 
7
 T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 29. 
8
 The development of customary law in the face of changing social context is discussed in 
more detail in part 4 below, as well as in Chapter Five. 
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A normative order, for purposes of this thesis, is taken to be any more 
or less autonomous set of rules to which people feel a sense of obligation, 
and from which they derive a code of conduct from their daily interactions 
with one another.9  For present purposes, pluralist jurisprudence can be 
traced to a simple statement made by John Griffiths in 1986: “the presence in 
a social field of more than one legal order.”10  Griffiths further contended that 
the common assumption - that state law was the dominant system – was an 
illusion and an ideology.  So as to reflect the contemporary operation of 
pluralism in South Africa, this thesis argues that customary law formally co-
dominates in the same social field.  The example of the delict of seduction as 
reflected in both legal orders will be discussed in Chapter Eight and will 
illustrate this co-dominance. 
Griffiths’ contention posed a clear challenge to the positivist and 
centralist conception of law at the time, whereby: 
…law is and should be the law of the state, uniform for all persons, 
exclusive of all other law, and administered by a single set of state 
institutions.  To the extent that other, lesser normative orderings, such 
as the church, the family, the voluntary association and the economic 
organisation exist, they ought to be and in fact are hierarchically 
subordinate to the law and institution of the state.11 
Griffiths called for greater respect to be shown to all the non-state normative 
orders.  Customary law is one such example that is discussed in detail in part 
2(a)(ii) below.  This is not to say that customary law is not recognised by the 
state, but rather, that it is not created by the state. 
Historically, of course, many states had been prepared to recognise 
and enforce certain subordinate normative orders, as in South Africa where 
																																																								
9
 For a full discussion of semi-autonomous social orders see S F Moore “Law and Social 
Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study” (1973) 7 
Law & Society Review 719-746. 
10
  Griffiths “What is Legal Pluralism?” (n 1) 2.  See also J Vanderlinden “Le pluralisme 
juridique: essai de synthses” in John Gilieen (ed.), Le Pluralism juridique (Brussels: 
Université libre de Bruxelles) 19-56 as referenced in J Vanderlinden, “Return to legal 
Pluralism: Twenty Years Later” (n 4) 149-158.  Note also that the work of Karl Renner on the 
development of the sociology of law pre-dates all of this and could arguably be the earliest 
writing on legal pluralism.  See K Renner (1949) The Institutions of Private Law and their 
Social Function (1949). 
11
 J Griffiths “What is Legal Pluralism” (n 1) 3. 
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customary law had long been recognised by the state.  But Griffiths 
describes this situation as a form of “weak” legal pluralism; “weak” because 
everything other than the received Western law depended on recognition by 
the state.12 
“Weak” pluralism was a feature of most colonial legal systems, and 
was continued into the post-colonial period.13  As established in South Africa, 
such pluralism was a means to accommodate indigenous systems of 
customary law while at the same time imposing a colonial code of rules that 
would dictate the general obligations and entitlements of all citizens in the 
public sphere.14  As Prinsloo explains, in South Africa we find the following 
pattern of legal pluralism with regard to family law: 
[T]he South African common law based on Roman Dutch Law, English 
law and legislation of the central government, briefly referred to as 
common law; different indigenous legal systems which in particular 
circumstances are applicable to members of the indigenous groups; the 
Hindu and Islamic family laws which are practised by members of the 
groups concerned but are not officially recognised.15 
  
In the place of weak pluralism, Griffiths called for a “strong” variety, 
one that would depict “an irreducible set of legal orders that can be partly in 
harmony, partly in contest with each other”.16  Such a set of circumstances 
																																																								
12
 R Michaels “Global Legal Pluralism” (2009) 5 Annual Review of Law and Social Science 
243 at 246. The reference to “everything other than the received Western law” refers to 
indigenous or customary practices in operation before the imposition of legal rules by the 
colonial settlers. 
13
 Upon independence, the new African governments set out on law reform programs that 
aimed at greater race, class and gender equality.  Whether it would be best to create a 
unified system applicable to all groups or to continue with a plural system of laws that 
accommodate the customary and religious laws of different ethnic populations has been a 
recurrent dilemma.  See A Hellum “Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial 
Africa: Option and Limits for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism” (2000) 28 Law & Social Inquiry 
636. 
14
 In fact, legal pluralism in South Africa, both historically and currently, acknowledges one 
system of rules to regulate the domestic matters for Black Africans and another set for 
matters related to broader areas for all other members of the population. This differentiation 
of normative orders on the basis of race was not unique to South Africa, but was a key 
feature of most colonised nations. See Hellum (n 13) 636.  See also, reference to Black 
Administration Act 38 of 1927 and the Repeal of the Black Administration Act and 
Amendment of Certain Laws Act 28 of 2005.  Note that further provisions of the Black 
Administration Act were also later repealed by Act 8 of 2006, Act 13 of 2007 and Act 7 of 
2008.  
15
 See M W Prinsloo “Pluralism or Unification in Family Law in South Africa” (n 4) 324-5. 
16
 R Michaels “Global Legal Pluralism” (n 12) 5.   
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implied a continual dialogue between the various normative orders, such as 
those that are based on religion or culture, without the presumed hierarchy of 
one over the other.  Thus, the academic researcher would be obliged to 
regard the various normative orders under study as more or less equal in 
legitimacy and authority.  The prominence of one over the other, in any given 
instance, would depend on context.17 
 
(a) Operation of the Legal Pluralism Framework in South Africa 
 
Having discussed the general conception of the pluralism framework, it is 
useful now for us to begin to situate this framework in the context of South 
Africa and its customary law and common law.  
  (i) South African Common Law 
 
The current common law system in South Africa is referred to as a mixed or 
hybrid legal system, because it was influenced successively by three main 
sources: Roman, Roman-Dutch and English law.18  Without delving too 
deeply into the history of South Africa, its settlers and occupiers, suffice it to 
say that the primary sources of influence were the Dutch and the English.19 
																																																								
17
 Legal pluralism is generally defined as a situation in which two or more normative orders 
coexist in the same social field”, whether recognised by the state or not.  See S E Merry 
“Legal Pluralism” (n 4). 
18
 See L Berat “Customary Law in a New South Africa: A Proposal” (1991-1992) 92 Fordham 
International Law Journal 102-105, where she explains the history or the acquisition of 
Roman Dutch Law in South Africa, even after the Dutch settlers of the 1700s were replaced 
by British Colonialists of the early 1800s and that regime in turn became the republic of the 
Union of South Africa in 1961.  See also I Zajtay & W J Holsten “The Permanence of Roman 
Law Concepts in South African Law” (1969) 2 Comparative and International Law Journal of 
Southern Africa 181-205; H R Hahlo & E Kahn The South African Legal System and its 
Background (1968) 575; Proculus Redivivus “South African Law at the Crossroads or What 
is Our Common Law?” (1965) 82 South African Law Journal 17-25. See also M Chanock 
The Making of South African Legal Culture 1902-1936: Fear, Favour and Prejudice (2001). 
19
 See M C Schoeman-Malan “Recent Developments Regarding South African Common and 
Customary Law of Succession” (2007) Potchefstroom Law Review 1-33; M Herbst & W du 
Plessis, “Customary Law v Common Law Marriages: A Hybrid Approach in South Africa” 
(2008) 3 Journal of Comparative Law 105-118.  These two articles which focus on the 
differences between the common law and customary law in the context of succession and 
marriage respectively, suggest that the character of the common law is most remarkable 
when contrasted with customary law.  Historically, it has been our fascination with customary 
law and the effort to understand it within the familiar parameters of the common law that has 
led to specific commentary about the common law.  But for that fascination, the common law 
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Not only is the common law of mixed origin, but also what is referred 
to as the common law generally, is comprised of different components, 
namely case law and statute law.  As Van der Merwe and Du Plessis explain, 
…the fundamental rules and principles of large parts of the law, 
especially the law of obligations and property law are not contained in 
legislation.  By virtue of the breadth of their subject-matter and its 
centrality to all legal relations, these areas of law form the backdrop to 
those that are largely legislative in structure, so that even the latter 
cannot be fully stated or understood without recourse to common law 
principles and concepts.20 
 
The overarching law of the country – guiding both the common law 
and customary law is the Constitution Act, 1996.21  In addition to the 
Constitution as the guiding framework, the common law takes its distinct 
character from the courts, legislators, bureaucratic officials and lawyers, all of 
whom inherited English traditions of the common law. 
 
  (ii) South African Customary Law 
 
Ironically, the very attempt to define customary law functions to misrepresent 
its true essence.  As Bennett says, “[c]ustomary law derives from social 
																																																																																																																																																													
would likely remain an unremarkable entity.  That is, until the dawn of South Africa’s new 
constitutional era.  Just as the common law is illuminated in contrast to the customary law, 
similarly, the post-apartheid constitutional era has also ushered in principles and values 
against which the common law writ large can be compared.  See C Roederer “Working the 
Common Law Pure: Developing the Law of Delict (Torts) in Light of the Spirit, Purport and 
Objects of South Africa’s Bill of Rights (2009) 2 Arizona Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 427-504; J Sarkin “The Common Law in South Africa: Pro Apartheid or 
Pro Democracy” (1999) 23 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 1-26. 
20
 F du Bois “Introduction, History, System and Sources” in C G Van der Merwe & J E Du 
Plessis (eds) Introduction to the Law of South Africa (2004) 40. 
21
 The importance of the Constitution as an interpretive lens through which to view both the 
common law and customary law was expressed in the Constitutional Court decision in 
Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others.  Specifically the point being 
made is that the Constitution in its supremacy is a lens through which to view both the 
common law and the customary law.  This was to refute the perception that customary law 
was to be interpreted through (and hence subordinate to) the common law.  The Court said:  
While in the past indigenous law was seen through the common law lens, it must now 
be seen as an integral part of our law.  Like all law it depends for its ultimate force and 
validity on the Constitution.  Its validity must now be determined by reference not to 
common-law, but to the Constitution. 
2004 (5) SA 460 at paragraph 51. 
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practices that the community concerned accepts as obligatory.”22  This 
obligation is not derived from texts, but from a system of practice and 
acceptance by the community.  These practices, although unwritten are 
“lived” and adapted as circumstances require.  In essence, 
…law itself changed according to the needs of the people.  The law was 
a creative response of the people to the environment in which they 
found themselves.  As a result, African customary law embodied the 
common moral code of the people.  There was no sharp distinction 
between what ordinary members of society regarded as poor conduct 
and what the official organs of society decreed as law.23 
To reduce these practices to writing was to stifle the ability of those 
within (and potentially outside) the community to interpret community 
practices in a way that responded and adapted according to social context.24  
Yet, it is only in the written form that customary law can be examined and 
understood by state courts and lawyers.25  
There are three different forms of customary law.  The first, referred to 
as the “living law”, is what is practised and understood by the members of 
the communities themselves.  Secondly, there is the “official customary law”, 
which is what has been observed and transcribed into written codes – 
typically by those who are outside of the customary community.  Hence the 
																																																								
22
 T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 7) 1. 
23
 C R M Dlamini “The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs” (1991) Acta Juridica 
71 at 72. 
24
 The danger of stifling is wrapped up in the very attempt to capture community practices in 
writing which is typically attempted by outsiders in an effort to observe and understand the 
nature and implications of such practices.  However, one wonders whether the same degree 
of stifling occurs where community members themselves translate their practices into writing 
in an effort to preserve or record them for posterity.  Arguably, when community members 
reduce customary practices to writing, they may do so in a language, style and format that 
most accurately and appropriately captures the essence and character of the practice at 
issue. The same may not be necessarily said of those outside of the community who may 
observe and record what they perceive to be the essence or nature of a customary practice.  
Yet without any historical grounding in the community and the practice itself, it may be 
difficult to ascertain for sure that the essence of a practice that is captured by outsiders is 
indeed the essence of the practice as conducted by community members.  Perhaps only 
when community members themselves contribute directly to official customary law would it 
be most apt to authentically reflect the living law (at least for the time being – until the living 
law is developed through changes in community practice). 
25
 See Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 7) 5, 44. 
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authenticity of the official customary law may be challenged on the basis that 
it is not an accurate reflection of community practice.26 
Reference is often made to a third type of customary law – that which 
is recorded by academics, notably anthropologists.27  This third form is not 
itself law, but rather is commentary on or exposition of a system of law, 
conducted by those who are located outside of this system.  For the present 
purposes, the discussion will focus on “living” and “official” customary law. 
Historically in South Africa, Roman-Dutch law has been the dominant 
legal system, and customary law, although permitted to remain as the 
system adhered to by the indigenous peoples, was subordinate to Roman-
Dutch law.  As a consequence, it has generally been judged against the 
standards of Roman-Dutch law.28  The result of this value judgment is the 
“official” version of customary law that is presented in court in matters 
dealing with conflicts between the two legal systems. 
Once customary law becomes codified, however, it is no longer 
“living”, and thus less likely to be an accurate reflection of the contemporary 
attitudes and activities of the community.  In this way, official customary law 
cannot truly be said to be customary at all.  Nevertheless, the formal courts 
inevitably prefer official customary law, as it is available in a form that is 
familiar and readily ascertainable.29   
The core characteristic of living customary law is its flexibility, i.e., 
ease with which it can be adapted to meet current social needs.  Official law 
																																																								
26
 G R Woodman “A Survey of Customary Laws in Africa in Search of Lessons for the 
Future” in Fenrich, Galizzi & Higgins (eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2011) 12-
26. 
27
 See T Venter and J Nel “African Customary Law of Intestate Succession and Gender 
(in)Equality” (2005) 1 Journal of South African Law 99. 
28
 See L Berat “Customary Law in a New South Africa: A Proposal” (n 18) 102-105, where 
she explains the history or the acquisition of Roman Dutch Law in South Africa, even after 
the Dutch settlers of the 1700s were replaced by British Colonialists of the early 1800s and 
that regime in turn became the republic of the Union of South Africa in 1961.  See also C R 
M Dlamini who states the fact that “customary law has often compared unfavourably with 
Roman-Dutch law, is not due to its inability to develop … but rather because of negative 
attitudes towards it.”  C R M Dlamini “The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs” 
(n 23) 74. 
29
 See W Lehnert “The Role of the Courts in the Conflict Between African Customary Law” 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 263. 
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lacks this quality, as its existence in statute or precedent means that it may 
not be changed at will.  It is, moreover, removed from the control of the 
community, whereby outsiders become final arbiters as to its content and 
meaning.30  As Lehnert explains, 
The courts’ lack of understanding of and sensitivity to concepts of 
customary law is reinforced by their preference for the official 
customary law.  Courts only refer to the living customary law on 
extremely rare occasions despite the well-known distinction between 
the two versions and the problems of the distorting effect of official 
law...  Important reasons for this are probably that official customary 
law is easily ascertainable by and accessible to the courts, and that it 
best satisfies the desire of courts for clear and unambiguous rules.31 
This preference for official customary law results in a diminished 
appreciation of the living law.  The official customary law is given more 
attention and is presumed to carry more weight by the judiciary, although 
quite the opposite may be the case from the perspective of the community.  
Furthermore, Lehnert’s reference to “unambiguous rules” indicates that 
certainty has value for those who are external observers of community 
practice (especially the courts) and not necessarily for members of the 
community in question. 
Living customary law, although of critical importance to members of 
the community it governs, faces three challenges. First, it is likely to be 
marginalised, because it can only continue to flourish if the state permits it to 
develop outside the boundaries of official customary law.32  Living customary 
law is a dialogue between the need for stable rules and the daily life within 
which the rules are applied.  Official customary law functions to remove the 
dialogue of exchange, and instead leaves only a monologue of rigid, 
obligatory rules.  At least, this is the case where customary law is applied by 
outsiders – notably those from the western-styled judiciary.33  And it is the 
																																																								
30
 See W Lehnert, who comments: “African customary law is different from Western law in 
many central respects.  Important differences include its unwritten nature, its flexibility and its 
ability to adapt to changing circumstances.” Ibid. 
31
 Ibid 265. 
32
 Ibid 265-6. 
33
 Dlamini has attributed the lack of development of living customary law (in favour of the 
ossified official, written customary law), to the fact that:  
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problem of this outsider application that makes the GRACE analysis most 
helpful to the judge, as well as the litigants.  The GRACE analysis is a 
reminder and a roadmap to the identity of the litigants; including how culture 
operates to impact the legal issue and how it should similarly operate to 
influence the appropriate remedy.34 
However, as Himonga explains, the situation is different where 
customary law is applied by the traditional courts, since they are staffed by 
members of the community they serve.  She states that, 
The decisions of [local] courts are more likely to reflect norms of living 
customary law than those of the magistrates’ courts and superior 
courts for three main reasons. First, the judges are lay people who are 
in some cases also members of the local customary community and 
heads of their families.  ...  It would be difficult to imagine that these 
adjudicators completely abandon their living customary law the 
moment they don state hat to hear disputes arising within their 
community in state courts.  Secondly, because lawyers do not appear 
in these courts there is little or no influence of professionals, trained in 
western jurisprudence, on the interpretation of customary rules by the 
justices.  This minimises the distortion of customary law through 
western legal concepts and perceptions of law.  Finally, because the 
judges are all members of African communities, there is little chance 
of their being misinformed about the customary law practised by the 
people...35   
The second challenge to living customary law is that it fails the rule of 
law principle, which requires legal certainty.  Customary law is inherently 
																																																																																																																																																													
The courts, as part of the state apparatus, have not shown any willingness to develop 
or adapt customary law to altered circumstances nor have they displayed any 
profound insight into the institutions of customary law.  This in itself is understandable 
as the courts have largely been manned by people who had little to do with customary 
law.  
See C R M Dlamini “The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs” (n 23) 74. 
Thus, the further removed the arbiter of customary law is from the context and operation of 
that law, the less likely the arbiter will function to develop the law so that it is more reflective 
of contemporary community practice.  Dlamini further comments that this lack of 
development is often considered to be an inherent failing of customary law itself, which in 
actuality, it is a failing on the part of the judiciary charged with interpreting and applying the 
customary law.  See C R M Dlamini “The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs” 
(n 23) 74. 
34
 More details of the application of the GRACE analysis will be discussed in Chapters Five 
and Six in reviewing relevant Constitutional Court cases, as well as in Chapter Eight in 
presenting the seduction hypothetical. 
35
 C Himonga & C Bosch “The Application of African Customary Law Under the Constitution 
of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning?” (2000) 117 South African Law Journal 
306 at 323-4. 
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flexible and in general consists of broad, often indeterminate principles that 
can be adapted to changing circumstances and the particularities of the 
case.36  Uniform application of a fixed code of rules thus becomes a more 
difficult goal to achieve.37   
Closely related to this is the third challenge: living customary law may 
– or may not – give better effect to human rights than official customary 
law.38  However, caution must be exercised, as not all official law is 
necessarily compliant with human rights principles.  Inequality appears in all 
forms of law, and despite historical practices, one form of customary law 
should not be assumed to be inherently more just than another. 
It seems that although official customary law may have been 
developed in order to enable the understanding of living law for purposes of 
state courts and administration, the disproportionate attention paid to official 
law has had harmful consequences for living law.  Given that customary law  
develops from practices in the community which are considered 
binding, African customary law introduces a fourth actor to the trio of 
the legislature, the executive and judiciary – the people or the 
communities who live by and create customary law.  Although the 
legislature can codify the rules of customary law and the judiciary can 
lay down rules in precedents, neither institution creates, they merely 
reproduce or ascertain customary law.39 
In this way, the broader importance of living customary law is clear.  The 
same cannot be said about official customary law, as it is not dependent on 
input from the community.  In fact, quite the opposite is true, as official 
customary law often operates in a sphere removed from the community.40 
																																																								
36
 N Mbodla “Customary Law in Search of Development” (1999) 116 The South African Law 
Journal 742. 
37
 W Lehnert “The Role of the Courts in the Conflict Between African Customary Law” (n 29) 
265-6. 
38
 Ibid 266. 
39
 Ibid 272. 
40
 It is this separation from the community, and inflexibility of official customary law, which 
have supported the general acknowledgement that “’the official version’ of customary law, 
although frequently consulted as the most readily available source, is often inaccurate and 
misleading.” A P Kult “Intestate Succession in South Africa: The “Westernization” of 
Customary Law Practices with a Modern Constitutional Framework” (2001) 11 Indiana 
International & Comparative Law Review 709. 
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In discussing the broad and interactive character of living customary 
law, Himonga and Bosch explain that, 
Living customary law is used to denote the practices and customs of the 
people in their day-to-day lives. …  The living customary law is dynamic 
and constantly adapting to changing social and economic conditions. It 
has been observed in this regard that ‘[I]t is increasingly evident that 
what might be observed by or recited to researchers as being new 
customary norms, are the product of the melding of local customs and 
practices, religious norms and social and economic imperatives (and 
one may add constitutional imperatives), with the result that living 
customary law is formed out of interactive social, economic and legal 
forces which give it its flexibility in content.41 [footnotes omitted] 
Despite the challenges faced by living customary law, in the end, it is 
this form that most authentically reflects the daily realities of the communities 
in which it operates.  Official customary law on the other hand, is fixed and 
imposed.  These characteristics are not in themselves bad, but may have 
the effect of entrenching negative values, such as gender inequality.42  
Conversely, despite the benefits of the dynamic nature of living 
customary law, it too has some disadvantages.  Because it is so susceptible 
to change, it is also susceptible to abuse, misinterpretation, wide variances 
in application and development in ways that might be radically different and 
contrary to the original principle of the law, as well as contemporary 





 C Himonga & C Bosch “The Application of African Customary Law Under the Constitution 
of South Africa: Problems Solved or Just Beginning?” (n 35) 319. 
42
 Himonga and Bosch state that “while living customary law is considered to be more 
flexible and accommodative of women’s rights, official customary law is perceived in 
historical and contemporary terms as the embodiment of institutionalised gender inequality.”  
Ibid 329. 
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(b) Addressing the Presumptive Hierarchy Between the Common 
Law and Customary Law. 
 
The co-existence of normative legal orders may at times reflect a 
hierarchical rather than parallel relationship.43  Thus it is presumed that the 
common law trumps customary law, creating the impression that the latter is 
not worthy of the rigorous analysis and efforts to maintain a certain standard 
of principles, one of these being equality.  This section argues that the 
common law and customary law are equally deserving of respect and that 
each system should be taken to reflect the interpretive principles of the 
Constitution, including equality.44 
Historically, permitting customary law to address the domestic matters 
of the indigenous population was a convenient way of governing and 
pacifying the colonised.45  The notion of permission that is associated with 
customary law reinforces the presumptive hierarchy of the common law over 
the customary law.  Similarly, it was said earlier that within customary law 
itself official customary law is favoured over living customary law – notably 
because the former is something that can be readily discerned and fits within 
an accepted framework of deconstruction and analysis.  The same applies 
broadly to customary law vis-à-vis the common law.  The preference is for 
that which is accessible and therefore, understandable.  The fluidity of 
customary law poses challenges to those who believe that a system of law 
must be anchored in certainty.   
																																																								
43
 Historically, this hierarchy was reflected by the fact that customary law writ large was 
tolerated to exist, so long as it did not contravene the repugnancy proviso.  The repugnancy 
proviso was loosely meant to relate to principles of natural justice or public policy.  But in fact 
such determinations were based on a common law perspective of appropriateness. See T W 
Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 7) 67-8. 
44
 Section 1 of the South African Constitution indicates that the state is founded on certain 
values – first among them being: “Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms”.  See the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
45
 According to Chanock,  
Processes of state sponsored legislation and the disruption of family formation and 
workings by the money economy and labour migration, led to the dominance of a new 
version of customary law which suited the white administrators and African male 
elders who ruled colonial society. 
See M Chanock “Neither Customary Nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family 
Law Reform” (1989) 3 International Journal of Law and the Family 72. 
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The GRACE model seeks to demonstrate that all we really know for 
certain is that there are elements – either of identity or legal or cultural 
context that we cannot always know and thus cannot always predict.  Such a 
model of analysis encourages us to be open to variations of difference and 
their impact, not only on the contextual issues but also the remedies of same. 
 
  (c) Equality under Living Customary Law  
 
The centre of gravity of legal development lies, in our times as well as in all 





In the midst of this discussion on legal pluralism in South Africa, the focus of 
this thesis remains equality for the girl child living under customary law.  In 
this regard, the issue then is: how does pluralism affect the enjoyment of 
equality?  In the context of plural normative legal orders, this thesis 
considers whether the enjoyment of equality is possible – or simply different 
- under each of the normative orders at issue. 
 Although formal academic writing on the subject of equality under 
living customary law may be minimal, it is said that,  
[i]n South African jurisprudence, there is no single interpretation of the 
concept Customary Law. …  Because it is based on African traditions 
and customs, if it is not legislated upon, it should continuously respond 
to society’s contemporary values, needs and practices.  If it is 
sufficiently responsive to social reality, its contemporary value would 
be measured in terms of its compatibility with the contemporary 
values, needs and practices of its jural communities.47 
Here, Mokgoro explains that the fluidity of customary law makes it difficult to 
pin down, especially for those who come from outside of the community in 
which the particular law at issue arises.  
The mere fact that a system of law cannot be immediately accessed, 
interpreted and assessed by others, does not, by default, render the law 
																																																								
46
 See translation of Ehrlich’s “living law” as reflected in W F Menski Comparative Law in a 
Global Context: The Legal Systems of Asia and Africa (2000) Platinum 114. 
47
 Y Mokgoro “The Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution” (1996-1997) 
41 Saint Louis University Law Journal 1281. 
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inappropriate for people living in accordance to its dictates.  For instance, 
Bennett explains that, “Africa has its own system of rights, but one that was 
ignored by the colonial powers, because they refused to believe their 
subjects capable of producing such standards of conduct.”48 Moreover, living 
customary law “is not what the courts recognise as legally binding when they 
decide a case, but only that which the parties live by.”49 
As former Constitutional Court Justice Yvonne Mokgoro explains, 
…because social tradition and custom are so closely connected to 
social lifestyles, custom should reflect society’s stage of social 
development.  In the case of African traditional social institutions 
which form part of the corpus of “positive” customary law, however, 
the place and extent of evolution was the prerogative of political and 
legal authorities.  The denial of participation of blacks in the political 
and judicial processes generally precluded Africans themselves from 
having a direct influence on the development of customary law.  
Moreover, the significant failure on the part of legal policy to keep 
customary law abreast with social reality resulted in a sharp dichotomy 
between custom as law and custom as social practice.50  
This dichotomy, whether real or imagined, is partly what led to the 
diminished authority of customary law vis-à-vis the common law.  
 The assumption that customary law is inferior persists and, 
interestingly enough, as Mokgoro points out, even at the time of the drafting 
of the South African Constitution, there was much surprise that such credit 
was given a law thought to be inferior in content and purpose to the common 
law.  However, 
[c]ontrary to popular belief, the spirit, purport, and objectives of the Bill 
of Rights are not foreign to African custom and tradition.  African 
culture has its own indigenous doctrine of rights, one which European 
																																																								
48
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colonists overlooked because they were too blinkered by a sense of 
superiority to realise that Africans too could evolve ethical systems.51 
From a perspective of strong legal pluralism, customary law is not 
necessarily inferior to the common law in the eyes of its adherents.  In the 
framework of strong legal pluralism, customary law exists as an acceptable 
system of rules.  Further, because customary law is adaptable to the 
circumstances of the case, it is better placed to ensure substantive equality 
for the individual, than is the formulaic, rigid common law. 
 To presume that there is a universal standard of equality to which all 
normative orders must comply flies in the face of strong legal pluralism. 
Certainly there are generally accepted norms of fairness in a regime such as 
customary law, but these are infused by a culturally specific context.52  To 
this point, consider the Constitutional Court’s statement in Alexkor that, 
… indigenous law … is a system of laws that was known to 
the community, practised and passed on from generation to 
generation.  It is a system of law that has its own values and 
norms.  Throughout its history it has evolved and developed 
to meet the changing needs of the community.  And it will 
continue to evolve within the context of its values and norms 
consistently with the Constitution.53 
Further, in his dissenting judgment in Bhe, Justice Ngcobo cautioned that  
when dealing with indigenous law every attempt should be made to avoid the 
tendency of construing its concepts in light of the common law.  There are 
obvious dangers to such an approach.  These two systems of law developed 
in two different situations, under different cultures and in response to different 
conditions.54   It is the protected reality of different situations, cultures and 
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3 Customary Law Prior to 1996 Constitutional Recognition 
 
Throughout Africa, association with customary law has historically been 
based on race.  The racial divide was a consequence of colonialism and the 
clash of two social and economic systems, namely, the traditional tribal 
society of the indigenous peoples and the new world of the colonisers.  The 
withdrawal of the colonial powers did not resolve this divide, and the 
contemporary conflict between customary and common law is a result of the 
colonial law.55 
So too in South Africa, indigenous Blacks were expected to regulate 
their personal family matters (marriage, inheritance, child custody, spousal 
support, etc.) in accordance with customary law, while other non-family law 
matters (notably criminal matters) were dealt with in accordance with the 
common law.56  Whites were assumed to be subject to the common law in all 
matters. 
The regime rendering Blacks subject to two different legal systems 
was regulated by the 1927 Black Administration Act (BAA).57  This Act 
established one system of courts for Black litigation – commissioners’ courts 
and those of traditional leaders - leaving the magistrates’ courts and High 
Courts for Whites.  In the later 1980s, commissioners’ courts were abolished 
and customary law was made applicable (as a system of law) in all courts in 
the land.  Complete unification of the court system, however, was not 
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contemplated, since the courts of traditional leaders continued to administer 
civil and minor criminal justice according to customary law to people living 
within their areas of jurisdiction.  These courts were (and still are) connected 
to magistrates’ courts and the High Court by a system of appeal. 
The BAA always stood as a symbol of apartheid because it had 
established a racialised judicial structure: “a separate and inferior system of 
justice for Africans” and a more highly advanced, technical system of 
common law for all other South Africans.58  With the introduction of a new 
democratic constitution in South Africa, the BAA was repealed (albeit 
piecemeal) in order to dismantle these racial divisions.  But in practice race is 
still a major factor in determining application of customary law and access to 
different courts.59  A particular problem is the courts of traditional leaders, 
which are still governed by the BAA. 
 
4. Culture and Customary Law under the Constitution 
 
 
During the period of constitutional negotiations, the history of the 
discriminatory apartheid regime in South Africa led to calls for a unification of 
the court system and the laws.  This, however, did not happen.  Customary 
law was maintained as a separate and discrete system, although formally 
elevated to equal status with the common law.  The reasons, no doubt, were:  
a need to incorporate on an equal basis a legal system rooted in African 
cultural traditions; a majority of South Africans identified and conducted their 
lives in accordance with customary law; the state had an already functioning 
system in rural areas that could be incorporated into official justice and 
administrative structures with minimal disruption.60 
Section 211(3) of the 1996 Constitution therefore provided that “the 
courts must apply customary law, when that law is applicable, subject to the 
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Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.”  
In other words, when the rules governing conflicts of law (see below) indicate 
that customary law is applicable to the facts of a particular case, the court is 
bound to apply that law, but always subject to the Constitution and any 
relevant legislation.61 
In addition, the new Constitution introduced a right to culture, which 
began an association of customary law with a fundamental human right.  
Sections 30 and 31 of the Bill of Rights provide that: 
s 30 Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in 
the cultural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may 
do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights 
 
s 31(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community 
may not be denied the right, with other members of that community -  
(a) to enjoy their culture, practise their religion and use their 
   language; and 
(b) to form, join and maintain cultural, religious and linguistic 
associations and other organs of civil society. 
 
(2) The rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights 
 
 In the pre-constitutional era, individuals were bound by the laws of 
their race and, although they could opt out of some or all aspects of 
customary law, for example, by applying for exemption, marrying or making 
wills.62  In the current constitutional era however, individuals are now free to 
choose the law pertaining to their culture.63  In this regard, customary law is 
not simply another legal system subordinate to the common law.  It is equal 
in respect and consideration to the common law.  As former South African 
Constitutional Court Justice Yvonne Mokgoro explains, 
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…on its face, the choice of law principle in South African 
jurisprudence provided a person with the freedom to participate in his 
or her cultural life, but did not provide that as of right.  Section 31 of 
the Interim Constitution, however, introduced the idea of that choice 
as of right.  It has been argued that this right does not nullify the 
previous freedom.  A person only had an additional right to insist on 
the application of customary law in appropriate legal proceedings.  
The freedom, it is further argued, comprehends the generality of social 
life while the right requires a special act of recognition by courts or 
authorities.64 
More importantly, application of customary law no longer lies exclusively within 
the state’s power to permit or deny, although applicants may also seek such 
application in terms of their right to culture under s 31 of the Constitution.  
Nevertheless, a law or culture may not be practised “in a manner 
inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights.”  In other words, the 
enjoyment of a culture (including customary law) is only protected as long as it 
does not violate the equality and dignity rights of other individuals.  This 
provision does not necessarily mean that all customary law or practices that are 
inconsistent with specific provisions of the Constitution or the spirit of equality 
therein should be abandoned.  There is scope for the development of customary 
law as a means of aligning traditional practices with contemporary constitutional 
principles.  The GRACE model is offered as a tool to facilitate such 
development.  It is also noted that, in his dissenting judgment in the Bhe case, 
Justice Ngcobo makes an eloquent argument for the development of customary 
law as a means of reinterpreting and safeguarding customary practices and 




 Y Mokgoro “The Customary Law Question in the South African Constitution” (n 47) 1285. 
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5. Recognition of Customary Law and the Conflict of Personal Laws 
 
Since the new Constitution, customary law has been kept as a separate 
system, although formally not inferior to the common law.  As a result, 
conflicts between the systems of law are bound to occur.  When individuals 
find themselves subject to two or more legal streams at the same time, an 
issue of choice of laws arises, and a decision must therefore be made as to 
which law is to prevail in resolving a particular issue.66  This choice is 
complicated by the absence of a clear hierarchy of one system over the 
other.67 
This conflict has produced a discipline that is known as the 
interpersonal conflict of laws.  In essence, the term refers to a situation 
where “two or more systems of law that are potentially applicable to a 
particular problem and the court must choose between them.”68  Although 
framed in oppositional language, as the conflict of laws applies in the 
contemporary South African context, it is in reality a simple choice of whether 
to apply the common or customary law in a particular context.  To decide 
such matters, the South African courts have been armed with certain 
statutory choice of law rules,69 together with a rich heritage of precedents. 
These various rules generally required consideration of the form and 
function of the parties’ lifestyles -- did they follow a notionally “western” or 
“African” model?70 – which could be deduced from the following factors: 
(i) Agreement and Intention: courts considered whether the 
parties formally or implicitly agreed to the application of either 
customary law or the common law. 
(ii) Nature of a Prior Transaction: The words and actions of 
parties could provide insight into which normative order governed 
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their relationship.  For instance, “transactions about lobolo and 
loans of cattle…suggest an implicit understanding to allow 
application of customary law.” 
(iii) Subject Matter and Environment of Transactions: Where a 
particular type of transaction was found in both legal systems, courts 
considered its purpose, subject matter and environment in order to 
determine a general cultural orientation of the case. 
(iv) Form of a Transaction: Where a transaction was known to 
both legal systems, the parties’ use of a form unique to one system 
of law could indicate an intention to abide by that system.  For 
instance, “if a couple married in church or a civil registry office, the 
form of the ceremony determined application of the common law to 
their capacity to marry, the divorce action and most of the 
consequences of the marriage.” 71 
(v) The Parties’ Way of Living: Courts considered the way in 
which the parties lived, and their overall cultural orientation as an 
indication of choice of law.  For instance, “people who adhere to a 
traditional African way of life have been deemed subject to 
customary law, while those who adopt a Western way of life have 
been deemed subject to the common law.”72 
(vi) Exemption from Customary Law: This institution (now 
abolished) related to the state’s practice of permitting those 
Africans thought to be “suitably acculturated” to be exempted from 




 Himonga explains that with the case of marriage, although individuals have a choice to 
contract marriages under either the common law or customary law regime, in most cases, 
Africans who contract civil marriages also conclude customary marriages with the same 
partner, with the result that they combine more than one legal order in a single 
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The study of legal pluralism did not begin in the field of legal philosophy, but 
in colonial administrations and legal anthropology.  It is only over the last 
three or four decades that pluralism moved into the “mainstream of legal 
discourse”.74  Michaels attributes this shift to globalisation.  He says that the 
“irreducible plurality of legal orders in the world, the coexistence of domestic 
state law with other legal orders, the absence of a hierarchically superior 
position transcending the difference – all of these topics of legal pluralism 
reappear on the global sphere.”75 
Although, as Michaels suggests, globalisation may be responsible for 
the widespread interest in legal pluralism, the fact of pluralism is of course 
not a new phenomenon.  As Merry says, “plural normative orders are found 
in virtually all societies”.76  Thus, study of legal pluralism in various societies 
across the globe may not be so much a reaction to globalisation, as a recent 
awareness of the multiple normative orders regulating society. 
For purposes of academic study, however, global pluralism is the third 
phase in a development from classical to new legal pluralism.  This follows 
the distinction between the first two phases as set out by Merry.  First that,  
classical legal pluralism was confined in two ways:  
geographically, it concerned only the interplay of Western and 
non-Western laws in colonial and postcolonial settings; 
conceptually, it treated the indigenous nonstate law as 
subordinate to the official law of the state as introduced by the 
colonising power.77   
And second that, 
the new legal pluralism extends the concept to Western societies 
and the interplay between official and unofficial law more 
generally.  In this genealogy, the third stage has an even broader 
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focus beyond the individual localised state or community (whether 
colonial or Western) and toward the transnational sphere.78 
 
It is this broader focus that inspired the term “global legal pluralism” for 
the third phase.  Such pluralism implies a relationship between legal systems 
that extends beyond national borders.  For the present focus, however, the 
emphasis will remain on domestic legal pluralism within the borders of South 
Africa.   
 
 
7. The Implications of Legal Pluralism for Women 
 
Given that gender is a key component in the equality analysis, it is helpful to 
explore the role of women in a pluralist framework, especially because 
women are often able to manipulate laws and jurisdictions to obtain which 
remedies are most favourable to their claims.   
 
(a) The Pros and Cons of Taking Cognizance of Pluralism 
 
In environments where customary law operates, the status of women is often 
regulated by two or more systems of law.  As a result: 
 First, women can seize opportunities to manipulate laws and forums to 
their own advantage.79  As we have seen, “individuals situated at the 
intersections of semi-autonomous social fields have choices as to which rules 
they will invoke and abide.”80  Over the last 25 years awareness of 
discrimination against women and children within customary law communities 
has increased considerably,81 thereby giving women a new agency, and the 
necessary platform to assert their rights.  Even so, customary law cannot 
completely escape accusations of discrimination or unfavourable applications 
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Mutilation82 and virginity testing.83  Bronstein explains that, “in South Africa 
the customary law dilemma is invariably conceptualised as a terrible clash 
between culture or the cultural rights of historically disadvantaged 
communities on the one hand, and the equality rights of women (a 
disadvantaged group within these disadvantaged communities) on the 
other.”84 
 Second, lawyers and law-makers can become more aware of ways to 
ameliorate the position of women.  What is more, we are now aware that 
different normative orders influence one another.  Thus, an increase in 
gender equality in one normative sphere can be used to influence another.85 
Hellum says that, “the situation in which women rely on more than one 
body of law has drawn attention to the need for more complex and 
multifaceted strategies of gender and legal change than those pointed out 
within the centralist notion of law.”86  Further, acknowledgement of 
“intersecting and interacting normative orders” may likely result in a more 
coherent strategy for women’s empowerment and equality rights, as any 
such initiatives can be implemented within the context of each normative 
order. 
In spite of these positive results, pluralism may have a negative effect 
on individuals.  “The competing values of these plural legal systems more 
often than not result in denial of rights, and, ultimately, access to justice is 
adversely affected.”87  This negative consequence for women is likely to be 
due to their diminished status under customary law.  Full alignment of the 
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customary law with constitutional principles, such as equality, however will 
gradually mitigate, if not entirely reduce, this adverse impact.  
Furthermore, women’s lives, as well as their bodies, can become 
over-regulated.  Consider for instance that, 
[t]he regulation of women’s position by more than one body of norms 
has given rise to different theories about the relationship between 
gender and legal change.  Within feminist legal scholarship there has 
been a shift from centralist legal theory exploring the relationship 
between de jure equality and de facto discrimination to studies that 
explore the norms that surround gender relationships as a process of 
plurality of intersecting and interacting normative orders.88 
Over-regulation of women’s issues may effectively erode the agency and 
autonomy that women have over their own lives.   
Finally, Bonthuys and Erlank recognise a problem that arises from a 
formal conflict of laws in a system of weak pluralism: 
Structuring a dichotomy between civil and customary law presents 
African women with two equally unacceptable options.  They must 
either conform to civil law standards, which do not necessarily 
accommodate their cultural values and with which they may not agree, 
or they must retain old forms of customs or religious law which deny 
women power under the rules of “immutable culture”.  Applying 
customary law implies that all African women for whom lobolo has 
been paid share the same rural context and values, and ignores the 
fact that many women alternate between traditional and western 
values for different purposes.  On the other hand, structuring women’s 
rights so that they only appear accessible under civil law denies 
African women the opportunity to take part in internal cultural debate, 
to challenge detrimental customary practices and so to contribute to 
the evolution of customary law.89 
A system of strong pluralism which supports the validity of non-state laws 
provides de facto support and context for women to choose options which 
best meet their needs and best enable them to contribute to community, 
cultural and legal development.  In this way, strong legal pluralism celebrates 
and promotes the agency of citizens not only as recipients of structured legal 
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framework, but also as invested and knowledgeable participants in the 
construction and revision of such frameworks. 
 
(b) New Interpretation of Customary Law 
 
Throughout the remainder of this thesis, the notion of the evolving female 
litigant will be explored in the context of developing the customary law in line 
with Constitutional principles and provisions.  In particular, through 
discussion of the Constitutional Court’s judgments in the Bhe, Shilubana and 
Mayelane cases, Chapters Six and Seven discuss the roles and entitlements 
of women in regard to: succession to property and to chieftainship, and 
consent and recognition of polygamous marriages.  Following the line of 
reasoning explored in these cases, Chapter Eight relies on this jurisprudence 
and the GRACE analytical model to conduct a hypothetical analysis of the 
delict of seduction under both customary law and the common law. 
 The focus of this analysis, and in fact, this entire thesis, is to elevate 
customary law and ensure its alignment with the Constitutional provision for 
equality.  Special attention is given to the following eight principles describing 
the place of customary law under the Constitution, as extracted from both the 
Alexkor and Bhe cases and eloquently presented in Mayelane: 
a) customary law must be understood in its own terms, and not 
through the lens of the common law; 
b)  so understood, customary law is nevertheless subject to the 
constitution and has to be interpreted in the light of its values; 
c) customary law is a system of law that is practised in the 
community, has its own values and norms, is practised from 
generation to generation and evolves and develops to meet the 
changing needs of the community; 
d) customary law is not a fixed body of formally classified and 
easily ascertainable rules.  By its very nature it evolves as the 
people who live by its norms change their patterns of life; 
e) customary law will continue to evolve within the context of its 
values and norms consistently, with the Constitution; 
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f) the inherent flexibility of customary law provides room for 
consensus-seeking and the prevention and resolution, in family 
and clan meetings, of disputes and disagreements; and 
g) these aspects provide a setting which contributes to the unity of 
family structures and the fostering of co-operation, a sense of 
responsibility and belonging in its members, as well as the 
nurturing of healthy communitarian traditions like ubuntu.90 
 
8. Plural Normative Orders, Plural Paths to Equality? 
 
The coexistence of separate systems of legal norms to address separate 
spheres of life, may seem to be administratively easy.  The reality, however, 
is that spheres of life rarely, if ever, operate independently from one another, 
and there is often overlap amongst them, thus making it difficult for the state 
to maintain consistent administrative efficiency.  Given this reality, it is 
helpful for citizens as well as the state, if the various legal systems operate 
under the same basic understanding of intersection and cohesion.  In this 
regard, Prinsloo discusses the concepts of unification,91 integration92 and 
harmonisation93 as approaches to eliminating or modifying legal pluralism.  
As each concept suggests, the focus is on working out how the various 
normative systems should coexist and function, where possible, 
cooperatively and collaboratively. 
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marriages on an equal basis, that is considering both marriages as valid marriages with 
recognition and protection of the rights of the spouses and children.  See Prinsloo Ibid. 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






Oppermann presents a different view, notably that the coexistence of 
different normative orders necessitates competition rather than cooperation.  
In Oppermann’s analysis, the history of legal pluralism makes it difficult for 
different normative legal orders to be accorded the same degree of worth 
and consideration.  This approach is premised on hierarchy without 
recognising scope for intersection.  In Oppermann’s analysis,  
legally pluralistic countries [are those] where traditional law and national 
law exist side by side.  Because these bodies of law grew out of 
culturally distinct customs and practices, their coexistence frequently 
results in conflict.  The implications of conflicts between traditional and 
national law are particularly serious for women since, in many countries, 
women’s rights – particularly in the context of traditional law – are often 
subordinate to those of men.  Cultural norms reflecting male values and 
interests permeate traditional or indigenous law regulating family issues 
and resulting in the legal supremacy of male interests over female 
interests.94 
Oppermann suggests here that legal pluralism can function as a tool 
to enable those engaged in legal analysis to crudely separate laws that 
appear progressive from those that are traditional, oppressive and 
unenlightened.  Adopting a legal  
“pluralist perspective provides a means of giving recognition to those 
normative orders that impinge on women’s lives and so factor them into 
analyses which can take account of the conditions under which women 
and men find themselves silenced or unable to negotiate with others in 
terms of day-to-day life, or the converse, and how this shapes their 
perceptions, access to and, use of law.”95   
 
Thus, those aspects of society that are considered to be unenlightened and 
unfavourable are readily identified as “other”, hiding from view the fact that, 
in unitary legal societies, one system of law can serve both favourable and 
unfavourable interests, depending on the perspective of the person engaged 
in the analysis.   
																																																								
94
 B Oppermann “The Impact of Legal Pluralism in Women’s Studies: An Examination of 
Marriage Laws in Egypt, South Africa and the United States” (2006) 17 Hastings Women’s 
Law Journal 65. 
95
 A Griffiths “Legal Pluralism” in R Banakar & M Travers (eds) An Introduction to Law and 
Social Theory (2002) 304. 
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In contrast to Oppermann, Prinsloo offers a viewpoint that supports 
the intersection and collaboration of normative orders, rather than their 
opposition and competition.  This intersection is referred to by de Sousa 
Santos as interlegality, which he describes as the phenomenological 
counterpart of legal pluralism.96 
The frameworks offered by Prinsloo and de Sousa Santos suggest an 
approach to legal pluralism which acknowledges not only the coexistence of 
multiple normative orders, but also a working relationship between these 
normative orders.  This approach is also reflected by the von Benda-
Beckmanns, where they explain that  
under conditions of legal pluralism, elements of one legal 
order may change under the influence of another legal 
order, and new, hybrid or syncretic legal forms may 
emerge and become institutionalised, replacing or 
modifying earlier legal forms or co-existing with them.  In 
other cases, concepts from one legal vocabulary are used 
to label institutions of another legal order.97 
Thus, legal pluralism in its current sense is increasingly about 
appreciating value in the intersections of equally weighted normative orders.  
In a similar vein, the modern approach to intersectionality focuses on 
intersecting aspects of identity.  This thesis is concerned not simply with 
these intersections – whether they be intersections of normative orders, or 
intersections of identities – but also specifically with the nature of the 
experience for those who are located at particular intersections - of both 





 B de Sousa Santos “Law: A Map of Misreading Towards a Postmodern Conception of 
Law” (1987) 14 Journal of Law & Society 298.  
97
 F von Benda-Beckman & Keebet von Benda-Beckman “The Dynamics of Change and 
Continuity in Plural Legal Orders” (2006) 53-54 Journal of Legal Pluralism & Unofficial Law 
19. 
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 Equality rights for the girl child must be considered in a scope that extends 
beyond the cultural community and the nation state, into the international 
realm.  In discussing the concept of legal pluralism, this chapter has sought 
to describe the importance of identity and contextual considerations in the 
quest for equality.  Acknowledgement of legal pluralism, or the co-existence 
of more than one normative order in operation at the same time is a major 
feature of context.  This coexistence need not necessarily result in confusion, 
but is instead an opportunity to take into account the broadest possible scope 
of options for the interpretation and application of applicable normative 
orders.  The result is an analytical framework that reflects both the existence 
of plural normative orders and the intersecting identities of the individuals 
who operate within and between these normative orders. 
 Recalling from Chapter Two that equality is a comparative concept98, 
the comparative analysis that must be undertaken in a legal pluralist context 
is subject to the biases, level of knowledge and insight of the one conducting 
the comparison. But in a society with a single normative order, where full 
consideration is given to an intersectionality analysis, there is little room for 
the errors that result from impartial application of the law because what is 
considered is the result, and not the system of law.  There is more objectivity 
to be gained from focusing on the impact or consequences of the law rather 
than the law itself.99   
																																																								
98
 See Chapter Two, part 2. 
99
 Mokgoro makes reference to Nhlapo’s argument that it is not the mere recognition of 
customary law that creates tension in a legal pluralist context, but the technical difficulties 
that arise from such recognition.  Consideration of customary law in the context of an 
intersectionality analysis, wherein customary law is part of the continuous axes of law, rather 
than a separate entity, alleviates the problem of recognition (and the imputed ranking that 
inevitably follows).  See Y Mokgoro “The Customary Law Question in the South African 
Constitution” (n 47) 1289.  
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Despite the relative infancy of intersectionality100, proposals for its 
joint application with legal pluralism are not new.  For example, Anne 
Hellum points out that  
…current trends demonstrate the need to move beyond both the 
anthropological approach to legal pluralism, which seems satisfied 
with description and analysis, and the centralist notion of law, that has 
tended to exclude the norms generated through human interaction in 
daily life.  An alternative life is to move toward an integrated 
sociolegal scholarship that combines descriptive and normative 
analysis.101  
This notion of “integrated socio-legal scholarship” could also be used to 
describe intersectionality as it is being applied in the current context.  
Further, these two approaches can also be seen to reflect two values, 
namely judgmental and non-judgmental. 
A close examination of the two concepts reveals that legal pluralism 
can be viewed as a variant of intersectionality. Just as one may have a 
particular gender, race, religion, or adhere to a particular culture, the fact that 
one lives within a context of normative pluralism is also an aspect of identity. 
Furthermore, following the notion that such pluralism is an aspect of identity, 
it is suggested that a pluralist perspective allows scope for the intersection of 
the various normative orders. Thus intersectionality does not simply exist in 
one plane, but it is multidimensional, demonstrating that there are 
intersections within intersections.  These layers of intersectionality may on 
the one hand suggest complexity, but they also suggest precision in 
characterising the context in which the rights claimant operates.  And context 
is both a determinative and interpretive feature in the rights analysis.  
Essentially, intersectionality requires factual analysis, whereas pluralism 
requires a normative analysis. 
Intersectionality as discussed in the previous chapter and legal 
pluralism discussed herein, both function as analytical frameworks that 
																																																								
100
 Note that intersectionality emerged in the context of critical race theory (as aspect of 
Critical Legal Studies) in 1988/89. 
101
 A Hellum “Human Rights and Gender Relations in Postcolonial Africa: Option and Limits 
for the Subjects of Legal Pluralism” (n 13) 642. 
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acknowledge the coexistence and collaboration of various aspects (be they 
of factual identity or normative order).  Pluralism acknowledges and invites 
exploitation of different normative orders shaped by cultural context.  
Intersectionality acknowledges that various aspects of identity – for the 
present purpose, reference is made to the aspects of gender, race, age and 
culture – all intersect to create a unique experience (and identity) for the 
individual concerned.  Any failure to consider all aspects of this unique 
identity is a failure to fully address the needs of the individual.  This inspires 
us to recognise that those from pluralist communities arguably possess a 






 In this context it is also interesting to note that pluralism has helped us to realise the 
biases in state managed weak pluralism, and to realise that people living under customary 
law may be happy to do so – and may be able to exploit its fluidity.  This happiness is 
bolstered by the fact that in the ideal instance of legal pluralism, the various legal systems 
are weighted equally vis-à-vis one another, and one is not expected to be interpreted within 
the parameters of the other. 
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1. Introduction   
 
The discussion of legal pluralism in the previous chapter set the stage for 
the current discussion of the intersecting identities of GRACE, the South 
African girl child.  Just as plural and parallel normative orders exist, 
similarly, there are plural and parallel identities.  Those who promote the 
recognition of multiple or intersecting identities, or multiplicity,1 argue that 
full access to equality is dependent upon full consideration given to all 
aspects of one’s intersecting identity.  Any position that does not take all 
characteristics of identity into account fails to address the whole person. 
Chapter Two made reference to equality as a comparative concept.2  
The measurement of the achievement of equality involves a comparative 
analysis of certain aspects of identity.  For example, the customary law rule 
of male primogeniture provides that intestate succession is awarded to the 
eldest male in a family line.  The arguments of inequality that are levelled 
against male primogeniture challenge it on the basis that it discriminates on 
																																																								
1
 See H Lewis “Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Critical Race Feminist Perspective” 
(2003) 12 Columbia Journal of Gender & Law 514-515; D L Hutchinson, “Identity Crisis: 
“Intersectionality,” “Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of 
Subordination” (2000-2001) 6 Michigan Journal of Race & Law 309-10.  See also Chapter 
Three, part 3.   
2
  See Chapter Two, part two.  See also See P Westen, “The Empty Idea of Equality” (1982) 
95 Harvard Law Review 553. 
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the individual and intersecting identity aspects of age, gender and birth 
order.3  Chapter Three, in introducing the intersectionality framework and its 
origins, focused on the intersection of race and gender.  Chapter Five now 
expands intersectionality beyond race and gender to focus on the 
importance of culture.  Although Chapter Four discussed culture as a 
normative component of legal pluralism, the emphasis will now be on the 
factual elements of culture as an aspect of identity. 
 
2. The Nature of Intersecting Identities 
	
The concept of culture is complex to define, since it is hugely variable.4  The 
broad spectrum of what culture encompasses suggests that it is mutable 
and, therefore, uncertain.  Ssenyonjo quotes Steiner as stating that, “culture 
is plastic, made and remade through the course of history, not unshakable 
and essentialist in character but in many respects contingent, open to 
evolution and to more radical change through purposeful human agency 
informed by human rights ideals.”5  Further, culture is a living aspect of 
identity and is susceptible to the influence of changing socio-economic 
contexts.6  To some degree gender, race and age are also fluid constructs, 
but they are clearly more fixed than culture.7 
																																																								
3
 Some customary law cases dealing with male primogeniture also discuss the issue of 
legitimacy, and the case analysis first involves a determination as to whether there was a 
valid customary law marriage between the parents (see Mthembu v Letsela and Another, 
2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA) and Bhe and Others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and Others 2005 (1) 
SA 580 (CC)), but for the present purposes, legitimacy is not an aspect of identity that is 
discussed in the GRACE analysis. 
4
 F Raday discusses “two differing perceptions of culture.”  Essentially, culture can be a  
“relatively static and homogenous system”, or it can be “adaptive, in a state of constant 
change, and rife with internal conflicts and inconsistencies.”  See F Raday “Culture, Religion 
and Gender” (2003) 1 International Journal of Constitutional Law 667. 
5
 M Ssenyonjo “Culture and the Human Rights of Women in Africa: Between Light and 
Shadow” (2007) 51 Journal of African Law 66. 
6
 See B Ibhawoh “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of 
Human Rights in the African State” (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 841. 
7
 Culture is variable and considerably more open to shifts and interpretation than the other 
aspects of identity.  This does not mean however that culture is incapable of being 
predictable and stable, but that it reflects this to a much lesser degree than gender, race and 
age. 
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Since Kimberlé Crenshaw first wrote about “demarginalising the 
intersection of race and sex”8, efforts to construct intersectionality as a legal 
analysis that included an appropriate remedy for multiple, simultaneous 
discrimination, have expanded beyond the borders of the United States, and 
have been applied to identity factors in addition to and apart from race and 
gender.9  In the wake of this expansion, this chapter argues that 
intersectionality is an appropriate theory applicable to the cultural, legal and 
social context of GRACE, a South African girl child, subject to customary 
law. 
Hope Lewis presents an example of the applicability of 
intersectionality beyond American critical race theory as follows: 
A black woman’s actual experience of discrimination might be lost in a 
legal system that defines violations of rights by treating race and gender 
as entirely separate categories.  She would be expected to claim her 
rights either as an African American or as a woman, but not as both at 
the same time. … This form of theoretical analysis is now referred to as 
“multidimensionality” theory so as to include sexual orientation, 
ethnicity, religion, nationality, disability status, and other forms of 
identity in the analysis.  A legal framework that fails to account for 
our complex and multilayered realities as women cannot be 
expected to achieve the full implementation of human rights.10 [bold 
emphasis added]  
That which Lewis refers to as multidimensionality – namely an 
intersectionality analysis that involves two or more axes of identity – has 
come to encompass a contemporary understanding of intersectionality.11 
The intersectionality analysis discussed herein demonstrates that 
there are not one or two “core” aspects of identity, but rather each aspect of 
identity is endemic to the individual.  For the purposes of an equality rights 
																																																								
8
 K Crenshaw “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique 
of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics” (1989) University of 
Chicago Legal Forum 139. 
9
 See P E Andrews “Globalisation, Human Rights and Critical Race Feminism: Voices from 
the Margins” (1999-2000) 3 Journal of Gender, Race & Justice 373; and J Bond 
“International Intersectionality: A Theoretical and Pragmatic Exploration of Women’s 
International Human Rights Violations” (2003) 52 Emory Law Journal 71. 
10
 H Lewis “Embracing Complexity: Human Rights in Critical Race Feminist Perspective” (n 
1) 514-515. 
11
 See generally, Chapter Three of this thesis. 
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analysis, the failure to consider all identity aspects of an individual 
compromises the equal access to rights vis-à-vis those who may have a 
different set of identity aspects.  Although it is true that certain aspects of 
identity may be more relevant to a particular situation at a certain moment, 
the remaining intersecting identities should not be ignored because they will 
provide the supporting context in which that moment’s primary identity is 
understood.  
The importance of acknowledging multiple aspects of identity in order 
to fully appreciate the full person is explained by Taunya Lovell Banks as 
she reflects upon her own intersectional experience: 
My life stories influence my perspective, a perspective unable 
to function within a single paradigm because I am too many 
things at one time.  My perspective often transcends race and 
gender and is sometimes fully or partially conscious of the 
complexities and intersection of race, gender and class.  It is a 
multiple perspective…12  
Acknowledging this multiple perspective as necessary to transition 
GRACE from a position of marginalisation to one of agency and enjoyment 
of equality,13 can be demonstrated by reference to a Constitutional Court 
case.  In President of the Republic of South Africa v. Hugo,14 a challenge 
was brought against a presidential pardon directed at “mothers in prison on 
May 10, 199415 with minor children under the age of twelve years.”  John 
Hugo challenged the presidential pardon for being discriminatory on the 
basis of sex, as it did not extend to fathers of children under twelve.  Hugo 
was in prison and he was also the single parent of a child under twelve. In 
the language of intersectionality, Hugo’s claim was that the pardons were 




 T L Banks ”Two Life Stories: Reflections of One Black Woman Law Professor” (1990-91) 6 
Berkeley Women’s Law Journal 56. 
13
 See Chapter Three, part 3, of this thesis for an additional discussion of multiplicity.  
14
 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC). 
15
 This date specified in the pardon decree is the date on which Nelson Mandela was 
inaugurated as South Africa’s first democratically elected black President. 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






Hugo argued that the rationale behind the pardon, namely “a concern 
for children who have been deprived of the nurturing and care which their 
mothers would have ordinarily have provided,”16 could also apply to him and 
his son.  Hugo’s position was that gender,17 as constructed by the 
parameters of the pardon was merely incidental to his claim.  Rather, what 
was key was his identity as a prisoner and as a single parent of a child 
under twelve.  However, the pardon legislation was aimed specifically at 
female single parents.   
The Court reasoned that the fact that Hugo could not be located at 
the designated intersection (of being female and a single parent) did not 
constitute discrimination because the legislation targeted a broad 
generalised category on the basis that women are typically responsible for 
the care and nurture of children.18  As is often the case where a majority 
group is targeted, a minority is neglected.  Further, the Court noted that as 
there was no outright entitlement to a pardon, Hugo could not argue unfair 





 See Hugo (n 14) at paragraph 36 (referring to the affidavit of Nelson Mandela) 
17
 For a discussion of the complexity of “gender” and its operation in contemporary South 
African society and social analysis, see H Moffett “Gender” in N Shepherd and S Robins 
(eds) New South African Keywords (2008) 104.  
18
 This generalisation exemplifies Butler’s comment that it is “impossible to separate out 
‘gender’ from the political and cultural intersections in which it is invariably produced and 
maintained.” See J Butler Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (1990) 
Routledge New York 3. 
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3.   Definitional Positioning of Culture in the African Human Rights 
Framework 
 




A delicate balancing act is required in order to prioritise considerations of 
cultural rights vis-à-vis those of gender equality rights.  For instance, the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights “places emphasis on 
traditional African values and traditions without addressing concerns that 
many customary practices … can be harmful or life threatening to women.”20  
Yet, the existence of regional, African-specific human rights instruments 
shows that culture influences the way in which human rights norms are 
constructed, interpreted and applied.   
It is true that in this modern era of globalisation, different nuances 
and cultural underpinnings create different understandings of human rights 
norms - so much so that it may not be accurate to use the word “norms” at 
all.  The converse is also true, meaning that in striving towards universality 
(the emphasis of common similarities and the dismissal of differences), 
cultural variations are overshadowed by notions of commonality and 
sameness.21  But there certainly are generally accepted standards and 
fundamental entitlements that all societies agree to be basic human rights 
and responsibilities.22   
Regional instruments such as the African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights23 and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
																																																								
19
 J A M Cobbah “African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective” 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 310.  
20
 M Ssenyonjo “Culture and the Human Rights of Women in Africa: Between Light and 
Shadow” (n 5) 44. 
21
 See generally, L Volpp “The Culture of Citizenship” (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 
571-601. 
22
 The generally accepted standards are reflected in the universal human rights framework 
as described in notes 24-27 below. 
23
 See African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, 
ratified by South African in June 1996,  
Article 17(2)  Every individual may freely take part in the cultural life of his 
community. 
Article 17(3)  The promotion and protection of morals and traditional values 
recognised by the community shall be the duty of the State 
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Child24 reflect an acknowledgement of the value of culturally specific human 
rights instruments.  Even without these Africa-centric instruments, 
international instruments such as the International Covenant on Economic 
Social and Cultural Rights25, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights26, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child27 and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women28 all provide for 
the right to culture, together with the respect for cultural diversity and 
difference that goes along with this.  Furthermore, on the domestic level, the 
South African Constitution provides for cultural rights and the equal status 
given to customary law, alongside the common law. This equal status is an 
indication of the deference and respect that is given to cultural diversity.29 
																																																								
24
 African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 
(1990), 
  Article 11(2)  The education of the child shall be directed to 
(c)  the preservation and strengthening of positive Africa morals, 
traditional values and cultures. 
25
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN GA Res 2200A (XXI), 
in force 3 January 1976, 
Article 15 (1)  The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone: 
           (a) To take part in cultural life 
26
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, UN GA Res 217A (III) December 10, 1948 
Article 27, 
Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to 
enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits. 
27
 Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted by GA Res 44/25 of 20 November 1989, 
ratified by South Africa in June 1995, 
 
Article 30  
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of 
indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous 
shall not be denied the right, in community with other members of his or her group, 
to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to 
use his or her own language. 
 
Article 31 (2)  
States Parties shall respect and promote the right of the child to participate fully in 
cultural and artistic life and shall encourage the provision of appropriate and equal 
opportunities for cultural, artistic, recreational and leisure activity. 
28
 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, in force 3 
September 1981; ratified by South Africa in September 1995, 
Article 5   
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures 
To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view 
to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices 
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes 
or on stereotyped roles for men and women; 
29
 See sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, which provide 
protection for language and culture, as well as cultural, linguistic and religious communities. 
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(a) Definition and Character of Culture30  
 
“Culture” as a concept falls into a variety of fields, such as science, law and 
anthropology, to name a few.  For the present purposes, however, the 
discussion will focus on overlapping definitions of culture in the fields of law 
and anthropology.  As Ssenyonjo explains, anthropologists commonly use 
the term “culture” to refer to a society or group in which many people live 
and think in the same ways.  Culture includes “inherited ideas, beliefs, 
values, and knowledge, which constitute the shared basis of social action.”31  
In this sense, culture is not only something that one observes, but is 
something in which one actively participates.   
In the context of this “shared basis of social action”, it is important to 
remember that, “culture is not static.  It is constantly being challenged and 
redefined.”32  The nature of this challenge and redefinition is that  
…culture may be defined as the “integrated pattern of human 
knowledge, belief and behaviour,” which is dependent upon the 
capacity of human society to learn and transmit knowledge about their 
values, ideas, and beliefs to succeeding generations.  In other words, 
culture may be taken to mean those elements that human society 
produces in non-materialistic terms, and transmits to posterity.  A 
second definition of the term is more apt, for example, the customary 
beliefs, social forms, and material traits of a racial, ethnic, linguistic, 
religious or social group.33 
Culture, has a fluid, transmittable character that gives it meaning and 
significance from one generation to the next, even if the precise content of 
the culture varies.  Thus, it is not the cultural content itself that is valued as 
significant, but rather, it is the ability of the people within the culture to 
																																																								
30
 Recall that in Chapter Three parts 2(a) and 2(b), the notion of culture as an interpretive 
force was discussed.  Here, the discussion is expanded to define culture, not only as an 
interpretive lens, but also as an influential aspect that dictates the manifestation of other 
aspects of identity. 
31
 M Ssenyonjo “Culture and the Human Rights of Women in Africa: Between Light and 
Shadow” (n 5) 50. 
32
 F Banda “Global Standards: Local Values” (2003) 7 International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family 14. 
33
 J. Oloka-Onyango ”Who is Watching Big Brother”? Globalisation and the Protection of 
Cultural Rights in Present Day Africa” (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 1247. 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






compel and predict behaviour within a particular group vis-à-vis another 
group.  This juxtapositional or comparative element to cultural 
considerations suggests that culture is always relative.   
Regardless therefore of the context in which one may choose to 
define culture, the social behaviour is always fluid and shifting.34  Thus, even 
though some cultures in whole or in part may reflect elements that are 
contrary to full enjoyment of human rights of citizens within that particular 
culture, it is entirely conceivable that they will change with time.  This 
potential for change and evolution is similarly reflected in living customary 
law.   
The factors that influence cultural change are many, and may be 
external or internal.  For example, external influences may come into play 
when identified cultural practices are contrary to international principles of 
human rights.  Addressing these external influences brings us to the notion 
of a delicate balance that was discussed above.  The issue is how to 
respect cultural integrity, and at the same time keep pace with a notion of 
universal human rights. 
The danger is that the notion of universality can completely obliterate 
the uniqueness of any one particular culture.  But this danger can be 
avoided if it is understood that “every cultural tradition contains some norms 
and institutions that are supportive of some human rights, as well as norms 
and institutions that are antithetical or problematic in relation to other human 
rights.”35  The key is to sustain those elements that are supportive and adapt 
those that are not into something that is encouraging and respectful of full 
human rights.36  In light of this, a  
constructive approach to promoting human rights is to seek ways of 
enhancing the supportive elements of culture while redressing the 
																																																								
34
 M Ssenyonjo “Culture and the Human Rights of Women in Africa: Between Light and 
Shadow” (n 5) 66. 
35
 B Ibhawoh “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of 
Human Rights in the African State” (n 6) 859-860. 
36
 See the discussion of the development of customary law that occurs in part four of this 
Chapter.  
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antithetical or problematic elements in ways that are consistent with 
the cultural integrity of the tradition in question and the contending 
groups within it.  It would be counterproductive to attempt to enhance 
the awareness of human rights within any culture in ways that are 
unlikely to be accepted as legitimate by that culture or significant 
groups within it.37   
The attempt to achieve this delicate balance is underscored by an 
appreciation that  
the interplay between national human rights standards on one hand and 
local cultural orientations on the other should be a dynamic process of 
give and take, ideally through persuasion and dialogue, with legislation 
serving only to complement this process. … In this way, the gap 
between national human rights provisions and cultural orientations can 
be narrowed and constitutional rights can derive their legitimacy not 
only from state authority but also from the force of cultural traditions.38 
Further, in the course of this balancing act, it must also be 
remembered, that culture is but one aspect of identity, and although it may 
function as the contextual background against which other identity aspects 
are realised, culture is still only one element to consider in the attempt to 
ensure access to equality for a particular individual.  Within the broader field 
of international human rights, the “particularities of culture, race, 
nation[ality], and other forms of identity must be fully recognised as 
important aspects of feminist human rights discourse,”39 – and it might be 
added, the human rights discourse generally. 
Any discussion of human rights in Africa must acknowledge the 
operation of the cultural lens.  Although, on the one hand, this 
acknowledgement creates space for the respect of cultural rights, on the 
other hand, it is clear that culture can also be “an obstacle to women’s full 
participation in society.”40  In advocating for the equality rights of GRACE, an 
African girl child, within her particular cultural context, one must be mindful 
																																																								
37
 B Ibhawoh ”Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of 




 H Lewis “Embracing Complexity: Human Right in Critical Race Feminist Perspective” (n 1) 
511.  
40
 C I Nyamu “How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural 
Legitimisation of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?” (2000) 41 Harvard 
International Law Journal 381. 
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that it could well be culture (or at least the way it is interpreted and applied) 
that poses the greatest threat to her access to equality. 
To avoid this, Nyamu discusses the abolitionist approach, which 
advocates for “an end to cultural practices that contravene international 
human rights norms.”41  Implicit in this approach is the belief that many 
cultural practices, or in fact “culture” itself, is devoid of women’s rights, and 
must therefore be replaced by an adopted (or imposed) culture that explicitly 
provides for women’s rights.  Those who are opposed to the abolitionist 
approach, challenge it on the basis that it is “decontextualised, hegemonic, 
and counterproductive for gender equality in practice.”42  This 
“decontextualisation” is based on two assumptions: first, that culture is only 
manifested or reflected in one way, and second, that cultural must be 
assessed against a universal conception of equality. 
The alternative argument (and one which this thesis supports) is that 
“culture is dynamic, responds to social change (as does customary law) and 
undergoes transformation over time.  Such cultural change necessarily 
includes improvement in women’s rights.”43  It is true, that cultural change 
could include an embracing of women’s rights, but it is also true that “social 
transformation does not always create improvement in women’s lives.  It is 
quite possible for matters that are central to women to remain bound by 
tradition even after other aspects of social life have undergone significant 
change.”44  In referring back to the GRACE model and the emphasis that is 
placed on gender, race and age in addition to culture, one must be mindful 
that cultural change does not have the potential to impact gender solely, but 
other identity aspects as well.  
Full consideration of the abolitionist approach and the dynamic 
response approach, requires a thorough analysis of the role and function of 
																																																								
41
 Ibid 392-393. 
42
 Ibid 394. 
43
 Ibid 393. 
44
 Ibid.  See also, N Taefi “The Synthesis of Age and Gender: Intersectionality, International 
Human Rights Law and the Marginalisation of the Girl-Child (2009) 17 International Journal 
of Children’s Rights 250-1 and 367-8. 
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culture in a contextualised equality analysis.  This thesis takes the position 
that culture forms the backdrop against which the equality comparison must 
occur.45  This means that the comparative equality of two entities is likely to 
differ from one cultural context to another.  Regardless of the approach to 
be favoured, it must be borne in mind that  
it is what culture does rather than what it is which is important: it gives 
[people] a sense of identity.  Whether the item chosen as the 
distinguishing feature is mutilation in the form of slit earlobes or facial 
marks, or rules of exogamy in marriage, or certain funeral rituals – we 
ignore at our peril the centrality in people’s lives of the need to belong 
and to be different.46   
Culture is not simply the glue that binds people to one another and 
satisfies their need for belonging; culture is also the framework within which 
people come to understand themselves and the world.  As Nhlapo explains, 
culture is “a medium – a language or device which enables us to give 
meaning to the world and to go about life in more or less familiar 
pathways.”47   
The meaning that one gives to the world is (and can only be) relevant 
to the meaning that one ascribes to oneself based on the cultural context in 
which one lives.  Although not all aspects of one’s identity (as informed by 
culture) may come into play at all times, at least the existence of these 
various aspects of identity should always be acknowledged.  To 
demonstrate the plethora of identities that individuals possess, Nhlapo, in 
referring to his own cultural identity, explains that 
[a] person usually has the option of emphasising or deemphasising 
one’s membership in the many identities which may have a claim on 
his/her loyalty.  As a Zulu I may strongly support a particular kind of 
relationship between youngsters and elders; as a Christian I may 
abhor polygamy; as the recipient of a post-secondary education I may 
be indifferent to witchcraft or lukewarm to lobolo.  This we may call 
‘intensity of allegiance’.  In the South African human rights debate this 
																																																								
45
 See C I Nyamu ““How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural 
Legitimisation of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?” (n 40) 392-393. 
46
 T Nhlapo “Cultural Diversity, Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa: 
Lessons from the South African Constitutional Debate” (1995) 9 International Journal of Law 
and the Family 213. 
47
 Ibid 215. 
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element of ‘volition’ may yet prove to be crucial in establishing a 
system which allows people to ‘opt out’ of the particular cultural 
package attributed to their group.48 
  
One must also consider that a strong degree of “volition” may have 
the effect of reducing the compelling strength and enforcement of a cultural 
framework.  If one can readily opt out of a cultural rule, does it hold the 
necessary influence that is characteristically associated with culture? 
 
 (b) Culture as a Key Aspect of Identity 
 
In South Africa, culture has always been regarded as a significant tool of 





Typically, aspects of identity are defined in a binary pattern or along a 
relatively static and predictable spectrum.  For instance, gender is typically 
male or female, (or on occasion, in some state of transition between the 
two).  Race is generally clearly defined (and reflected), but it may also be 
blended or manifested in ways that may not be immediately discernible.  
Age is considered within stages (infant, child, youth, adult, elderly), or is 
specified by a certain number that increases annually.   
Culture is an exception to this typical pattern of identification.  Like 
race, culture may be blended, but more specifically, culture can be fluid and 
is susceptible to change in manners and frequencies that are entirely 
unpredictable.  Although in some circumstances, race and culture can be 
synonymous, for the most part, they are distinct identity aspects, and each 
may include multiple aspects of the other.  For instance, Japanese culture 
may be synonymous with the Japanese race; further, American culture may 





 H Garuba & S Raditlhalo “Culture” in N Shepherd & S Robins (eds) New South African 
Keywords (2008) 43. 
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African Americans may reflect a range of cultural practices, originating from 
Africa, the Caribbean, Europe or Asia.   
Some aspects of an individual’s identity – and culture particularly so – 
are likely to change or transition over the course of her or his life.  It is this 
propensity for change and evolution that makes culture such a fundamental 
aspect in the equality analysis.  Unlike aspects such as religion or marital 
status, changes in the cultural aspect of identity are due to influences 
outside the control of the individual.  This is largely because cultural identity 
is derived from the group.50 
Culture is akin to a large basket of factors affecting identity.  For 
instance, in the case of GRACE, the particular relevance of her gender, race 
and age, is dependent upon her culture.  For GRACE, a girl child in the 
South African customary law cultural context, the effect of her intersecting 
identity is different from what it would be for GRACE, a girl child in a 
Western common law cultural context.51 
In posing a vivid metaphor, Volpp refers to culture as a salad bowl 
where, “individual cultures can coexist as equal ingredients with 
autonomous identities.”52  In this image, the various aspects of identity are 
the different salad ingredients, and all combine to form a distinct flavour or 
culture.  Volpp uses food to explain that the participants of a culture rely on 
the fact that the terrain of difference is where diversity is considered to be 
exciting and positive.53  This perspective acknowledges that salads may 
have a distinctively broadly African or broadly Western flavour, yet each 
salad will be celebrated for this uniqueness.  The ideal of celebrating 
uniqueness can be realised if it is accepted that diversity within and across 
cultures is better celebrated as a “universal homogenous whole.”54 
																																																								
50 See Chapter Nine part 3(a) for a broader discussion of individual and group identity. 
51
 Although the discussion is based on broad generalisations of Africa versus the West, it is 
acknowledged that there are myriad distinct African cultures, just as there are different 
Western cultures.    
52
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Another metaphor to explain culture, or more specifically to explain 
the role of culture in the context of other intersecting aspects of identity, is to 
consider that if race, gender and age, for instance, are streets that intersect 
on a map, then culture is the topography that adds depth and context to the 
map.  Culture is the landscape – the mountains and valleys, rivers and 
streams around which the other aspects of identity must navigate.  
Moreover, the cultural landscape provides character to the map on which 
the other avenues of identity merge intersect and travel in parallel.55  
 
(c)  Culture as a Key Aspect of Law Formation and Interpretation   
  
 
The notion of culture as a key aspect of the formation and 
interpretation of law is particularly relevant in an African context, vis-à-vis 
human rights universalism, where the relevance of culture is particularly 
heightened. As Ibhawoh explains, 
…the legitimacy and acceptability of the modern universal human 
rights regime needs to be complemented and strengthened with the 
specific cultural experience of various societies.  In the case of Africa, 
this has been interpreted to mean that the content of human rights, 
though founded on universal principles, has to bear what Makau Wa 
Mutua describes as the “African cultural fingerprint” that emphasises 
																																																								
55
 See A Garry “See A Garry “Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender” 
(2011) 26 Hypatia 216-831.  Gary’s work on intersectionality focuses on the way in which 
multiple aspects of identity are constructed as multiple forms of oppression, but she 
effectively uses metaphors of traffic roundabouts and merging liquids to illustrate the 
operation and utility of intersectionality as both a representative and analytical tool.  
Similarly, for a link between culture and landscape in the South African context, see “I Am an 
African”, Statement of then Deputy President T M Mbeki, on Behalf of the African National 
Congress, on the Occasion of the Adoption by the Constitutional Assembly of “The Republic 
of South Africa Constitutional Bill 1996.  The Statement begins:  
 
I owe my being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the rivers, 
the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing seasons that 
define the face of our native land. 
 
My body has frozen in our frosts and in our latter day snows. It has thawed in the 
warmth of our sunshine and melted in the heat of the midday sun. The crack and the 
rumble of the summer thunders, lashed by startling lightning, have been a cause 
both of trembling and of hope. 
 
… 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






group, duties, social cohesion and communal solidarity as opposed to 
rigid individualism.56 
Application of the “African cultural fingerprint” requires a particular 
interpretation of human rights, one that recognisably fits within an African 
context.  This approach is not intended to contradict the universality of 
human rights, but rather, to demonstrate that in order to attain universality, 
the local relevance of these rights must be acknowledged. 
One example of this is the Protocol to the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.  The Protocol arose out of concern that  
despite the ratification of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights and other international human rights 
instruments by the majority of State Parties, and their solemn 
commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination and 
harmful practices against women, women in Africa still 
continue to be victims of discrimination and harmful 
practices.57  
 
 In order to address this concern and the broader challenges 
associated with the full implementation of women’s rights, the Protocol 
reflects a determination on the part of State Parties to “ensure that the rights 
of women are promoted, realised and protected in order to enable them to 
enjoy fully all their human rights”.58 
The practice of customary law is often interpreted in the context of 
the right to culture.  The customary law practice that is usually protected by 
the right to culture is most often in conflict with another equality right, 
namely the right to gender equality.59  Thus, the issue is how to negotiate a 
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 B Ibhawoh “Between Culture and the Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of 
Human Rights in the African State” (n 6) 843. 
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 Preamble to the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa.  The Protocol was adopted on July 11, 2003, and came into force 
on July 25, 2005. AHG/Res. 240 (XXXI). African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human and People's Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa, 11 July 2003.  Available at: 
http://www.achpr.org/instruments/women-protocol/  (last accessed February 2015). 
58
  Ibid. 
59
 See B Mmusinyane “The Role of Traditional Authorities in Developing Customary Laws in 
Accordance with the Constitution: Shilubana and Other v Nwamitwa” (2009) 12 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 136 at 149.  See also, T Nhlapo “Cultural Diversity, 
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balance, or mediate a compromise between the right to culture and the right 
to gender equality.  This conflict can be resolved by application of 
intersectionality considerations. 
In the first place, intersectionality acknowledges the coexistence of 
gender and cultural context as equal impacting factors on one’s identity.  
Secondly, the rights that are based on these identity characteristics are no 
longer viewed as being in competition, but as coexistent rights, the full 
acknowledgement of which is necessary to creating a sustainable human 
rights culture. Bennett suggests that such a creation is possible “if the 
advocates of human rights are prepared to give the argument of cultural 
relativism a sympathetic hearing, they may find that institutions peculiar to 
Africa can achieve the same objective as human rights.”60 This objective 
would be reflected in the context of a local African perspective, thus 
demonstrating the relevancy to cultural participants. 
The question now becomes the extent to which GRACE has the 
option of emphasising or de-emphasising certain aspects of her identity 
(especially where these aspects of identity are bound up with group cultural 
practice).  This practice of emphasising aspects of identity implies a certain 
amount of agency over who one is and what one’s place is in society.     
In section 3(a) above, when discussing the importance of culture as 
an aspect of identity, reference was made to Nyamu’s discussion of the 
abolitionist approach and the contention that cultural practices that are 
contrary to international human rights norms ought to be abolished.61  This 
contention seems to prefer the notion of international human rights norms 
(universal) to culture (local).  This leads us to consider whether international 
human rights norms are appropriately juxtaposed with cultural practices.  
The sphere of international human rights is much broader than that which is 
																																																																																																																																																													
Human Rights and the Family in Contemporary Africa: Lessons from the South African 
Constitutional Debate” (1995) 9 International Journal of Law and the Family 208.  
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 T W Bennett “The Equality Clause and Customary Law” (1994) 10 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 122 at 123. 
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 C I Nyamu “How Should Human Rights and Development Respond to Cultural 
Legitimisation of Gender Hierarchy in Developing Countries?” (n 40) 392-3. 
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contained within the ambit of cultural practices.  In fact, it could be argued 
that cultural practices (or the right to engage in such), are themselves a 
component of international human rights. The fundamental right to dignity 
and self-worth is derived from the practice and enjoyment of cultural 
practices.   
In discussing the difference between African and Western cultural 
interpretations (and manifestations) of human rights, it becomes clear that 
often what is required is not simply an understanding of the operatives at 
play within one’s own culture, but also a sense of what issues are to be 
considered across cultures.  This need for cross-cultural understanding is a 
key to contextualising both the similarities and differences amongst cultures.  
Gunning explains that an understanding of both the self and the “other” 
within the respective cultures enhances cross cultural understanding and 
also serves to reinforce one’s understanding of one’s self.  She proposes a 
three-pronged approach to creating recognition and understanding of the 
uniqueness of one’s own culture, as well as the similarities that exist across 
cultures: 
[1] In order to understand the independence of the “other” one needs 
to be clear about one’s own boundaries.  [2] One has to be clear 
about the cultural influences and pressures that are inextricably 
involved in one’s own sense of self.  [3] This requires understanding 
oneself in one’s own historical context with an emphasis on the 
overlap, influences and conditions which one is observing in the 
“other”.  Recognising interconnectedness requires two additional 
approaches.  The first is to understand one’s historical relationship to 
the “other” and to approach that understanding from the “other’s 
perspective, i.e., to see the self as the “other” might see you.  
Second, one must see the “other” in her own cultural context as she 
sees herself.62 
In view of this, cross-cultural understanding is important in 
recognising and reinforcing GRACE’s equality rights.   
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 I R Gunning “Arrogant Perception, Third World Travelling and Multicultural Feminism:  
The Case of Female Genital Surgeries (1991-1992) 23 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 
204-5. 
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4.  Culture and Customary Law in the South African Context 
 
…never take for granted, ignore or erase the complexities and 
contradictions of women’s realities. We must invoke the core values of our 
societies to engender transformation; find those values that resonate from 





In exploring the relationship between customary law and culture, specifically 
with regard to living customary law, this thesis takes the position that 
culture, like living customary law, is not static.64  This law can nevertheless 
be consistent within a certain geographic and temporal framework.   
Chapter Four broadly discussed the types of customary law, as well 
as the challenges faced in interacting with it, particularly for courts.  One 
such challenge was with the differences between the official written 
customary law and the living customary law.  In the attempt to observe and 
transcribe living customary law for future official reference, nuance and 
details are often lost.  This result is particularly unfortunate where the 
untranslated (or unnoticed) cultural nuances in fact contain the key to 
broader understanding and interpretation.  So, the real challenge is how to 
capture the current form of customary law adequately and reflect this in 
writing so that it can be observed and understood by outsiders.   
Furthermore, there is the matter of how to update the written texts (or 
legislation) so as to keep pace with the natural development of living 
customary law.  Once this issue has been resolved, then one can readily 
identify the content of the customary law at issue.  It is this content (as 
currently practised and/or reflected in writing, as applicable) that must be 





 S Tamale “The Rights to Culture and the Culture of Rights: A Critical Perspective on 
Women’s Sexual Rights in Africa” (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 47 at 60. 
64
 See L Juma “Reconciling African Customary Law and Human Rights in Kenya: Making a 
Case for Institutional Reformation and Vitalisation of Customary Adjudication Processes” 
(2002) St Thomas Law Review 459 at 485.  This conception of customary law not being 
static is akin to the fluidity of culture, as discussed earlier in part 2. 
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In presenting the GRACE model as a means of facilitating access to 
equality, four themes set the framework for an analysis that is applicable to 
GRACE’s situation.  Firstly, GRACE’s multiple and complex identity aspects 
intersect to form the basis of the discrimination to which she is susceptible 
in the context of South African customary law.  At the same time however, 
these intersecting aspects of her identity establish GRACE as a distinct, yet 
familiar individual in the context of South Africa, as a result of which she is 
readily absorbed into an established community. 
Secondly, GRACE’s contemporary existence in post-Apartheid South 
Africa means that she is caught between multiple contexts, each with a 
unique perspective on the range of human rights applicable to her.  On the 
one hand, there is the modern drive towards globally endorsed and 
protected notions of human rights for the individual; on the other, there is 
the traditional cultural perspective, which emphasises the rights of the group 
over those of the individual.65 
Thirdly, acknowledgement of GRACE’s intersecting identity requires 
a similar acknowledgement that her identity is set against a background that 
reflects an intersection and interdependence of economic, social, and 
cultural rights, as well as civil and political rights.  This particular intersection 
acknowledges the impact that the range of rights has on influencing the 
context within which equality is defined and enjoyed. 
And finally, if any of the discrimination or oppression that GRACE 
experiences is at the community or cultural level, then efforts to change this 
experience would require an examination of the role of these community 
factors.  This final theme examines how citizens, through actions in their 
daily lives, can contribute to the oppression and marginalisation of women.  
This is not to ignore (or leave unchallenged) the role that state actors may 
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play, but rather to acknowledge (as is reflected in South Africa’s 
Constitution66), that there is a horizontal relationship of interaction between 
and amongst citizens, as well as a vertical relationship between state and 
citizen – and both of these relationships have the capacity to either foster or 
diminish an individual’s enjoyment of equality. 
The attainment of equality rights for GRACE must be developed 
through a network that is applicable in her community, her country, and 
beyond.  GRACE’s attainment of equality is not only dependent upon who 
she is, but also upon the culture and, by implication, the legal system by 
which she is governed.  This legal regime is another intersecting aspect of 
her identity.  Access to equality for GRACE becomes problematic when it is 
determined through the conflicts of law process by an outsider to GRACE’s 
culture and value system.   
The idea of using GRACE as an analytical model is based on an 
acknowledgement of the impact that GRACE’s intersecting aspects of 
identity have on her experience of the world.  Similarly, the notion of a plural 
legal system takes into account the myriad social and legal normative legal 
orders at play in South Africa.67  Both pluralism and intersectionality are 
contemporary theories of legal analysis that pay close attention to the legal 
subject and give full consideration to contextual factors related to both 
environment and identity.   In focusing on an intersectionality analysis that 
seeks to secure equality rights for GRACE, the identity aspect of culture 
includes customary law.   In fact, arguably, this aspect is at the core of her 
identity, just as culture was also at the core of the intersectionality analysis.    
																																																								
66
 See subsection 8(2) of the Constitution, which states: 
A provision of the Bill of Rights binds a natural or a juristic person if, and to the 
extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the nature of the right and the 
nature of any duty imposed by the right. 
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Essentially, “culture represents the accumulation of a people’s wisdom 
and thus their identity; it is real and without it a people is without a name, 
rudderless and torn from its moorings.”68 Despite its core positioning, the 
fluidity of culture (and by extension identity) renders it more like a pivot than 
an anchor.   Indeed, Mutua reminds us:  
culture itself is a dynamic and alchemical mix of many variables 
including religion, philosophy, history and mythology, politics, 
environmental factors, language and economics.  The interaction of 
these variables – both within the culture and through influence by 
other cultures – produces competing social visions and values in 
any given society.69 
 
Hence, although culture does provide context, meaning and relational 
understanding among community members, it does not ascribe a meaning or 
definition that is fixed or intransient.  Again referring to the importance of 
culture as being what it does rather than what it is, we see that it provides a 
framework for the fluid expression and development of a group’s identity, 
rather than prescribe a fixed label. 
The issue explored in this chapter is not simply one of recognising 
GRACE and the intersecting aspects of her identity, but also one of 
accepting that an intersectionality analysis provides for full realisation and 
development of her rights in the context of customary law.  Further, an 
intersectionality analysis may also make allowances for an interpretation of 




 M Mutua “Savages, Victims and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights” (2001) 42 
Harvard International Law Journal 220. 
69
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The 2005 Constitutional Court decision in Bhe v Khayelitsha1 can be used as 
a basis to demonstrate the application of the GRACE model to illuminate 
context and equality entitlement in future customary law situations involving 
female succession and property inheritance.2  The analysis of select cases 
involving a direct conflict between customary law and (gender) equality3 
																																																								
1
 Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (Commissioner for Gender Equality 
as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights Commission 
and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC). 
2
 In Chapter Seven, the GRACE model is further applied to certain other customary law 
cases, particularly Shilubana v Nwamitwa.  An assessment of how equality as provided for in 
the GRACE analysis can be realised under both the common law and customary law 
frameworks to address the delict of seduction will be explored in Chapter Eight.  
3
 The cases to be discussed here in Chapter Six and following in Chapter Seven are Bhe 
and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); Mabena v Letsoalo 
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indicates that the women litigants have a means of agency, independence 
and capacity to litigate, all of which women had been traditionally denied in a 
customary law context.  This agency and capacity reflect an 
acknowledgement that customary law can be embraced in contemporary 
society in a manner that reflects principles of equality, fairness and non-
discrimination.   
The cases discussed in Chapter Six and Chapter Seven seek to 
balance the right to culture (as reflected in the form of customary law) with 
the right to equality or non-discrimination.4  The GRACE model demonstrates 
the fundamental connection between intersecting aspects of identity.  Note 
that the specifics of the model are adaptable and transferable to various 
situations where community practice may be in conflict with constitutional 
provision – particularly the right to equality.5  
2. Bhe v. Khayelitsha Magistrate: An Overview 
 
The challenge for the Constitutional Court in Bhe was to reconcile the 
customary law rule of male primogeniture6 with the constitutional principle of 
equality.  Almost a decade earlier, the 1996 Constitution had been heralded 
as the panacea for all of the injustices that had characterised South Africa 
during the Apartheid era.  The Constitution brought in a new regime, one 
governed by equality, non-discrimination and fairness.  This shift would help 
to transform a new post-apartheid South Africa.7 
																																																																																																																																																													
(1998) (2) SA 1068 (T); Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC) and Mayelane v 
Ngwanyama and Another 2013 (4) SA 415 (CC). 
4 Equality and non-discrimination are identified as two of the founding provisions of the 
Constitution of South Africa.  See section 1, Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996.  
See also section 9, which provides for the framework of equality rights. 
5
 Although constructed to represent an African girl child subject to customary law, the 
GRACE model can be used to represent any intersecting set of identities.  The purpose of 
the model is to demonstrate the consequences and entitlements that flow from one particular 
identity construction vis-à-vis another. 
6
 Simply put, the customary law rule of male primogeniture provides that succession is only 
through the male line; effectively excluding females from succeeding to the role of family 
head.  See T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 335. 
7
 See Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, section 1.  See also: Z Motala “South 
Africa’s Constitutional Options in Comparative Perspective: Moving Towards a Responsible 
and Democratic Constitution” (1993) 2 Journal of International Law & Practice 253-280; Z 
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Bhe presented an opportunity for the Court to set the standard for 
future negotiations between the new constitutional principles and customary 
law.  The negotiations also included a determination of the role that 
Apartheid era legislation8 would or should play in paving the way forward in 
the new South Africa.  Similarly, it would include consideration of the way in 
which the new constitution could be used to develop the customary law 
while preserving cultural traditions in a way that was not contrary to the 
contemporary notions of equality and fairness. 
The Bhe case required the Constitutional Court to grapple with the 
issue of equality balanced against customary law principles and practices.  In 
rendering its decision, the court “found that the protection of women and 
children would be achieved by not allowing the development of the 
customary law of succession in a piecemeal and sometimes slow fashion.”9  
Thus, in one bold sweeping decision, the (official) customary law practice of 
male primogeniture was abolished as being contrary to the Constitution.  The 
issue however, is whether this one bold move would be effective in securing 
full access to substantive equality for GRACE, an African girl child subject to 
customary law. 
The approach taken in Justice Langa’s majority judgment, was to 
remove the rule of male primogeniture from customary law altogether, and 
apply the common law gender-neutral rule reflected in the Intestate 
Succession Act instead.  This suggested that the common law could remedy 
the problem of discrimination that was inherent in the customary law rule.  
																																																																																																																																																													
Motala, “Constitution-Making in Divided Societies and Legitimacy: Lessons from the South 
African Experience” (2005-2006) 15 Temple Political & Civil Rights Law Review 147-164; A 
D Lowenberg “Post-Apartheid Constitution for South Africa: Lessons from Public Choice” 
(1992-1993) 12 Cato Journal 297-320; C Murray “A Constitutional Beginning: Making South 
Africa’s Final Constitution” (2000-2001) 23 University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
809-838. 
8
 A prime example of apartheid-era legislation would be the Black Administration Act 38 of 
1927.  Justice Ngcobo in his dissenting judgment in Bhe quotes his own statement from a 
2000 Constitutional Court case in which the Act has been referred to as “an egregious 
apartheid law that anachronistically has survived our transition to a non-racial democracy”. 
See Bhe per Ngcobo at paragraph 141. 
9
 B. Mmusinyane “The Role of Traditional Authorities in Developing Customary Laws in 
Accordance with the Constitution: Shilubana and Others v Nwamitwa”, (2009) 12 
Potchesfstroom Electronic Law Journal 141. 
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Although this might have produced an immediate and desirable result for the 
litigants in Bhe, it tainted the reputation of customary law, thus suggesting 
that it was inherently incompatible with the Constitutional provision of equality 
– an incompatibility that could not be resolved.10  Moreover, this approach 
insinuated a hierarchal preference for the common law over the customary 
law.  Such a preference was contrary to the new position of customary law 
under the Constitution, and contrary to the argument for parity in a conflict of 
laws process and a policy of strong legal pluralism expressed in Chapter 
Four.11 
(a) Bhe v Khayelitsha: The Facts 
 
The constitutional challenge in the Bhe case was brought on behalf of the 
two minor daughters of Ms Nontupheko Bhe and Mr. Vuyo Mgolombane.  Mr. 
Mgolombane died intestate in 2002.  The couple had lived together from 
1990 until the time of his death.  During the period of cohabitation, Ms Bhe 
was a domestic worker, and Mr. Mgolombane was a carpenter.  They lived in 
a temporary informal shelter in Khayelitsha, Cape Town.  Mr. Mgolombane 
obtained state housing subsidies that he used to purchase the property on 
which the family lived, as well as materials to build a house.  At the time of 
his death, the youngest daughter lived with her parents in the temporary 
shelter, and the oldest daughter lived with Mr. Mgolombane’s father, 
Maboyisi Mgolombane, in another community. 
The estate of the younger Mr. Mgolombane consisted of the 
temporary informal shelter, and the property on which it stood, and various 
items of movable property that Ms Bhe and Mr. Mgolombane had acquired 
over the years, including the materials for the house they intended to build.  
When Mr. Mgolombane died, his father, who lived several hundred 
kilometres away, was appointed representative and sole heir of his estate, in 
accordance with section 23 of the Black Administration Act, the legislation 
																																																								
10
 Even so, this immediate and desirable result, although providing for equality in the 
moment, could be construed as myopic in the customary law sense if it did not also consider 
the future interests of the girl child. 
11
 See Chapter Four, part 2(b) and (c). 
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dealing with both choice of law and the substantive law of succession for 
black South Africans.12  Essentially, section 23 provided that the intestate 
devolution of estates of black South Africans would be in accordance with the 
customary law rule of male primogeniture. 
The elder Mr. Mgolombane indicated that he intended to sell the 
movable property to offset his son’s funeral expenses.  This decision did not 
seem to consider the consequences that would result for Ms Bhe and her 
daughter(s).  In seeking to prevent the sale of the property, Ms Bhe argued 
that the automatic application of customary law and the rule of male 
primogeniture unfairly discriminated against her daughters by preventing 
them from inheriting the estate of their father. 
 
 
(b) Bhe v Khayelitsha: The Result 
 
The Court decided 10-1 in favour of resorting to the Intestate Succession 
Act as a stopgap measure to provide for equality rights for those subject to 
customary law, where such law does not clearly make such a provision.13 
The dissent by Justice Ngcobo was not a dissent against the end result of 
equality; rather, his approach aimed to develop the particular customary law 
rule at issue so as to reflect the constitutional principles of equality. 
Justice Ngcobo’s suggestion that the judiciary must develop the 
customary law so as to align it with contemporary constitutional principles is 
the best way of ensuring that customary law is both preserved and 
developed in accordance with constitutional principles.14  The caution and 
																																																								
12
 The particular result in Bhe is that once the provisions of the Black Administrative Act are 
deemed contrary to the Constitution, the default fall-back position is to bring customary law 
of succession into the ambit of the common law regime provided for in the Intestate 
Succession Act 1987. 
13
 Where the majority judgment in Bhe found that the customary law rule of male 
primogeniture was inconsistent with the constitutional provisions of equality, it opted to 
substitute the regime detailed in the Intestate Succession Act 1987 for the customary law 
regime.   
14
 See Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, section 39(2), which states: 
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deference that Deputy Chief Justice (as he then was) Langa applies to 
customary law should not be overlooked.  However, if all law in South 
Africa, is to be subject to the Bill of Rights, then there is indeed a judicial 
obligation to ensure that this takes place.  In the course of making this 
argument, the following discussion considers certain key issues and 
examines the strengths and weaknesses of each judgment in resolving 
these issues. 
The result in Bhe still leaves room for further judicial intervention (or 
development of the customary law, as referenced by Justice Ngcobo in 
dissent).15  Such development would reflect an interpretation and application 
of contemporary equality principles in light of customary law.16  It is 
contended that intersectionality, even if not expressed by the rights-seeker, 
can be applied as an analytical method to facilitate the determination of a 
remedy by the courts.17  The basis of this argument is not that 
intersectionality should be considered only when it is pleaded by a litigant as 
a characteristic feature, but rather that intersectionality, and the breadth of 
the equality rights analysis that comes in its wake, can be applied more 
generally by the judiciary in the process of meting out equality rights.   
																																																																																																																																																													
When interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights.  
15
 Ngcobo’s argument for development of the customary law of succession begins first with a 
review as to how the customary law itself developed in terms of its community purpose and 
impact.  It is only with this understanding that the judiciary can appropriately develop the 
customary law in line with the Constitution. See Bhe (n 3) at paragraphs 162-175.  Further, 
Justice Ngcobo’s argument is development of customary law, rather than simply striking it 
down.  See Bhe at paragraph 215-222. 
16
 See J C Bekker & P D De Kock “Adaptation of the Customary Law of Succession to 
Changing Needs” (1992) 25 Comparative & International Law Journal of Southern Africa 
366-378. 
17
 In his discussion on the appropriate remedy in view of the decision to develop the 
customary law of succession to bring it in line with the Constitution, Justice Ngcobo in 
dissent argues that simply substituting the principles of the Intestate Succession Act is 
insufficient, as this Act does not speak to the contextual realities of those to whom the 
customary law of succession applies. This recognition of the need for development within 
context does not speak directly to acknowledging the intersection identities of the rights 
claimant, but Ngcobo’s analysis is clearly thinking along the lines of addressing individual 
identity as well as community cultural context.  See Bhe at paragraphs 235-239. Note also 
that the broader contextual development argued here by Ngcobo was the approach taken by 
the majority in Mayelane v Ngwenyama 2013 (4) SA 415. The issue there however was 
whether it was appropriate for the Court to develop the customary law without being explicitly 
asked to do so by the parties.  Mayelane is discussed in Chapter Seven, part 2(c) of this 
thesis. 
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3. Bhe: An Analysis in Three Parts 
 
Having presented an overview of the Bhe judgments, we move now to an 
exploration of the concepts of succession and inheritance and how these are 
related to the customary law rule of primogeniture.  This is done through a 
contextual analysis of the following components: 
a) identification of customary law 
b) the customary law of male primogeniture 
c) addressing the presumptive hierarchy between the 
common law and customary law 
 
(a) Identification of Customary Law 
 
In negotiating the balance between customary law and the common law, the 
first step is to determine the precise content of the customary law at issue.  
As was discussed in Chapter Four, there are three different forms of 
customary law: living, official and academic.18    
Living customary law differs from both official and academic 
customary law in the sense that it has the capacity to change as social 
context and attitudes change.  However, judicial intervention may be 
necessary to ensure that such changes are in line with the Constitution.19  
At issue in this case was the validity of the customary law of 
succession.  It may be helpful here to pause to clarify the distinction 
between common law inheritance and customary law succession and 
expound upon the content of customary law succession as it relates to Bhe.   
																																																								
18
 See Chapter Four, part 2(a)(ii) for an earlier discussion of the living, official and academic 
forms of customary law. 
19
 See Constitution of South Africa (n 14) section 39(2).  
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Inheritance “generally refers to the testate or intestate transfer of 
rights, liabilities or title of the deceased.”20  Succession refers to “the order in 
which or the conditions under which one person after another succeeds to a 
property, dignity, position, title or throne.”21  In South Africa, the common law 
of succession uses the two terms interchangeably.  Only the term 
“succession” should be used for customary law in order to describe properly 
the “process whereby the successor steps into the shoes of the deceased 
with regard to the latter’s property and his status.”22  Most importantly, in the 
customary law context, the successor (or heir) succeeds not only to assets 
of the estate, but also to its liabilities.”23 
It is one thing to acknowledge the force and applicability of customary 
law in theory.  It is quite another to determine the precise content of a 
particular customary law rule and practice within a certain customary law 
community.  As Bennett explains, “customary law derives from the practice 
of particular communities; these practices differ from place to place, and 
they change constantly over time. In such circumstances, a court that is not 
part of the community it serves cannot possibly know the law.”24  Thus the 
potential problem of ascertaining customary law was sidestepped by the 






 C Rautenbach & Willemien du Plessis “Reform of the South African Customary Law of 
Succession: Final Nails in the Customary Law Coffin?”  in J Fenrich P Galizzi & T E Higgins 
(eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2013) 336. 
21




 Ibid.  See also, Bhe (n 3) at paragraph 158 per Ngcobo. 
24
 T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 6) 44. 
25
 Despite the elevated status of customary law (both living and official) brought on by the 
1996 Constitution, the difficulty of ascertaining the precise content of customary law and 
practice still remains – and was most recently an issue in the 2013 Constitutional Court case 
of Mayelane v Ngwenyama.  Mayelane, and the Court’s difficulty in determining the 
customary law (for the purposes of developing it – which incidentally was not a remedy that 
either of the litigants requested) is discussed in Chapter Seven. 
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(b) The Customary Law Rule of Male Primogeniture 
 
The customary law rule of male primogeniture permits only senior 
males to succeed to a deceased man’s estate.  The theory behind the 
original rule was sound, as it assumed that a male heir, in fulfilling the role 
that culture bestowed upon him within his family and community, would step 
into the place of the deceased and thus provide for any dependent women 
and children.26  In essence, the heir would inherit the estate in trust so as to 
discharge his on going responsibility to provide for surviving dependants in 
the family.27 
Traditionally under customary law, women could not succeed to the 
status of a family head for at least two reasons.  In the first place, they had 
neither the authority nor the capacity to represent the deceased’s family to 
the outside world, in part, because they lacked the necessary locus standi to 
sue or be sued in court.  In the second place, it was believed that daughters 
could not serve as heirs, because, in due course, they would eventually 
marry and move to their husband’s family.  Their loyalties would therefore lie 
																																																								
26
 In addition to caring for dependents, one of the main objectives of the customary law of 
succession was to continue the family lineage.  See M Mamashela and W Freedman “The 
Internal Conflict of Law and the Intestate Succession of Africans: Zondi v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2000 2 SA 49 (N)” (2003) Journal of South African Law 201-207. 
Interestingly, Maluleke notes that primogeniture was not an original aspect of customary law 
at all, but in fact was a construction of colonial rule, which became adopted as customary 
law because it served the interests of the male authorities who interpreted and applied 
customary law.  So, although it may not be historically accurate to say that customary law 
originally provided for male-only inheritance, it did certainly evolve that way.  Consider: 
 
The primogeniture rule, which has just been abolished by the Constitutional Court 
in the case of Bhe, was not a customary law principle but a colonial and imperial 
construct imposed on Africans. The irony of it is that African males embraced it as 
their customary principle because it benefitted them; therefore they are the ones 
who were fighting against its being declared unconstitutional. The primogeniture 
rule was conceived by the framers of the Natal Code to be one of the main pillars 
of the 'native law' to their own benefit. It was imposed on Africans in order for the 
state to be able to litigate against one person rather than to have to join the whole 
family when the head of the house died. 
M J Maluleke “Culture, Tradition, Custom, Law and Gender Equality” 15 (2012) 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 16. 
27
 See T W Bennett A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (1991) 383, 
where he notes the difference between “inheritance” and “succession”.   
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with the new family and not with their natal family.28  Hence, to permit a 
woman or girl child to inherit from her father would bring with it the risk that 
once she married, she would take her family’s wealth to her husband’s 
family, thus disadvantaging the family into which she was born. 
The customary law rules of succession and the rule of primogeniture 
in particular, were not originally designed to place women and children at a 
disadvantage.  Instead, this rule was developed in consideration of the 
family structure and the responsibilities between family members.29  The 
reality is that as this traditional family structure evolved over time, what 
began as a protective mechanism transformed into something 
discriminatory and unjust.  The main purpose of succession and the rule of 
primogeniture was to keep the family property in the family, not to 
disenfranchise those who have been traditionally recognised as being the 
most vulnerable.  This vulnerability is often heightened by the fact that 
customary law is typically practised by those living in rural communities.  
This creates a further divide between the rural customary law practitioners 
and those who migrate to the cities in search of education and employment 
and in the process develop a disdain for their customary law roots and 
traditions. 
According to the cultural context in which the rule of male 
primogeniture was developed, this all made perfect sense.  But times and 
circumstances have changed and contemporary application of this rule (in 
both rural and urban locations) is no longer as appropriate.30 The traditional 
rule of male primogeniture was based on the understanding that the heir 
																																																								
28
 J C Bekker & D S Koyana “ The Judicial and Legislative Reform of the Customary Law of 
Succession” (2012) De Jure 569. 
29
 As Justice Ngcobo explains: 
The rules of indigenous law, in particular, the rule of primogeniture, have their origin in 
traditional society.  This society was based on a subsistence agricultural economy.  At 
the heart of the African traditional structure was the family unit.  The family unit was 
the focus of social concern.  Individual interests were submerged in the common weal.  
The system emphasised duties and responsibilities as opposed to rights. … The 
family organization was self-sufficient.  Within this system, the position of each 
member of the family was based on an equitable division of labour. 
See Bhe (n 3) at paragraph 162, 166. 
30
 Part of the reason for this is that in contemporary South African Society, wives have begun 
to work outside of the home in order to contribute to the family’s welfare. 
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would put the interests of the deceased’s family before his own.  This is an 
overly optimistic assumption in modern times, given that the demands of 
urban life have spawned individualism and self-interest.31   
The customary law rules of succession, and the rule of primogeniture 
in particular, were originally developed as a result of the family structure and 
the high degree of responsibility expected of members.32  The reality is that, 
as the traditional family structure has changed, what began as a protective 
mechanism changed into something potentially discriminatory, that is, 
something materially prejudicial to women.33  This prejudice is often 
exacerbated by the fact that tradition tends to be stronger amongst those 
living in rural communities.34 
The majority judgment held that in light of the new era of non-
discrimination, estates that would previously have devolved according to the 
customary law rules prescribed in the Black Administration Act35 and the 
																																																								
31 See W Lehnert “The Role of the Courts in the Conflict Between African Customary Law 
and Human Rights” (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 257: 
It has been shown that under present conditions heirs, both in urban and in rural 
areas, increasingly ignore their obligations of support.  Because heirs are becoming 
increasingly disobedient with regard to performing their duties, customary law no 
longer achieves its social purpose of protecting the interests of all family members, 
and the formal recognition of women and children’s rights under customary law does 
not ensure that they will be respected. 
See also M Chanock “Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of 
Family Law Reform” (1989) 3 International Journal of Law and the Family 72-79; A Griffiths 
“Legal Pluralism in Africa: The Role of Gender and Women’s Access to Law” (1996) 19 
Political and Legal Anthropology Review 93-94. 
32 See again, Ngcobo J’s comments about the origin of primogeniture rules (n 29).  See 	Bhe 
(n 3) at paragraph 162, 166.  For a further discussion of the content of the customary law of 
succession as it relates to this case, see part 4(a) below.	
33
 See the Preamble to the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of 
Related Matters Act, 11 of 2009, where it is noted in the Preamble that “social circumstances 
have so changed that the customary law of succession no longer provides adequately for the 
welfare of family members” 
34
 This creates a further divide between the rural customary law practitioners and those who 
migrate to the cities in search of education and employment and in the process develop a 
disdain for their customary law roots and traditions.  See T W Bennett, “The Interpersonal 
Conflict of Laws: a Technique for Adapting to Social Change in Africa” (1980) 18 Africana: 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 128.   
35
 Note that at the time of the Bhe decision, provisions of the Black Administration Act were 
gradually being repealed, out of recognition of the inherent racist and divisive context in 
which the legislation emerged and prospered in apartheid-era South Africa. At the time of the 
writing of this chapter, the Act had been repealed in its entirety, thus alleviating any 
legislative basis for differential treatment of Black South Africans.  As explained by Justice 
Ngcobo in Bhe,  
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customary law rule of male primogeniture, must now give way to the rules 
provided for in the Intestate Succession Act36.  Before the Bhe case, this Act 
applied to deceased persons who did not fall under customary law, and 
consequently the ambit of the Black Administration Act.37 
Justice Langa was of the opinion that development of the customary 
law was not the responsibility of the judiciary.38  His solution was to remove 
the Bhe daughters from the operation of customary law altogether, in order to 
secure their right to equality.39  Such an approach, although it produces the 
desired result for the applicants in the moment, does not satisfactorily 
address the long-term implications of a conflict between customary law and 
equality.   
																																																																																																																																																													
The Act was one of the pillars of the apartheid legal order, and together with other 
racially based statutes, it was part of the edifice of the apartheid legal order.  The Act 
has been described as “an egregious apartheid law” that “anachronistically has 
survived our transition to a non-racial democracy. 
See Bhe (n 3), per Ngcobo J at paragraph 141.  See also Moseneke and Others v The 
Master and Another 2001 (2) SA 18 (CC) at paragraph 29, per Sachs J.  This case 
examined the constitutionality of section 23(7)(a) and regulation 3(1) under the Black 
Administration Act [BAA] challenged on the basis that they disallowed black intestate estates 
from being administered and distributed by the Master of the High Court. The Court granted 
the applicant direct access and declared the section unconstitutional with immediate effect 
and inconsistent with the applicants’ rights to equality and dignity. An appeal by the Minister 
of Justice against the order of the High Court striking down the regulation was upheld in part. 
The regulation was struck down and the order of invalidity was suspended for a period of two 
years.  The Court decided that the fact that the BAA brought black estates automatically into 
the purview of customary law (as opposed to providing for the option of having the Master 
administer the estates) was problematic. 
36
 Act 81 of 1987. 
37
 The complicating factor with devolving estates via the BAA was that the Act required the 
fragmentation of the estate, with widows and children inheriting fractions of estates.  In the 
context of small estates, which might only consist of a township shack (as was the case in 
Bhe), the challenge was that these divided fractions of shacks would be impractical and 
useless.  This example highlights the difference (namely poverty and racial divisions) 
between the white estates that devolved via the Intestate Succession Act and the Black 
estates that devolved via the Black Administration Act. 
38
 In finding that there was insufficient evidence and material to enable the Court to develop 
the customary law rule of male primogeniture, Justice Langa stated that “[t]he difficulty lies 
not so much in acceptance of the notion of ‘living’ customary law, as distinct from official 
customary law, but in determining its content and testing it, as the Court should, against the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.”  See Bhe per Langa at paragraph 109.   
39
 The assumption here is that Langa performed a deliberate choice of law (see the rules on 
choice of law in Chapter Four).  Such an approach, however, while perfectly correct in 
principle, leaves customary law intact. 
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In terms of the argument put forward by this thesis, the decision in 
Bhe has the unfortunate effect of removing culture40 (in the form of living 
customary law) as an aspect of identity for the girl child.  Recall that the 
importance of culture as a fundamental aspect of identity was discussed in 
Chapter Five41.  In fact, it is the position throughout this thesis that culture is 
the backdrop against which all aspects of identity intersect.  Moreover, a 
cultural lens prescribes not only the determination of equality, but also the 
comparators upon which this determination is assessed. 
In dissent, Justice Ngcobo, expressed his opinion that, before striking 
down customary law, courts have a constitutional obligation to “develop”42 it 
to bring it into line with the Bill of Rights, in particular, the right to equality.43    
Development of the customary law as proposed by Ngcobo has the 
advantage of allowing the judiciary to observe cultural practices as they are 
currently being applied in the communities.44 
While Justice Ngcobo’s dissent reflects a clear appreciation of the link 
between gender and discrimination in customary law, he says that the 
customary law rule of primogeniture is being challenged “on the basis that it 
																																																								
40
 Part of the consequence of removing or disregarding culture as an aspect of identity is that 
the entire framework of understanding becomes unmoored and essentially cast adrift without 
any grounding.  Specifically, such removal would mean that women who have been given 
common law rights as a remedy from the courts, are likely to suffer persecution from their 
communities for drifting outside of the community framework.  Additionally, given that the 
common law and customary law enjoy equal status under the Constitution, the removal or 
disregarding of culture functions to remove any distinguishing features between the two. In 
this respect it may then be redundant to emphasise the equal status between the two, if the 
removal of culture renders them characteristically equal in any event. 
41
 See Chapter Five, section 3(b). 
42
 But note that the argument advanced in this chapter is not that courts should “develop” 
customary law, but rather that the GRACE model is a tool to enhance recognition and 
consequently, judicial application of living customary law. 
43
 See s 39(2) of Constitution which reads:  
When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common law or customary law, 
every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights. 
44
 See Bhe (n 3) per Ngcobo J at paragraph 139. But note that the argument is not simply 
that the judiciary must always engage in development of the customary law, but also that the 
judiciary must be able to recognise the development of customary law that has taken place 
at the community level. In so doing, however, the living law becomes official law.  Ostensibly, 
once it has been interpreted and reformulated by the judiciary it carries precedent value for 
future cases.  It should be noted that any formal determination of unconstitutionality of a 
living law practice is pronounced when a party has raised the issue in litigation.  Yet for 
reasons which may or may not relate to constitutionality, communities are constantly revising 
and developing their own living law. 
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discriminates unfairly on the grounds of gender, age and birth [order]”.45  The 
acknowledgement of these two latter grounds suggests that there is a 
recognised aspect of intersectionality to the discrimination.  Therefore 
arguably, intersectionality should also factor into the remedy. 
Justice Ngcobo goes further to address not only the intersecting 
nature of the discrimination, but he also seeks to develop the customary law 
to alleviate that discrimination.  This approach is not seen as a means of 
transforming it into the common law, but rather as a means of ensuring its 
compliance with the Bill of Rights “on its own terms and not through the prism 
of common law.”46 
 
(c) Addressing the Presumptive Hierarchy between the Common 
Law and Customary Law 
 
Both the majority and minority judgments in Bhe refer to official customary 
law.  Section 23 of the Black Administration Act, was understood to require 
the application of the customary law rule of primogeniture.47  Neither 
decision contemplates a living form of the customary rule, which might have 
provided a different result.  (In any case, the Court was entitled to consider 
whether the official customary law rule of male primogeniture was in conflict 
with the Constitution.)  The present inquiry examines whether future courts 
should develop the customary law to bring it in line with the Constitution as 
per Justice Ngcobo’s decision. 
																																																								
45
 Bhe (n 3) per Ngcobo J at paragraph 147. 
46
 Ibid paragraph 148. 
47 Note that section 23 of the Black Administration Act did not explicitly codify customary 
law.  Instead, it provided choice of law rules, such that, it provided that movable house 
property and land held under quitrent tenure had to devolve by the customary law of 
intestate succession.  In addition, in terms of Regulation GN R200 of 1987, which was 
issued under s 23(10) of the BAA, the estates of Africans who died intestate were governed 
by customary law, unless: 
• the deceased had been exempted from customary law in terms of the Zulu Code; 
• the estate was devised by will; or 
• the deceased was married by civil/Christian rites with an ante nuptial contract.	
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Such development would have meant that the impugned customary 
law, rather than being struck down in its entirety, would be amended in such 
a way that a customary norm still existed to deal with the issue raised in the 
case, and would no longer be offensive to the constitutional principles of 
fairness and equality.   In this regard, mention may be made of Justice 
Langa’s comment that, 
It is important to appreciate the distinction between the legal 
framework based on section 23 of the [BAA] Act and the place 
occupied by customary law in our constitutional system.  ...  
Certain provisions of the Constitution put it beyond doubt that 
our basic law specifically requires that customary law should be 
accommodated, not merely tolerated, as part of South African 
law, provided the particular rules or provisions are not in conflict 
with the Constitution.48 
The message here is that customary law, generally, ought to be preserved.  
The precise form and content that will be preserved is determined by what is 
left after constitutional negotiation.  This commitment to the preservation of 
customary law alleviates any fear that it will be swallowed up by the 
common law.   
In the effort to preserve customary law, it should not be forgotten that 
the true nature of the system is its ability to adapt and change with the 
times.49  Strictly guarding the law stifles this quality.  As Langa explains, 
[t]he rules of succession in customary law have not been given the 
space to adapt and to keep pace with changing social conditions 
and values.  One reason for this is the fact that they were captured 
in legislation, in text books, in the writings of experts and in court 
decisions without allowing for the dynamism of customary law in 
the face of changing circumstances.  Instead, they have over time 
become increasingly out of step with the real values and 
circumstances of societies they are meant to serve and particularly 
the people who live in urban areas.50 
																																																								
48
 Bhe (n 3) at paragraph 41. 
49
 See Alexkor Ltd and Another v Richtersveld Community and Others 2004 (5) SA 460 at 
paragraph 53, where the Constitutional Court stated:  
…unlike common law, indigenous law is not written.  It is a system of law that has its 
own values and norms.  Throughout its history it has evolved and developed to meet 
the changing needs of the community.  It will continue to evolve within the context of 
its values and norms consistently with the Constitution. 
50
 Bhe (n 3) at paragraph 82. 
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Ironically, therefore, protection of customary law in Apartheid-era 
statutes preserved something that may not have had any social currency.  
In fact, these preservation efforts have also had the effect of delegitimising 
customary law.  People living according to customary law are told that 
certain rules in legal text books and legislation apply to them, although they 
had no hand in drafting the rules. This disjuncture between what the courts 
protect as official customary law and what the people have come to practise 
as living customary law may have done little else than solidify old 
relationships, some of which may, or may not pass the muster test of 
equality.51 
 
4.  Reflections on the Majority Decision in Bhe 
 
As was discussed in Chapter Four, the existence of legal pluralism in South 
Africa means that, rather than being represented as a dying, outdated 
normative order, customary law is very much alive and thriving. 52  The fact 
that the majority decision in Bhe opted to remove the operation of succession 
from the realm of the customary law (albeit, perhaps, temporarily)53, did not 
reflect the fact that a significant population of South Africans live according to 
customary law, albeit one that might not have been accurately reflected in 
the legal texts. 
It ought not to be the case that any issue of incompatibility (whether 
real or presumed) between customary law and the Constitutional provision of 
equality automatically results in the retraction of customary law.  If that were 
the case, then customary law would soon cease to exist in post-Apartheid 
																																																								
51
 Ibid at paragraph 83. 
52 See C Rautenbach & W du Plessis “Reform of the South African Customary Law of 
Succession: Final Nails in the Customary Law Coffin?” (n 20) 340. 
53
 This temporary state was intended to remain, until the legislature could develop a 
permanent solution to the problem of the incompatibility of the customary law operation of 
succession and the rule of male primogeniture with the equality provisions of the 
Constitution.  See Reform of Customary Law of Succession and the Regulation of Related 
Matters Act, 2009.   
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South Africa.54  Another solution to incompatibility lies in acknowledging that 
customary law is a “dynamic system of law which is continually evolving to 
meet the changing circumstances of the community in which it operates.”55  
This feature is common to all custom, and to that extent, customary law is a 
more socially responsive form of law than the precedent bound component of 
the common law.   
In the Bhe case, an appropriate solution might have been found in the 
conflict of laws.  If the parties had demonstrated a “Western” manner of 
living, common law might have been applied.  The choice of law rule in South 
Africa at the time however demanded imposition of customary law regardless 
of the cultural orientation of the deceased or litigants by reason of section 23 
of the Black Administration Act.  What is more, the version of customary law 
considered in the majority judgment was an official version.  The Court did 
not consider that there might have been a living form of this customary law 
rule that could have provided a different result.56  If the Court had deliberated 
further on this matter, it would have been obliged to call witnesses to 
establish whether the community practice on succession had developed to 
reflect changes in the traditional gender roles.57 
Having found that the rule of male primogeniture was in conflict with 
the Constitution, however, the question posed to the Court was whether it 
was further obliged to develop the customary law to bring it into line with the 
																																																								
54
 On this point, one considers whether, once a customary law issue is resolved by reversion 
to the common law, the issue is forever removed from the ambit of customary law. 
55
 Bhe (n 3) per Ngcobo J at paragraph 153. 
56
 Such consideration may have required the Court to ask the parties to provide witness 
evidence to establish whether the community living customary law practice of succession 
had developed to reflect changes in traditional gender roles.  This form of judicial activism 
was evident in Mayelane, where the Court took it upon itself to establish living customary law 
practice.  There has also been much debate (beginning with the dissent in Mayelane as to 
whether this judicial activism was appropriate.   
57
 Note that this issue of witness testimony to assist with ascertaining contemporary living 
customary law is discussed in Chapter Seven in reference to the Shilubana v Nwamitwa and 
Mayelane v Ngwenyama (n 3) cases. 
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Constitution or simply to replace it.58  In this regard, attention is paid to 
Justice Langa’s comment that, 
It is important to appreciate the distinction between the legal 
framework based on section 23 of the act and the place 
occupied by customary law in our constitutional system.  Quite 
clearly the Constitution itself envisages a place for customary 
law in our legal system.  Certain provisions of the Constitution 
put it beyond doubt that our basic law specifically requires that 
customary law should be accommodated, not merely tolerated, 
as part of South African law, provided the particular rules or 
provisions are not in conflict with the Constitution.59 
 The development of the (official) customary law proposed by Ngcobo is 
a means of ensuring that the rules keep pace with evolving social context, by 
reinvigorating the dynamism that is characteristic of customary law.  
Moreover, the importance of this development was referenced by Ngcobo, 
citing Alexkor v Richtersveld, where he says that indigenous law “has 
evolved and developed to meet the changing needs of the community” and 
that it will “continue to evolve within the context of its values and norms 
consistently with the Constitution.”60 
5. Reflections on the Dissent in Bhe 
 
The dissenting judgment of Justice Ngcobo endeavoured to preserve and 
develop the customary law, rather than dispense with it and resort to the 
common law in order to find the equality that was otherwise missing.  Both 
majority and minority judgments arrive at the same result: that the Bhe 
daughters should inherit from their father.  The difference is how this result is 
attained.  The approach taken by the majority is to remove the Bhe 
daughters from the operation of the customary law, since it is this framework 
that is perceived to be at the root of the injustice and inequality that they 
experience.   
																																																								
58
 One question to bear in mind is whether this obligation to develop the customary law is a 
legal duty that is provided for elsewhere than section 39(2) of the Constitution.  
59
 Bhe (n 3) at paragraph 41. 
60
 Alexkor Ltd v The Richtersveld Community 2004 (5) SA 460 (CC) at paragraph 53, as 
cited by Ngcobo J in his dissenting judgment in Bhe paragraph 153. 
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However, recognising that the official customary law in its current form 
(as reflected in the Black Administration Act) was inconsistent with the 
Constitutional provisions of equality, Justice Ngcobo attempted instead to 
develop the official customary law to alleviate any inconsistency.  In fact, he 
was of the opinion that the judiciary was obliged to undertake such 
development.61  Note that this obligation was not new, as the notion of judicial 
development of customary law has existed almost as long as customary law 
has been formally recognised as law in South Africa.62 
 Although theoretically, the solution of developing the customary law is 
more favourable to the rights claimant than that proposed by the majority, 
Justice Ngcobo’s approach fails to acknowledge that the official form of 
customary law may differ from the living law.63  In dealing with this distinction 
from the very beginning, Ngcobo’s analysis differs from that of Justice Langa, 
in that Ngcobo rightly identifies that the litmus test for equality must be the 
Constitution and not the common law.64  
																																																								
61
 See Bhe, paragraph 215, per Ngcobo J: 
[w]here a rule of indigenous law deviates from the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill 
of Rights, courts have an obligation to develop it so as to remove such deviation. This 
obligation is especially important in the context of indigenous law.  Once a rule of 
indigenous law is struck down, that is the end of that particular rule.  Yet there may be 
many people who observe that rule, and who will continue to observe the rule. And 
what is more, the rule may already have been adapted to the ever-changing 
circumstances in which it operates. Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees the 
survival of the indigenous law.  These considerations require that, where possible, 
courts should develop rather than strike down a rule of indigenous law. 
62
 See R S Suttner “The Study of Bantu Law in South Africa: A Review Article (1968) Acta 
Juridica 147-156. 
63
 Specifically, Justice Ngcobo’s proposal for development seems to be based on the official 
customary law – that which can be discerned, interpreted and developed by outsiders – but 
there is no option to defer to a form of living customary law that may not require 
development.  Nor is there an option of how to develop the living customary law if this were 
necessary.  This in turn poses the question as to whether it is possible and appropriate for 
living customary law to be developed by the judiciary, or if development of living customary 
law must come from within the community itself.  (As noted in note 44 above, any 
engagement by the judiciary with living law in effect renders it official law,)   Although 
communities are continuously varying and revising their living law, such changes are not 
considered to be “development” in the context of section 39(2) of the Constitution, for this 
power rests solely with the courts. 
64
 See Bhe per Ngcobo J at paragraph 148.  Note that for the purposes of this argument, the 
Constitution is not considered to be part of the common law, but rather the Constitution sits 
above both the common law and customary law, and both systems of law are subject to the 
Constitution. 
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Justice Ngcobo’s dissent operates from the premise that the first duty 
of the Court is the protection of equality rights.65  The second duty is to apply 
and interpret customary law in a way that is consistent with that duty.   
 
6.   Applying GRACE to the Facts of Bhe v Khayelitsha 
 
This thesis takes the position that since intersection is a reality of GRACE’s 
identity, then intersectionality is also key to the analysis that proposes a 
remedy to address the failed acknowledgement of GRACE’s intersecting 
identity.  In Bhe, development of customary law was an option endorsed by 
Ngcobo’s dissent; it is the most authentic way of ensuring that customary 
law is consistent with equality principles.  Further, such authenticity is 
enhanced if the development reflects an acknowledgement of the 
intersecting identity of the rights holder, for instance, GRACE.  
When a matter reaches the level of judicial intervention, then it is the 
responsibility of the judiciary to develop the customary law at issue 
appropriately to avoid any conflicting interpretations or operation between the 
impugned law and the Constitution.66  In the course of developing customary 
law, due consideration ought to be given to the current and evolving 
practices of the community in relation to the issue at hand. 
Application of the GRACE model to the facts of the Bhe case involves 
at first instance, recognition of the importance of cultural context as the 
backdrop to GRACE’s intersecting identity.67  The result in Bhe is wholly 
dependent upon an acknowledgment of the customary law context and what 
this means in terms of the attainment of equality.  Acknowledging context 
implies that the practice and perspective of the community is important to the 
task of finding the best remedy. 
																																																								
65
 The right to equality is provided for in section 9 of the Constitution. Moreover, section 1(a) 
identifies equality as one of the founding provisions of the Constitution.  These founding 
provisions also function as interpretative principles.  Thus the right to equality is intended to 
be a guiding principle that shapes the interpretation and application of the Constitution. 
66
 See section 39(2) of Constitution. 
67
 See Chapter Five, part 3(b). 
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The majority analysis in Bhe correctly identifies the relevant issues as 
gender, age and birth order (all within the broader context of customary law).  
The GRACE model further requires consideration of how the age, gender 
and birth order collectively impact the right of the Bhe daughters to inherit 
from their father.68  An analysis that did not incorporate this perspective 
would look at the issues of gender, age, and birth order independently, 
without any consideration as to how each may inform the other, thereby 
further inhibiting potential access to equality.69  Furthermore, a 
comprehensive GRACE analysis would recognise and apply considerations 
of race and culture.  
Application of GRACE to the facts of the Bhe case involves 
consideration as to whether the cultural context in which the Bhe daughters 
live is one that can separate out the gender distinction from the inheritance 
entitlement.  If contemporary culture, social and economic conditions do not 
operate to restrict family inheritance simply along male lines, then there is no 
basis for denying the Bhe daughters an inheritance right that they would 
have had if they had been Bhe sons. 
The Bhe case turned on the issue of the right of succession – or 
specifically, a claimed property.70  The inheritance of resources at the centre 
																																																								
68
 As Lehnert explains, the Court’s application of a strict interpretation of the rule of male 
primogeniture in Bhe would mean that the deceased’s father became the sole heir, and the 
two daughters were excluded from inheriting.  “The court then assumed that male 
primogeniture constituted intersectional unfair discrimination based on race and gender, 
because it excluded persons who are black and female from inheriting.”  Thus this 
recognition of intersectional discrimination suggests that an analytical method to address the 
discrimination ought also to reflect an acknowledgement of intersectionality.  See W Lehnert 
(n 31) 260. 
69
 Birth order becomes an aspect of identity that forms part of the GRACE analysis, because 
the rule of male primogeniture in customary law held that only first-born males could inherit.  
This is contrary to the customary law rule of ultimogeniture, where inheritance was accorded 
to the youngest son.  See Bhe (n 3) per Ngcobo J at paragraph 192. 
70
 This is not intended to conflate the issues of succession and inheritance, for Bennett has 
clearly explained that the two issues are completely separate.  However, for the purpose of 
simplifying the issues and making them relevant to contemporary realities, it is said that the 
real issue in Bhe was who had access to the property of the deceased.  The right of access 
or entitlement to the property was for the purpose of controlling it – whether this meant the 
use, occupation or sale of the property.  Simply put, the issue of succession in Bhe was a 
matter of determining who was rightfully entitled to inherit the property and thereby do with it 
as was necessary to preserve the best interests of the family.  The constitutional issue was 
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of this case involved bare necessities: building materials and shack housing.  
As meagre as these materials may have been by some standards, they 
constituted the very lifeblood of existence for those concerned.  And it was 
this grave matter of bare survival that made the case and the consequences 
of its analysis so fundamental to the future of the livelihoods and existence of 
members of customary law communities in South Africa. 
The daughters’ right to inherit property is not only about being 
recognised as legal subjects, but also about the ability to own, manage and 
control property as a means towards economic independence and self-
sufficiency.  The modernisation of the customary law rule of male 
primogeniture to include equal inheritance rights to women and girls reflects 




The problem with gender is that it prescribes who we should be rather than 
recognises who we are71  
 
Gender is quite obviously a key aspect of the official customary law rule 
of male primogeniture.  The origins of this rule as being responsive to the 
social and practical realties of family relationships and family needs was 
explained earlier.72  What is less clear however, is that contemporary 
realities of shared contributions to the household and the diminishing 
rigidity of fixed gender roles, as well as the equality provisions in the 
Constitution have eroded the basis for differential treatment and 
entitlement under customary law.  Hence, true gender equality would see 
the Bhe daughters – as opposed to sons – as heirs to their father’s estate 
(and their mother as guardian of this inheritance on their behalf).  
																																																																																																																																																													
specifically whether this right of access was in any way diminished or compromised by age 
and/or gender. 
71
 C N Adichie We Should All Be Feminists (2014) 28.  
72
 See part 3(b). 
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The Reform of the Customary Law of Succession Act (RCLSA) and 
the post-Bhe regime specifically provide for spousal inheritance and the 
requirement that the heir administer the children’s share of the estate.73  
This of course assumes that the mother was indeed the spouse of the 
deceased.  In Bhe there was some question as to the legitimacy of the 
Bhe daughters due to questions about whether the lobolo payment had 
been sufficient to solemnise the marriage.74  The Reform of the 
Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 
also addresses the issue of legitimacy and provides increased protection 
for children of customary marriages (by presuming legitimacy unless it 
would be inappropriate or unreasonable to do so). 
 
(b) Race  
 
The mere fact that the issue in the case involves customary law suggests 
that the litigants are Indigenous Black Africans.  As part of the historical 
underpinning of official customary law, male primogeniture was only 
applicable to this sector of the population.75  The BAA itself did not create 
customary law, but in the historical context of legal pluralism in South Africa, 
part of governance of two legal systems required clear demarcations as to 
which laws applied to which sectors of the population and for what purposes.  
Customary law applied to domestic matters, such as marriage and property 





 See Reform of Customary Law of Succession and the Regulation of Related Matters Act, 
2009, s. 2(a). 
74
 See Bhe per Langa at paragraphs 54-59.  However, this question was resolved in favour 
of legitimacy and so this was not the obstacle for the Bhe daughters that it had posed in the 
Mthembu case.  See Mthembu v Letsela and Another 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA).  This decision 
of the Supreme Court of Appeal predates Bhe, although it was based on similar facts – 
namely a daughter’s right to inherit from her father under customary law.  
75
 See Black Administration Act, 1927. 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 








Age is only relevant in the current context because the Bhe daughters were 
minors.  But age was not the identity aspect that restricted their ability to 
succeed or inherit from their father – the primary obstacle was gender.  Had 
the Bhe daughters been Bhe sons, they would have been entitled to 
succession.  Hence age was not the site of inequality, as logistical 
guardianship provisions would have been put in place to safeguard the 
inheritance interests of minors (this is similar to what is now reflected in the 
Reform of Customary Law of Succession Act and the Regulation of Related 
Maters Act, 2009). 
The Introduction to this chapter made reference to the increased 
agency of female litigants in the new constitutional post-apartheid era.  Age 
is a factor that is relevant to this agency – specifically the issue is whether 
minority status prevents girls from accessing a substantive equality benefit 
that they would otherwise be entitled to.  Arguably, true equality for the Bhe 
daughters in this case would have resulted in their inheritance being 
administered by their mother on their behalf.  Similarly, it is argued that 
development of official customary law to reflect a GRACE intersectionality 
analysis would provide that age should not function as a barrier to 
entitlement.  But rather, the issue is how to manipulate the reality of age into 
the analysis.  Such manipulation would mean that any necessary practical 
measures ought to be put in place to address any obstacles that might 
otherwise exist due to the age of the litigant (rights-seeker). 
 
 (d) Culture 
 
It is somewhat of a theoretical academic debate to consider whether it is 
culture or race that determines the operation of customary law.  Or perhaps 
the real consideration is whether culture is synonymous with race.  It is 
contended that race and culture are completely different aspects of identity 
and to conflate the two is to engage in an essentialist colonialist practice that 
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does not appreciate the myriad cultural practices and communities that are 
embodied under the broad racial category of Indigenous Black South African. 
In considering the operation of culture in the context of the GRACE 
analysis, one may also ask whether it is culture that determines customary 
law or whether it is customary law that determines culture.  In any event, 
there is something of a symbiotic relationship between the two, such that any 
variation of one within a particular community will have an impact on the 
other.  Further, it is also interesting to note that unlike gender, race and age 
(at least for certain contained periods of time), both culture and customary 
law are fluid and flexible to change.  Although both expect a certain level of 
adherence by the community, it is also understood that the community may 
from time to time, vary, adjust or adapt the specific content of either culture 
or customary law, and such variation does not diminish the import or impact. 
Note that the reasoning in Bhe reflects a departure from other cases 
where the Supreme Court of Appeal and provincial High Courts had been 
loathe to vitiate male primogeniture on the basis that it warranted cultural 
protection under the Constitution. 76 
 
 (e)  Equality 
 
The crux of the equality analysis is that the intersection of the gender, race, 
age, and culture aspects of the identity of the Bhe daughters should not 
restrict their right to inherit under customary law if such inheritance would be 
permitted under the common law with the same identity intersections. 
In considering both the majority and minority decisions in Bhe, the 
final analysis seems to indicate that the decision is about promoting equality 
in an official customary law context.  But perhaps a deeper question is what 
is the content of equality in a living customary law context.  Recall that the 
initial theoretical inquiry posed in this thesis was the applicability of the 
																																																								
76
 See Mthembu v Letsela 2000 (3) SA 867 (SCA); Mabuza v Mbatha, 2003 (4) SA 218 (C), 
Thembisile and Another v Thembisile and Another 2002(2) SA 209 (T). 
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GRACE model to discern equality, and equality is primarily a common law 
concept, but when imported into customary law, it is very clearly official 
customary law.77  Hence, the question still remains whether the GRACE 
analysis, or perhaps even equality as an evolving notion on its own, is 
applicable in a living customary law context. 
 
7. Conclusion:  Post Bhe: The State of Equality and Customary Law 
in the Absence of Primogeniture 
 





This chapter has provided the GRACE model of analysis as a means of 
both remedying the inequalities that may result from a blind adherence to 
customary law, as well as filling the gap that may result in the law following 
the swift removal of a customary law rule.  An interesting consideration to 
ponder is whether, since the Constitutional Court decision in Bhe v. 
Khayelitsha Magistrate, there have been any improvements regarding the 
enjoyment of equality for young girls subject to customary law.  If a marked 
improvement were noticeable, it might suggest that the lack of equality was 
attributed strictly to the rule of male primogeniture.  Although it is argued 
that male primogeniture certainly did not contribute to equality rights for 
girls, it is also recognised that primogeniture may not be the only customary 
law issue that poses a challenge for the attainment of equality. 
The discussion in Bhe and analysis in the context of the GRACE 
model has now set the stage for the discussion of Shilubana, Gumede and 
Mayelane that follows in Chapter Seven. 
																																																								
77
 It should be noted that there is no identifiable research indicating the nature or application 
of equality in living customary law. 
78  W Van Genugten “Protection of Indigenous Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, 
Position Seeking, and the Interaction of Legal Systems” (2010) 104 American Journal of 
International Law 39. 
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The previous chapter demonstrated application of the GRACE model as an 
interpretive tool to discern gender equality within official customary law.  
Given that the model is flexible according to social context, it is presented as 
an effective tool for the courts to apply to situations involving living customary 
law, since it is both reflective of and responsive to the fluid development of 
the law. 
The particular construction of identity, as represented by GRACE, an 
African girl child, results in different levels of access to equality for a 
comparator individual, whose gender, race, age or cultural context is different 
than that of GRACE.  The cases discussed in this chapter involve a 
challenge to the application of the constitutional right to equality in a 
customary law context, and presented an opportunity for the judiciary to 
apply intersectionality theory to effect the best possible equality result.1   
																																																								
1
 As indicated earlier, culture as an identity facet is represented by customary law, as 
customary law and culture are intertwined.  Similarly the identity facet of race is also 
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This chapter demonstrates application of the GRACE model as a 
means of fine-tuning the analysis of the cases of Mabena v Letsoalo2, 
Shilubana v Nwamitwa3, and Mayelane v Ngwenyama.4  The analysis and 
outcome in each of these cases depicts the female litigants as exhibiting 
qualities of agency, such as the independence and authority that had 
traditionally been reserved for men.  This is interpreted as acknowledgement 
that customary law can be embraced in contemporary society in a manner 
that reflects principles of equality and non-discrimination. 
2. Application of the GRACE Model of Analysis Beyond Bhe 
 
Discussion of the GRACE model herein focuses on succession to the office 
of chief and the right to negotiate a customary law marriage.  Each of these 
issues is rooted specifically in customary law and requires the judiciary to 
engage in an equality rights analysis that considers the rights enjoyed by the 
women (or girls) who are the subjects, vis-à-vis the rights of either men within 
the same customary law context, or women outside of the customary law 
context (i.e., subject to the common law),  whatever the appropriate 
comparator may be in the circumstances.5 
 The cases of Mabena, Shilubana and Mayelane all presented similar 
opportunities for the courts to develop the customary law in accordance with 
the Constitutional principles of equality.  In each instance, the gender 
discrimination that is a feature of the particular customary law at issue is 
identified by the Court as an infringement of equality that must be remedied. 
																																																																																																																																																													
embedded within customary law, as in the South African context, customary law is only 
applicable to those whose racial identity is “Black African”.  The collapsing of race and 
culture into customary law does not alter the significance or applicability of the GRACE 
model. The crude marker of culture in Africa is still race, both because of colonial and 
Apartheid traditions and because of ease of determination.  In contemporary South Africa 
race is now an unspoken factor in deciding culture.  This raises its own problematic, which is 
beyond the scope of the present work.  
2
 1998 2 SA 1068 (T). 
3
 2009 (2) SA 66 (CC). 
4
 2013 4 SA 415. 
5
 In view of the fact that equality is a comparative concept, then the attainment (in full or in 
part) of equality is considered relative to the standing and status of another individual or 
group.  In fact, equality is only given contextual meaning through this comparison process. 
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The 1998 case of Mabena v Letsoalo demonstrates that cognisance of 
intersectionality – particularly the emphasis on gender and culture – is not a 
new phenomenon.  This example does not, however, flow from the reasoning 
that develops in Bhe and Shilubana, but pre-dates it, as Mabena was a lower 
court decision that was decided at least seven years before Bhe. 
(i) Overview of the Facts in Mabena 
 
In Mabena, the existence of a customary marriage was challenged on the 
basis that the lobolo was negotiated and received by the wife’s mother in the 
absence of her father.6 This situation was contrary to the official customary 
law, which allows only men to participate in lobolo negotiations.  The court 
took a broad approach and considered the specific rules and customs that 
were practised on a daily basis, in essence, the living customary law.  It was 
accepted that there are instances where a woman may act as head of a 
family and could receive lobolo, and so the Court developed the customary 
law to be more reflective of how the practice was actually engaged in at the 
community level.7  
The notion of male authority and power that is at the heart of the 
customary law rule of male primogeniture was not limited to property 
inheritance, but was also based on the cultural practice that only senior men 
had the authority to represent the family and negotiate with outsiders. 
Negotiation of lobolo is one such issue that in terms of customary law, rested 
traditionally with the male head of the family. 
The decision in Mabena suggests that Justice Du Plessis “did not 
perceive customary law as a closed system but rather as a fluid narrative 
																																																								
6
 See T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 188-198 for a discussion of the 
historical and contemporary significance of lobolo in customary marriages. 
7
 As Lehnert explains, that the court relied on current community practice in concluding that, 
“…nowadays mothers of the bride can indeed negotiate lobolo with an intended bridegroom, 
and that the bridegroom has a right to negotiate and pay the lobolo without the consent of 
his father.” See W Lehnert “The Role of the Courts in the Conflict Between African 
Customary Law and Human Rights” (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights 262. 
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which changed in light of changing gender roles”8.  The Judge noted that it is 
evident that customary law is, as many systems of law should be, “in a state 
of continuous development.”9  Similar to Shilubana, the decision in Mabena 
reflected an acknowledgement and incorporation of the sentiments and 
practices of the particular community being discussed.10  Furthermore, 
although not decided on the basis of constitutional alignment, the decision 
also made reference to principles of gender equality.  However, in this case, 
the agency of the bride’s mother to negotiate lobolo arose only owing to the 
absence of the bride’s father and the unavailability of another male relative to 
fulfill the technical formalities of customary law.11 
 Bhe, Shilubana and Mabena all raised issues of the conflict between 
traditional customary law rules and gender equality.  The conflict comes 
about as a result of the death (or absence) of the male family head.  The 
issue of succession – whether it be related to the issue of negotiating and 
accepting lobolo, in the case of Mabena, or property succession as in the 
case of Bhe or political office in the case of Shilubana – only became 
relevant when the male family member who had charge, guardianship or 
ownership of the person, office or property in question, died.  
 
(ii) Application of Intersectional Components of the GRACE 




 M Mswela “Cultural Practices and HIV in South Africa: A Legal Perspective” (2009) 12 
Potchefstroom Electronic Reports 179. 
9
 See Mabena (n 2) paragraph 1074.  The much contested concept of development of the 
law in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution is discussed in Thebus & Another v S 2003 
(6) SA 505 (CC) per Mosenke J.  In this case, the issue was raised on appeal that a 
particular law (the law of common purpose) be developed so as to provide a remedy to the 
accused appellant.  As an initial step, the Constitutional Court held that the law was not 
unconstitutional and hence was not in need of development. 
10
 See S Jagwanth & C Murray “Ten Years of Transformation: How Has Gender Equality in 
South Africa Fared?” (2002) 14 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 297-298 and C 
Himonga “Implementing the Rights of the Child in African Legal Systems: The Mthembu 
Journey in Search of Justice (2001) 9 International Journal of Children’s Rights 96-97. 
11
 Note that the context applicable to the absence of the bride’s father is likely based on 
racial identity, given that the absence of men was a situation peculiar to the realities of Black 
Africans living in South African townships.  These realities included migrant labour – a 
seasonal phenomenon, and not representing a permanent social practice that would justify a 
finding that a new rule of customary law had developed. 
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The aspect of gender here relates specifically to the bride’s mother engaging 
in the negotiation of lobolo.  Historically, customary law provided that this 
was a task for the family head, who was by definition, male.12  In the absence 
of the bride’s father as the typical head of the family, the assistance of 
another male relative would be sought.  Both of these were unavailable in 
this case. So, the mother negotiates and accepts the lobolo as a result of the 
unavailability of a male family head, and not because customary law 
considered her eligible to do so in her own right.  
For the purposes of the GRACE analysis, the race component of 
identity is the entry point to customary law.  But more than simply prescribing 
the operation of customary law, race is also a marker for a host of possible 
contextual factors that could have contributed to the facts in Mabena.  For 
instance, given economic circumstances in South Africa, the race of the 
bride’s father could have meant that his absence was on account of his 
having to relocate away from his family in order to seek employment 
opportunities.  During the apartheid era, it was not uncommon for the male 
family head to leave his family’s rural home in search of employment in an 
urban area or township.  In this context then, race is not simply an aspect of 
identity, but it is a driving factor in the situation giving rise to the very issue 
under consideration.13 
 Age is not a particularly relevant aspect of identity for the purposes of 
the analysis in Mabena.  It is assumed that the bride is old enough to consent 
to the marriage, and similarly assumed that the mother is a mature woman, 
competent to negotiate the terms of lobolo.  However, competency is not 
simply a matter of maturity, but also involves the ability to act in the best 




 T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 6) 195. 
13
 See E Grant “Human Rights, Cultural Diversity and Customary Law in South Africa” (2006) 
50 Journal of African Law 2-23; T W Bennett “Legal Pluralism and the Family in South Africa: 
Lessons from Customary Law Reform (2011) 25 Emory International Law Review 1057; J 
Zimmerman “The Reconstitution of Customary Law in South Africa: Method and Discourse” 
(2001) 17 Harvard Black Letter Law Journal 224. 
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With respect to the cultural context of identity, the issue at the heart of 
the Mabena case – namely the capacity to negotiate lobolo – is a customary 
law consideration.  Lobolo is in fact a unique feature of customary marriages 
(some would argue that it is the essential component of a customary 
marriage).14  Given that customary law is by nature, fluid and ever evolving, 
the ability of the mother to negotiate lobolo in this instance speaks to the 
evolving role of women in customary law, which reflects the key intersections 
between gender and culture.15 
 In aspiring to meet the constitutional guarantee of equality, the 
decision in Mabena reflects the willingness of the courts to accept a new 
customary law rule that permits women to negotiate lobolo in the absence of 
the male family head.  Hence, the court had to consider whether a mother 
could take on a responsibility that is typically reserved for the father/male 
family head.  What is not so clear however, is whether the customary law 
governing lobolo negotiations has evolved to the point that either the mother 
or father can negotiate at any time, or whether the mother’s capacity only 
materialises when the father is absent.  Of course, true equality in line with 
the constitution would see no distinction between the two parental figures.  
The real question is whether customary law has evolved to this level of 
equality; if not, whether the courts can appropriately so develop it. 
Following the principle in Mabena, the 2007 Cape High Court decision 
of Fanti v Boto16 also demonstrates that there are circumstances that permit 
																																																								
14
 For a full discussion of the meaning and function of lobolo as a component of customary 
marriages, see T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 6) 220-236. 
15
 In the absence of customary law evolving on its own to permit women to negotiate lobolo, 
section 39(2) of the Constitution can be interpreted as requiring courts to developing 
customary law to permit this practice. 
16
 Fanti v Boto 2008 (5) SA 405 (C). See particularly, paragraph 21 of this case, which 
clearly articulates the equality argument associated with acknowledging the entitlement of 
mothers to negotiate lobolo: 
 …the mother of a girl whose father died or is for some other acceptable and 
understandable reason absent and/or unable to discharge duties normally meant for 
the “kraalhead”, is quite entitled to act as the head of the family.  Such mother 
becomes the “father” and legal guardian of the children of her family.  I state 
categorically that such a mother would legitimately negotiate for and even receive 
lobolo paid in respect of her daughter. … [I]f Courts do not recognise the role to be 
played by women in society, then that would indicate failure and/or reluctance on their 
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a woman to act as the head of the family.  However, it still seems that this 
agency only applies where there is no other alternative; for instance, in the 
case of the death of or abandonment by the male family head.  So although 
matters seem to have progressed to permit women to step into the role of 
family head, they have not yet reached the point where a woman or a man 
could equally serve as family head, regardless of the particular 
circumstances of the case.  Male preference still seems to be the default 
standard in customary law.  The fact that consideration and sometimes 
actual effect is given to the role of females in the absence of males does not 
constitute considerable movement towards gender equality, since this 




Shilubana represents a fine example of progressive development of the law.  
This “progressive” label does not speak to the sophistication of the judicial 
analysis, but rather to the court’s ability to trust in the community’s own 
analysis, development and application of customary law.  Here, the Court 
relies on the development of customary law initiated by the community in the 
wake of the new Constitutional equality provisions.  As was the case in the 
discussion of the Bhe case in Chapter Six, the discussion that follows here 
does not necessarily criticise the outcome in any of the cases, but takes 
issue with the method applied.  
  
																																																																																																																																																													
part to participate in the development of the customary law which development is 
clearly in accordance with the ‘spirit, purport and object’ of our Constitution. 
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(i) Summary of the Facts and Decision in Shilubana 
 
Shilubana involved a dispute between two first cousins: Ms Shilubana and Mr 
Nwamitwa.  The immediate issue was who would succeed Mr Nwamitwa’s 
father, Richard as Hosi (chief) of the Valoyi traditional community.  The 
historical context behind the dispute dated back to 1968, when Ms 
Shilubana’s father, Hosi Fofoza Nwamitwa, died without a male heir.  At the 
time, customary law practice did not permit women chiefs, and so Ms 
Shilubana could not succeed her father, although she was his eldest child.  
Instead, Hosi Fofoza was succeeded by his brother, Richard Nwamitwa.  
Fast forward almost 30 years to 1996 and 1997, in the wake of post-
apartheid South Africa and its new constitutional commitment to equality and 
non-discrimination, where the traditional authorities of the Valoyi community 
passed resolutions declaring that Ms Shilubana would succeed Hosi Richard. 
Indeed, the chief, Richard, was also in favour of this development of 
the customary practice to reflect equality considerations.17  When Hosi 
Richard died in 2001, his son challenged the succession of Ms Shilubana to 
the office of chief, claiming that the tribal authorities had acted unlawfully in 
suggesting that she could succeed.   
In overturning the decisions of the lower courts, a unanimous 
Constitutional Court ruled in Ms Shilubana’s favour, stating that the lower 
courts had failed to acknowledge the power of the traditional authorities to 
develop the customary law in the way that they did. 
 The Constitutional Court’s analysis in Shilubana is an example of 
judicial recognition (and application) of the development of customary law in 
fulfilment of constitutional principles.  In acknowledging the community’s 
efforts in this way, the Court demonstrated a contextual approach by 
deferring to the cultural context to give meaning and substance to the 
customary law practice at issue.  This judicial endorsement of community 
																																																								
17
 The evidence adduced suggests that at least Hosi Richard was initially supportive.  There 
is some debate as to whether Hosi Richard later withdrew his support for Ms Shilubana 
succeeding him in favour of his son.  See Shilubana (n 3) at paragraphs 5-6. 
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practice has also been referred to as “passive development” of customary 
law.18 
 Writing for a unanimous court, the decision of Justice Van der 
Westhuizen illustrates willingness to defer to the activities of the community 
when it comes to interpreting its best interests including a commitment to 
gender equality.19 Where the community has not been proactive in taking 
such an approach, the GRACE model presents a method for the judiciary to 
discern what course of action would reflect both constitutional principles and 
at the same time preserve the spirit, purpose and intention of a particular 
customary law or practice.20 
The court’s endorsement of the Valoyoi community’s development of the 
customary law of succession to chieftainship reflects a common and 
consistent interpretation of the powers and responsibilities of the traditional 
authority in accordance with section 211(2) of the Constitution.21  To best 
illustrate the application of the GRACE analysis, what follows is a discussion 
of the elements of the GRACE model (namely the intersecting impact of 
gender, race, age and culture on the attainment of equality), and the 




 See C Himonga “The Future of Living Customary Law in African Legal Systems in the 
Twenty-First Century and Beyond, with Special Reference to South Africa” in J Fenrich, P 
Galizzi & T Higgins (eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2011) 31 at 48.  Himonga 
clarifies that passive development occurs where community practice is not incompatible with 
human rights law.  In contrast, active development of customary law occurs where there a 
disjuncture between living customary law practices and human rights – the judiciary can 
actively develop the customary practice to align it with the constitution. 
19
 See Shilubana (n 3) paragraphs 44-49. 
20 See Farlam’s judgment in Nwamitwa Shilubana v Nwamitwa [2006] SCA 174, at 
paragraph 7 and paragraphs 36-41, where he likened the royal council’s decision to a 
common-law type of ‘executive order’ and gave effect to it.  Hence, customary law was not 
changed or upset, but the woman achieved equality.   
21
 Section 211(s) states:  A traditional authority that observes a system of customary law 
may function subject to any applicable legislation and customs, which includes amendments 
to, or repeal of, that legislation or those customs. 
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(ii) Application of GRACE to Shilubana facts 
 
The common understanding that was the foundation of the analysis of both 
the community and the Constitutional Court was that gender alone should not 
be an automatic bar to succession to office.  In view of the new constitutional 
dispensation and the era of equality – particularly on the aspects of race and 
gender, as reflected in the preamble to the Constitution, the Valoyoi 
community sought to fulfil its responsibilities to contribute to more equitable 
gender relations by eliminating a feature of customary law which reflected 
blatant inequality.22 
In its own assessment, the court found that there was no justifiable 
reason why the gender discrimination element was a necessary component 
of the customary law of succession to office.  In this respect the community 
would know best what is or is not a key element of customary law. The fact 
that gender discrimination may have been a long-standing element of this 
customary law rule was not reason alone to retain the rule.  In this instance, 
what the community is seen to value is the duty of the Hosi to act in the best 
interests of the community.23  Such determination of best interest and the 
corresponding action is not something that can definitively be conducted 
better by one gender than the other.  Instead, the ability to engage in a 
balanced consideration of community needs on the whole is required. 
Ms Shilubana’s gender identity initially functioned to disqualify her from 
succeeding to her father’s position of Hosi after his death.   Consequently, 
since Ms Shilubana was her father’s only child, the customary law principle of 
male primogeniture in operation at the time of his death required that the 
position of Hosi go to the closest male relative.  In this case, it was his 
brother, Richard. 
As the years went on and the Constitutional value of equality began to 
take hold in South Africa, the Valoyoi community took it upon itself to change 
																																																								
22
 The relevant phrase from the Preamble to the Constitution is as follows: “…Lay the 
foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of 
the people and every citizen is equality protected by law.” 
23
 See Shilubana (n 3) at paragraphs 39, 49. 
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the customary law practice of succession to Hosi.  The successor to Richard 
would not be his son (Nwamitwa) as male primogeniture would dictate.  
Rather, the principle of equality would take precedence to correct the 
situation that occurred when Richard was declared Hosi over Shilubana as 
the natural successor.  It seems that when the community decided to 
eliminate the gender inequality inherent in Hosi succession, Shilubana could 
at that time, have put an end to Richard’s rule and taken up the post 
immediately.  She chose instead to defer this while she explored other 
political ambitions.24 
The race component of identity in this case is what brings us to the 
operation of chieftainship succession and male primogeniture in the first 
place.  It is the intersection of race (which itself is accentuated by variations 
in culture and ethnicity) and gender that dictate the customary practice of 
chief succession.  In choosing to eliminate the determinative feature of 
gender, female identity is not an automatic bar to chieftainship, and so the 
Valoyoi community has effectively provided for gender equality. 
The aspect of race and the general operation of chieftainship 
succession lead to the issue as to whether the customary practices of 
installing Hosis as traditional leaders is itself in furtherance of equality. For 
instance, does the regulation of certain community affairs by traditional 
leaders advance the principle of equality in local government? This question 
is the subject of sporadic debate in South Africa.25  Government by chiefs 
was a means for furthering the interests of white minority rule in the country.  
So was (arguably) the entire customary law system, insofar as it created a 
																																																								
24
 It is also interesting to note the anecdotal context that Ms Shilubana was emboldened in 
her claim by her experience as a member of the ANC parliament.  Thus this challenge might 
have taken on a different dynamic had she not had this political support, insight and savvy.  
See: http://mg.co.za/article/2008-09-04-a-hosi-is-truly-born [last accessed February 2015]. 
25
 See S Düsing “The Impacts of Traditional Leadership on Gender Equality and Women’s 
Participation in Rural Development” in Traditional Leadership and Democratisation in 
Southern Africa: A Comparative Study of Botswana, Namibia and South Africa (Hamburg: Lit 
Verlag 2002) at 252-257; Leslie Bank and Roger Southall “Traditional Leaders in South 
Africa’s New Democracy” (1996) 37 & 38 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 407-
430; and T W Bennett “The Equality Clause and Customary Law” (1994) 10 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 122-130. 
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sphere of potential oppression for people who might otherwise have lived 
their lives according to the common law. 
 Age is not an identity aspect that has significant impact on the facts of 
this case.  At both material times – when her father died as well as when her 
uncle died, and the position of Hosi was open to a successor – Shilubana 
was of an age that would not have impacted her ability to take on the 
position.  Similarly, Nwamitwa, who was challenging Shilubana’s entitlement 
to the role, did not do so on the basis of age, but rather on the basis of 
gender and how this affected male primogeniture. 
Moving on to consider other aspects of identity involved in the GRACE 
analysis, recall from Chapter Six, that although it is often difficult to separate 
the identity aspect of culture from that of race, it is necessary to do so, as to 
conflate the two is highly problematic.26  The operation of customary law is a 
feature of race, as the nature and content of particular customary law 
practices relate to the local customs of the indigenous Black African 
community under discussion. 
One of the most interesting features of the constitutional Court’s 
judgment is the subject of tradition.  As Himonga explains, “….‘tradition’ 
emphasises the fact that customary law is rooted in the practices of the 
people, whereas reference to ‘culture’ signifies the inherent evolving nature 
of living customary law (as culture changes, so does the normative system 
regulating the lives of people under the culture concerned).”27  In a sense, 
tradition is the conceptual handmaiden of culture, for it denotes the mode of 
transmitting culture from one generation to the next.  Hence, culture, being 
the core identity aspect, is also the pivotal identity axis – as culture flexes 
and evolves – then so too do the contextual manifestation and interpretation 
of the other aspects of identity shift. 
																																																								
26
 See Chapter Six, part 6. 
27
 C Himonga “The Future of Living Customary Law in African Legal Systems in the Twenty-
First Century and Beyond, with Special Reference to South Africa” (n 18) 37. 
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The GRACE model involves acknowledgement of the intersection of 
the various identity components of the litigants in order to promote equality.  
However, in the Shilubana analysis, interestingly enough, application of the 
GRACE model is not required in order to demonstrate the ideal operation of 
equality, since the local community had already achieved the desired result 
by developing the law.  The GRACE model is appropriate, however, for a 
clearer understanding of the judicial reasoning that functioned to endorse the 
actions of the community. 
 Read in succession, Bhe and Shilubana seem to reflect a trend toward 
interpretation and development of customary law principles in a way that 
takes not only gender equality into account, but is also cognisant of cultural 




The 2013 case of Mayelane represents the most recent Constitutional Court 
consideration of customary (gender) equality right in keeping with Bhe and 
Shilubana.  This case considers the impact of the consent (or withholding 
thereof) of an existing first wife in a customary marriage on the validity of her 
husband’s subsequent polygamous unions.  Resolution of this issue at both 
the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal levels relied upon the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.28  This is somewhat similar to Bhe, 
where the issue of customary law conflict was resolved by reference to the 
Intestate Succession Act.29 
Mayelane is interesting, for it involves two women challenging the 
validity of each other’s customary marriage to the same husband. (This 
dispute has come a long way from the time when women were not entitled to 
																																																								
28
 See Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120, of 1998, section 7(6). 
29
 Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. See Bhe per Langa, DCJ at paragraphs 117-121 and 
at paragraph 136, where he pronounces on the invalidity of certain provisions of the Black 
Administration Act, as well as the Intestate Succession Act, but maintains that section 1 of 
the Intestate Succession Act should be applicable to Black African estates (which would 
otherwise have devolved in accordance with the Black Administration Act and the customary 
law provision of male primogeniture). 
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act in litigation.)30  The applicant sought to assert a hierarchy amongst wives 
in that the validity of the second wife’s status was dependent upon the 
express approval of the applicant as the first wife.  Although the first wife 
does not have a veto, should the husband wish to take a subsequent wife, 
customary law does recognise and provide for the consent of the first wife in 
order to legitimise any subsequent marriages.31  
The majority decision written by Justices Froneman, Khampepe and 
Skweyiya, used the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act as a basis for 
developing the customary law to make the consent of the first wife a 
requirement for the legitimacy of any subsequent marriage.  The majority 
took the initiative to develop the customary law.  The two dissenting 
judgments, penned by Zondo and Jafta, took the position that the Court 
ought not undertake the development of customary law, as this was not a 
remedy requested by the applicant, and such development was not required 
in this instance.  An interesting issue to consider is whether development of 
customary law is properly undertaken, even when it is not requested. 
It is submitted that development of customary law, whether it be on 
request or on judicial initiative, is not only within the power of the judiciary, 
but is also incumbent upon it.  Judges are therefore obliged to give remedies 
that reflect the needs of the broader social context and will be applicable 
beyond the particular case at hand.  Furthermore, such development of 
customary law so as to bring it in line with the provisions of the Bill of Rights, 
is not only permitted, but also arguably required by section 211(3) of the 
Constitution.  This provision requires courts to apply customary law. 
Hence, any analysis of a case before a court first requires a 
determination of the customary law at issue; in this regard, ascertainment of 
																																																								
30
 See T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 6) 31-33. 
31
 See Mayelane (n 4) per Froneman at paragraphs 21-52 and 71-84 for a broad discussion 
of the requirements under Xitsonga customary law and the Recognition of Customary 
Marriages Act with respect to the first wife’s consent to a subsequent marriage.  See also C 
Himonga’s case commentary on Mayelane: http://www.customcontested.co.za/mayelane-v-
ngwenyama-and-minister-for-home-affairs-a-reflection-on-wider-implications/ [last accessed 
February 2015]. 
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the living law will point to contemporary community practice.32  Where this 
practice is found to reflect constitutional principles appropriately, then it is 
converted into official customary law through the process of judicial decision-
making.  The majority in Mayelane seems to be doing just as Ngcobo 
suggested in his dissent in Bhe, namely developing customary law, rather 
than striking it down, or ignoring it and relying solely on legislation.33 
It should be noted that the court’s decision does not comment on the 
validity of polygynous marriages as a legal institution, despite their inherent 
inequality (men may marry more than one wife, women may not marry more 
than one husband). The court specifically noted that polygynous marriages 
“differentiate between men and women” in this way, but that their validity was 
not challenged by either party.  Accordingly, the court had to “work within a 
framework that assumes …existence and validity [of this form of marriage]”. 
The court thus left open the possibility for a constitutional challenge to the 
validity of polygyny as inherently discriminatory on the basis of gender.34 
(i) The Facts and Decision in Mayelane: 
Development without Invitation 
 
This case examined the rules related to customary polygamous marriages in 
a Tsonga community.  The husband, Hlengani Dyson Moyana, died in 
February 2009. The issue at the Constitutional Court was a dispute between 
Ms Mayelane, who claimed to have married Mr Dyson in January 1984, and 
Ms Ngwenyama, who claimed to have married Mr Dyson in January 2008.  




 See B Mmusinyane “The Role of Traditional Authorities in Developing Customary Laws in 
Accordance with the Constitution: Shilubana and Others v. Nwamitwa”, (2009) 12 
Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 140-1. 
33
 See Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others (Commissioner for Gender 
Equality as Amicus Curiae); Shibi v Sithole and Others; South African Human Rights 
Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 (1) 
SA 580 (CC) per Ngcobo at paragraph 139. 
34
 See E Christie’s case commentary on Mayelane, available at: 
http://www.hrlc.org.au/human-rights-and-gender-equality-and-the-limits-of-customary-law-
on-traditional-polygamous-marriages [last accessed February 2015]. 
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Upon the death of Mr Dyson, each woman sought to register her 
marriage in accordance with the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.35  
Ms Mayelane then sought and obtained an order from the High Court 
declaring her customary marriage valid, and that the marriage of Ms 
Ngwenyama to Mr Dyson was void on the basis that Ms Mayelane, as Mr 
Dyson’s first wife, had not given her consent.  Ms Ngwenyama then took the 
matter to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which affirmed the validity of Ms 
Mayelane’s marriage and overturned the invalidity of Ms Ngwenyama’s 
marriage.  At the Constitutional Court, Ms Mayelane appealed the Supreme 
Court of Appeal’s determination that Ms Ngwenyama’s marriage was valid.   
Neither the High Court nor the Supreme Court of Appeal fully explored 
the Tsonga customary law requirement that the consent of the first wife was 
required for subsequent marriages.  Both lower courts based their 
determination of validity of the marriages solely on the application of 
subsection 7(6) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act and did not 
explore the customary law rule of consent. 
The primary difference between the interpretations taken by the two 
lower court levels was that the High Court considered subsection 7(6) of the 
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act to mean that, if the husband did not 
obtain court approval of the written contract regulating the matrimonial 
property regime of the subsequent marriage, the marriage was invalid.36  The 
High Court on the other hand, determined that this lack of approval of the 
property contract did not invalidate the marriage itself, but only affected the 
proprietary consequences of the marriage, such that the marriage would be 
considered to be out of community of property. 




 Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. 
36
 Subsection 7(6) reads:  
A husband in a customary marriage who wishes to enter into a further customary 
marriage with another woman after the commencement of this Act must make an 
application to the court to approve a written contact that will regulate the future 
matrimonial property system of his marriages. 
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i) Whether the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act directly 
prescribes the first wife’s consent as requirement for validity of 
a subsequent marriage; 
ii) Whether Xitsonga living customary law requires the consent of 
the first wife; 
iii) If neither the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act nor 
Xitsonga customary law creates the requirement of consent of 
the first wife, does the Constitution require the law to be 
developed accordingly? 
The Constitutional Court concluded that Ms Ngwenyama’s marriage was 
invalid because Ms Mayelane was not informed thereof, in contravention of 
Xitsonga customary law as it existed at the time.  This conclusion was based 
on the majority reasoning espoused by Justice Froneman that: 
 
… the Recognition Act is premised on a customary marriage that is in 
accordance with the dignity and equality demands of the Constitution 
and that Xitsonga customary law must be developed, to the extent that 
it does not yet do so, to include a requirement that the consent of the 
first wife is necessary for the validity of a subsequent customary 
marriage.37 
 
In the analysis, Justice Froneman also made reference to Shilubana 
as providing guidance on what the Court should look for in terms of evidence 
of community development of customary law, as well as the factors the 
courts must consider when undertaking to develop customary law.  
Specifically, reference was made to Justice Van der Westhuzien’s analysis 
that the process of determining the content of a particular customary norm is 
informed by the following factors: 
a) consideration of the traditions of the community concerned; 
b) the right of communities that observe systems of customary law to 
develop their law; 
c) the need for flexibility and development must be balanced against 
the value of legal certainty, respect for vested rights and the 
protection of constitutional rights; and 
d) while the development of customary law by the courts is distinct 
																																																								
37
 See Mayelane (n 4) per Froneman at paragraph 13. 
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from its development by a customary community, the courts, when 
engaged with the adjudication of a customary-law matter, must 
remain mindful of their obligation under section 39(2) of the 
Constitution to promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of 
Rights.38 
Justice Froneman warned that, in considering the issue of consent,  
courts must understand concepts such as ‘consent’ to further 
customary marriages within the framework of customary law, 
and must be careful not to impose common-law or other 
understandings of that concept”.  Courts must also assume 
that such a notion as “consent” will have a universal meaning 
across all sources of law.39 
  
The decision in Mayelane discussed at length the development of 
customary law.  The discussion followed two tracks:  community 
development of customary law (as most clearly stated in Shilubana); and 
judicial development of customary law.  With respect to this second track, the 
court took its responsibility for development of customary law seriously.  This 
approach was owing to the fact that the court set out to develop a customary 
law rule to which it would not be bound (as it was not part of the customary 
law community).  Additionally, such development, although purporting to 
reflect the best interests of the community members, may not have occurred 
as a result of the contributions of all community members.  On this point, 
Justice Froneman stated: 
it is important to ensure that customary law’s congruence with our 
constitutional ethos is developed in a participatory manner, reflected by 
the voices of those who live the custom.  This is essential to dispel the 
notion that constitutional values are foreign to customary law and are 
being imposed on people living under customary law against their will.  
There is untapped richness in customary law which may show that the 
values of the Constitution are recognised, or capable of being 





 See Shilubana (n 3) per Van der Westhuizen J at paragraphs 44-49. 
39
 See Mayelane (n 4) per Froneman J at paragraph 49. 
40
 Ibid 50. 
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(ii) Applying GRACE to Mayelane 
 
In this case, there are two relevant gender comparators, the primary one is 
the husband and the wife in a customary marriage.  Arguably, there is a 
second issue between the first and second wives in a subsequent customary 
marriage entered into by the husband. Both comparative relationships raise 
the issue of equality vis-à-vis the comparator individuals.  However, the 
second issue between the two wives is not a direct gender comparison, but 
rather speaks to a hierarchy between the wives.  As for the key gender 
comparison, namely that between the husband and the first wife, the issue is 
with regards to the husband’s duty to consult with and obtain the consent of 
the first wife before introducing a new party into the marriage relationship. 
The identity aspect of race functions along with culture to make 
customary marriage – and its feature of polygyny - the focal issue in this 
case.41  But it should also be noted that, although the core issue is 
polygynous marriage, not all Black or indigenous South Africans practise 
polygyny.  Hence, race is not an automatic determinant of the polygyny, 
which is essentially the system giving rise to the conflict in this case: the right 
of parties to alter their marital relationship.  Further, this conflict is heightened 
by racial identity in the sense that the social construction of race and the 
economic and educational opportunities readily available to a Black woman 
in a customary law polygynous marriage, typically place her at a position of 
vulnerability and disadvantage vis-à-vis her husband; and moreover, her 
socio-economic options to address this inherent disadvantage, are also 
restricted by the same systems.42 
As has been the case with the discussion of every judgment except 
Bhe, age is not a key factor in the equality analysis. Similarly, Mayelane 
involves a discussion of the legitimacy of two customary marriages, and in 
neither case was the age of the parties a bar to the validity of the marriages. 
																																																								
41
 For a broad discussion of customary law polygyny (the practice where men have multiple 
wives), see T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 6) 243-248. 
42
 Ibid 243-245. 
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The identity aspect of culture is what brings us into the realm of 
customary law.  In particular, it is the law of customary marriages in the 
Tsonga community for the husband to require the consent of a first wife in a 
customary marriage before he can enter into a subsequent customary 
marriage with another woman.  The analysis in this case fully explored the 
meaning and interpretation of consent of the first wife. 
The equality analysis in the Mayelane case primarily concerns the 
equal ability of the husband and wife to alter the terms of the marriage 
contract.  Specifically, it was argued that the husband could enter into a 
second marriage without the express consent of his first wife.   
Secondly, this case concerns a consideration of equality between a 
first and second wife in a customary marriage.  The identity aspect that 
becomes the basis of comparison in this instance is simply the order of the 
marriages and the designation as first or second wife.  With respect to the 
other typical elements of the GRACE analysis - gender, race, age, and 
culture – both women shared these characteristics.  What they did not share, 
or more accurately, agree on, was the interpretation of the consent 
requirement.  
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This chapter began with the premise that interdependent facets of identity 
intersect to impact collectively on the attainment of equality.  However, what 
was not made clear at the onset is that for the purposes of the argument 
posed in this thesis, equality itself is not considered a right,43 rather, it is 
viewed as a measurement defined as the extent to which one is able to 
access other rights.44  
In the lower court case of Mabena, and the three Constitutional Court 
cases of Bhe, Shilubana and Mayelane, culture is the key aspect of identity 
analysed within a customary law context.  In all of these cases, resolution 
was based on a desire to promote and protect equality rights in keeping with 
the Constitution.  This chapter argues that when assessing equality, the 
correct comparator should be taken from customary law, namely, that the 
comparison should be undertaken as locally as possible, within the same 
legal arena – and not from the common law.  It does not specifically advance 
the analysis of equality rights if the default position is to remove the issue 
from the operation of customary law altogether, and interpose the common 
law. 
In all instances, the cases discussed herein challenge the status quo 
in a particular version of customary law in order to bring it into line with the 
Constitution.  Before the respective constitutional challenges, the women and 
girls concerned were denied their rights to property, the recognition of the 
existence of a valid customary marriage or political office, simply by virtue of 
their gender.  The key aspects of the litigants’ identity in all cases were 
gender and culture.45 Since equality is a comparative concept, when the 
																																																								
43
 See Chapter Two part 3(b). 
44
 This notion of equality as a measurement is in keeping with the description of equality as a 
comparative concept.  See note 5 above.  
45
 As previously mentioned, the relevant aspect of culture under discussion here is 
customary law generally.  In this system, certain entitlements are clearly demarcated on the 
basis of gender.  In a broader sense, that is relevant in the context of legal pluralism, 
customary law addresses certain areas of private law differently than would be the case 
under the common law.  In these situations, the clear demarcation of rights entitlement is 
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female litigants in Bhe, Shilubana, and Mabena were compared to the male 
respondents, the Court consistently found that discrimination on the basis of 
gender was unfair and unjustifiable in South Africa’s current constitutional 
context.46 
This chapter proposes the adoption and application of the GRACE 
model by the judiciary as a means of contextualising what might be deemed 
a modern interpretation and application of an established rule.  Despite the 
flexibility that characterises the GRACE model, in terms of which aspects of 
identity are relevant in a particular context, and precisely how much 
emphasis is placed on one aspect of identity vis-à-vis others, the GRACE 
model can function as a useful analytical tool.   
The strength of an intersectionality analysis is to ensure that the 
various aspects of identity are not separated from the individual thereby 
allowing individuals to enjoy the maximum equality and consequent dignity 
and freedoms, as reflected in the foundational values in the South African 
Constitution.47  
Using the case of Bhe v Khayelitsha discussed in Chapter Six as a 
launch point, this chapter argues that although the majority judgment may 
have appeared to produce a satisfactory outcome for the claimants, the 
Constitutional Court did not do as much as it could have done to provide an 
interpretation that essentially included a remaking of the law and establishing 
a precedent for protecting the equality rights of the African girl child living 
under customary law.  In other words, the Court could have “developed” 
																																																																																																																																																													
determined by legal culture – and not necessarily gender (although gender divisions may be 
the basis for further differential treatment within each legal system). 
46
 The comparator of African men is offered as an example.  But the argument of differential 
treatment resulting in inequality could also be made with comparators outside of customary 
law – for instance, the inheritance entitlement of women – Black or white – who are not 
subject to customary law.  The point of the argument is that if just one aspect of intersecting 
identity is altered – be it gender, race or the applicable law, then the result under 
examination would be different. 
47 See section 1 of the Constitution of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, which states: 
1. The Republic of South Africa is one, sovereign, democratic state founded on 
the following values: 
a. Human dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of 
human rights and freedoms. 
b. Non-racialism and non-sexism 
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customary law (as is required of the common law in s 8(3)(a) of the 
Constitution48) to meet the demands of the section 9 equality provision more 
appropriately in the context of contemporary South African society.49  
In the cases under discussion, resolution was based on a desire to 
promote and protect equality rights in keeping with the Constitution.  It seems 
then, that the notion of equality with which the customary law is expected to 
comply, is situated in the common law – given that Constitution is a creature 
of the common law.  The courts implicitly chose as comparators for the 
litigants, hypothetical characters drawn from the common law.  This chapter, 
however, argues that the context of equality, and hence the appropriate 
comparators against which to measure equality, must be situated within the 
same customary law context as the litigant.50  The journey of GRACE 
involves her various identity constructions through the plural world marked by 
the coexistence of the common law and customary law.  Beholden to both, 
and never forsaking one for the other, GRACE’s life is a journey to seek 
recognition for all aspects of her identity and at the same time, to realise the 
equality and recognition that will render her a whole person. 
																																																								
48
 Section 8 addresses the Application of the Bill of Rights.  Note also section 39(2) which 
deals with the Interpretation of the Bill of Rights. 
49
 In considering section 8(3)(a) and section 39(2) together, by implication the application of 
intersectionality theory will be the method by which customary law can best be “developed” 
and furthermore, acknowledgement of intersectionality is a feature of development.  This 
means that a “developed” customary law will acknowledge and reflect the operation of 
intersectionality where appropriate and applicable. 
50
 See G Massell “ Law as an Instrument of Revolutionary Change in a Traditional Milieu: 
The Case of Soviet Central Asia” (1967-1968) 2 Law & Society Review 194-228 for a 
discussion of the long term consequences of employing a “surrogate” in a social engineering 
experiment to suggest that one identity can functionally stand in place of another.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Earlier discussions in this thesis have reviewed the development of right to 
equality case law for the (mostly young) female African litigant.  Specifically, 
the focus has been on the increasing agency afforded African females as 
they navigate the intricacies of legal pluralism in South Africa.  In the course 
of this case law review, the thesis has also proposed the GRACE analytical 
model as a tool for the courts to further improve the realisation of equality 
rights.  The objective now is to further this proposal by demonstrating how 
the analysis developed in the previous chapters could be applicable to a 
hypothetical case dealing with the delict of seduction.  Seduction is 
interesting because the putative aggrieved party entitled to a remedy is 
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different depending on whether the case is argued under customary law or 
the common law.1  
2. Key Definitions and Principles 
 
Before the exercise of applying the GRACE model to a seduction 
hypothetical, it is helpful to begin with a general overview of the law of delict 
in South Africa with particular reference to the delict of seduction. 
 
(a) Delict - Generally 
 
A delict, whether considered in terms of customary law or the common law, is 
generally “the act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes 
harm to another”.2  The following five elements should be met before a 
person can be found liable for committing delict: (i) an act or an omission; (ii) 
which must be wrongful in law; (iii) fault;3 (iv) harm; and (v) causation.4  The 
crux of this definition is determining what constitutes harm.  A complicating 
factor is the requirement that “harm” has both objective and subjective 
aspects.   




Under the common law, if any one or more of the above five elements are 
lacking, then there is no delict and consequently no liability.6  The wrongful 
act, or delict has been defined as an unlawful, blameworthy act or omission 
																																																								
1 Note that succession cases will involve a different party, depending on which system of law 
is used.  Full consideration of equality rights in each system is a comparative analysis that is 
yet to be fully explored.  
2 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
4ed (2014).  References are to C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to 
Legal Pluralism in South Africa 3ed (2010) 105. 
3 The element of fault is indicated as one of the five general elements of delict.  But it is also 
noted that both common law and customary law conceptions of delict make provision to 
include exceptions to the fault requirement, particularly in instances of vicarious liability or 
strict liability.  See J Neethling J Potgeiter & P J Visser Delict 7ed (2014) 379-81; 389-98. 
4 E Knoetze “Fathers Responsible for the Sins of Their Children? Notes on the Accessory 
Liability of a Family Head in the Customary Law of Delict” (2012) Speculum Juris 47 at 61. 
5 See generally J Neethling, J M Potgeiter P J Visser Delict (n 3). 
6 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 105. 
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which causes another person damage to person or property or injury to 
personality7, and for which a civil remedy for recovery of damages is 
available.8 
 
(ii) Customary Law Delict 
 
The official version of customary law of delict provides that redress may be 
claimed for the violation of any right representing material value,9 capable of 
being acquired by a family head. This refers to redress for damage to 
property, as well as for injury to a woman in so far as a family head’s rights in 
her have been violated.10   Originally the customary law of delict comprised: 
damage to property; limited instances of defamation; and theft11; various 
sexual wrongs, such as seduction (the defloration of a virgin); impregnation 
of an unmarried woman; adultery (intercourse, with or without impregnation, 
with a married woman); intercourse with or without impregnation;  
In distinguishing between common and customary law, it is noteworthy 
that in customary law there is no clear and consistent difference between 





7 And for which redress is not usually dependent on a prior contractual undertaking to refrain 
from causing harm. 
8 Further, a breach of a general duty imposed by law giving rise to a civil action at the suit of 
the injured person would also constitute a delict.  See M Loubser, R Midgley, A Mukheibir L 
Niesing & D Perumal eds The Law of Delict in South Africa (2009). 
9 This would include dignity or honour, which are highly valued in customary law. 
10 J C Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa 5ed (1989) 342.  See also C 
Rautenbach, J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2).  
11 E Knoetze “Fathers Responsible for the Sins of Their Children? Notes on the Accessory 
Liability of a Family Head in the Customary Law of Delict” (n 4) 48. 
12 See T W Bennett “Customary Criminal Law in the South African Legal System” in J 
Fenrich P Galizzi &T E Higgins (eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2011) 363 at 
380-83. 
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(b) Delict of Seduction 
 
The delict of seduction gives rise to a right of action in both customary and 
common law.13 The primary difference is who is entitled to seek a remedy.  In 
customary law, if a woman were seduced,  her guardian would have an 
action for damages; in common law, she personally would have the action, 
but only if she were a virgin at the time of seduction.14  The common law 
action for seduction is primarily aimed at compensating the young woman for 
the impairment of her physical integrity, although together with any material 
damages she may suffer (notably medical expenses for pregnancy).15  
Customary law compensates the woman’s guardian for the diminution of her 
lobolo value. 
Strategically, it is important to determine who initiates an action, because 
that person will have first option in choosing the governing system of law.  If 
the defendant contests the application of one law, he or she will be put to the 
proof in alleging that the other is more appropriate in the circumstances.  If a 
young woman has instituted a successful claim under the common law, her 
father or guardian may not thereafter institute an action in terms of customary 
law.16  A court will generally deem the matter under common law res 
judicata.
17
  If her father or guardian has already successfully instituted a claim 
under customary law, however, a traditional seduction beast owed to him is 
																																																								
13 South African Law Commission Project 90 the Harmonisation of the Common Law and the 
Indigenous Law: Report on Conflicts of Law (1999) at paragraph 1.4, p 2.  Note also that: the 
common-law action is aimed at compensating the woman for impairment of her marriage 
prospects, whilst the customary action is primarily aimed at recovering a loss in the woman’s 
lobolo value. See T W Bennett, C Mills & G Munnick “The Anomalies of Seduction: A 
Statutory Crime to an Obsolete, Unconstitutional Delict?” (2009) 25 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 342. 
14 Ibid 330.  Moreover, the woman’s ability to claim an action for damages for seduction also 
depends her legal capacity to sue at common law.  In customary law, only the woman’s 
guardian can bring such a suit – and this is part of the gender inequality that is discussed 
below in part 4. 
15 This may be accompanied by, or this violation of physical integrity may be amplified by a 
breach of promise to marry.  See Bull v Taylor 1965 (4) SA 29 (A) at 37-38. 
16 C Rautenbach, J C Bekker & N M I Goolam (2010) (n 2) 109-110. 
17 T O Elias “The Customary Judicial Process” in The Nature of Africa Customary Law (1956) 
212-213. 
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taken into account in determining the damages to be awarded to the young 
woman under the common law.18  
 (i) Common Law 
 
The common law defines seduction as “the extra-marital defloration of a girl 
with her consent”.19  Two requirements must be met before a claim for 
seduction will succeed, namely: (i) physical defloration of the girl must have 
occurred, and (ii) the defloration must have occurred as a result of the man’s 
seductive conduct.20  The consent requirement functions to differentiate the 
delict of seduction from the criminal action of sexual assault.21  Although not 
criminal, the delict of seduction is still actionable and deserving of remedy, if 
the young woman can demonstrate loss in the sense of damage to reputation 
and/or her future marriage prospects.22  The following factors may be taken 
into account in calculating the amount of damages: (i) age of the plaintiff; (ii) 
her circumstances in life; (iii) the measure of resistance she offered; (iv) the 
methods applied by the defendant to overcome her resistance; (v) whether 
the seduction took place when an offer of marriage was made; and (vi) 




19 N Bohler-Muller “Of Victims and Virgins: Seduction Law in South Africa” (2000) 41 
Codicillus 2 at 3. 
20 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 109. 
21 Although Bennett et al argue that it is in fact the common law delict of seduction that has 
essentially become obsolete and the criminal law characterisation is gaining increasing 
favour.  See T W Bennett C Mills & G Munnick “The Anomalies of Seduction: A Statutory 
Crime to an Obsolete, Unconstitutional Delict?” (n 13) 347-9.  
22 Note also that, in studying customary law, it must be continuously borne in mind that there 
is no clear distinction, as is the case in most Western legal systems, between criminal and 
private law sanctions and procedures.  Added to that, the general elements and principles 
for delictual as well as criminal liability have not clearly crystallised in customary law to the 
same extent as in the common law.  In terms of the common law, a delict is defined as “the 
act of a person that in a wrongful and culpable way causes harm to another”.  Five elements 
must be met before a person can be held delictually liable in our common law, namely: (i) an 
act; (ii) wrongfulness; (iii) fault; (iv) harm; and (v) causation.  If any one or more of these 
elements are lacking, in terms of the common law, there is no delict and consequently no 
liability.  Recall that these elements are common to both common law and customary law 
systems of delict. See C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal 
Pluralism in South Africa (3ed) (n 2) 37-38. 
23 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 110. 
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Seduction in the common law provides for a right of action for the 
female “victim” of the seduction.24  It is the young woman who has 
experienced the harm who is entitled to the remedy directly.  The harm in 
question must, in terms of the general definition of the common law of delict, 
be caused wrongfully, but, in the case of seduction, the wrongfulness of the 
defloration is seemingly removed by her consent.  It may well be then that 
wrongfulness in this context is based on broader societal mores and 
expectations.25 
  (ii) Customary Law  
 
The customary law conception of seduction also involves consensual sexual 
intercourse with an unmarried woman, but requires in addition that the act 
take place without the consent of her guardian.26 
 
Traditionally, women did not have the capacity to litigate, and hence 
claims for seduction could only be made by the female “victim’s” male 
guardian. The rationale behind this was that the aftermath of seduction would 
be a reduction in any lobolo that could be offered upon her marriage.  Hence 
any “damages” applicable could be claimed only by the one whose financial 
investment in the young woman was impacted by the seduction.  From a 
																																																								
24 See Claassen v Van der Watt 1969 (3) SA 68 (T), where the female plaintiff brought an 
action for breach of promise and seduction.  Both claims failed because the plaintiff was 
aware that the defendant was a married man.  However, this case is presented not so much 
for its facts, as for it representing that the plaintiff had standing to bring the seduction action 
in common law. 
25 For a discussion rethinking the standard of wrongfulness as an element of common law 
delict, See Anton Fagan “Rethinking Wrongfulness in the Law of Delict” (2005) 122 South 
African Law Journal 90-141.  Further for exploration of the arguments that call for the 
abolition of common law seduction, see Van Jaarsveld v Bridges 2010 (4) SA 558 (SCA).  In 
this case, the SCA held, in a strong obiter dictum, that actions for breach of promise were 
outdated and no longer in keeping with public policy or social mores.  This case focuses on 
breach of promise to marry – which is not quite the issue discussed in the hypothetical case 
presented in part 3 below. 
26 See the commentary of W Ncube on the Zimbabwean case of Katekwe v Muchabaiwa 
where he states: 
Under traditional customary law, the delict of seduction is defined as sexual 
intercourse with a woman, with her consent, but without her guardian's consent. The 
delict is committed not against the woman, but against her guardian, who, is the 
wronged party. 
W Ncube “The Decision in Katekwe v Muchabaiwa: A Critique" (1983-4) 1 & 2 Zimbabwe 
Law Review 220.  
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certain point of view, therefore, the seduction remedy constructed the “victim” 
as property, and, as with all damage to property, the “owner” (or guardian) 
was entitled to compensation for the “loss” (both current and future) resulting 
from the damage.  Simply put, this “implies redress for damage to property, 
as well as for injury to a woman insofar as a family head’s rights in her have 
been violated.”27 
  It follows that sexual delicts such as seduction can only be properly 
understood against the background of the subordinate position of women in 
customary law, and the fact that their sexual integrity and child-bearing 
capacity fall under the control of a senior male.28  Furthermore, the action for 
defloration arises only in some systems of customary law, and in certain 
systems where it is available, the woman must be a virgin.29  Hence, there is 
less precision and overall consistency about customary actions, as the rules 
may vary from one community to another. 
 The “remedy” or payment for the delict of seduction in customary law 
is often in the form of a “seduction beast”, i.e., one head of cattle offered to 
the young woman’s (typically male30) guardian.31  Moreover, in most 
customary law communities, a penalty or fine is awarded to the male 
guardian, not only for the seduction of a virgin, but also, in most cases, for a 
further act of intercourse if pregnancy follows, and, in some cases at least, 
for a third and even subsequent pregnancies.32 
	  
																																																								
27 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 105. 
28 Ibid 108. 
29 Ibid. 
30 It is significant that, in customary law, only senior males in the woman’s family – whether 
her father or other guardians – may bring the action in this sense, seduction is seen as a 
form of theft or a trespass on the guardian’s property.  The woman has no locus standi.  See 
T W Bennett C Mills & G Munnick “The Anomalies of Seduction: A Statutory Crime to an 
Obsolete, Unconstitutional Delict?” (n 13) 332. 
31 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 109.  Note also that  
a distinction should be made between (i) the seduction beast, for the defloration of the 
girl; and (ii) the virginity beast, payable when a virgin gets married or the initial 
intercourse is followed by a marriage. … [T]he payment of the seduction beast was a 
considered a form of ‘punishment’, whereas the virginity beast is considered a form of 
compensation payable to the mother of the girl for keeping her virginity intact. 
32 J C Bekker Seymour’s Customary Law in Southern Africa (n 10) 349. 
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3. The Seduction Hypothetical: Zindzi and Marcus 
 
Having outlined the basic elements of the seduction delict in both the 
common and customary law, the task is now to apply them to the following 
hypothetical: 
 
Twenty-year old Zindzi comes from a traditional Xhosa family in the 
Eastern Cape.  Zindzi’s father died two years ago, and since then, Zindzi and 
her mother have been living in the homestead of her father’s brother. 
 
Up until six months ago, Zindzi had never travelled more than 20 
kilometres from the village where she lives and grew up, but now she attends 
University 200 kilometres away, having recently received a state bursary to 
pursue tertiary education.  Zindzi enrolled in an agricultural science program. 
 
Three months into the school year, Zindzi began a sexual relationship 
with Marcus, a 26 year-old graduate student, who is Zindzi’s tutor at the 
university.   
 
Marcus was born in the Eastern Cape, just as Zindzi was, but he and 
his family left South Africa when he was only one year old, as his parents 
were lecturers at a university in Egypt.  Marcus has only been back in South 
Africa for two years, and he has been studying and working at the university 
for that period.    
 
Marcus was immediately smitten with Zindzi when he saw her in his 
tutorial class.  It was not long before Marcus was able to convince Zindzi to 
begin a physical relationship, since she was in love with him.  When Zindzi’s 
family becomes aware of this relationship, a claim for seduction damages is 
brought against Marcus. 
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(a) Marcus, Zindzi and Seduction under the Common Law 
 
As outlined above, under the common law, Zindzi can bring an action for 
seduction damages against Marcus, provided that she can demonstrate that 
she was harmed by Marcus’ conduct.  There is no issue as to sexual assault 
(rape) as Zindzi was of age to consent to the sexual relationship, and the 
facts do not suggest that there is an issue as to consent.33  Neither Marcus 
nor Zindzi dispute the sexual relationship or the fact that Zindzi was a virgin 
before her relationship with Marcus.  Given these agreed upon facts, the only 
matter for determination in the common law seduction action is to calculate 
the loss to Zindzi in terms of her reputation and her future marriage 
prospects. 
Recall the following factors to be taken into account when calculating 
the “loss” to the female victim and the damages to be paid by the seducer:  
(i) age of the plaintiff; (ii) her circumstances in life; (iii) the measure of 
resistance she offered; (iv) the methods applied by the defendant to 
overcome her resistance; (v) whether the seduction took place when an offer 
of marriage was made; and (vi) whether the plaintiff has been rendered 
pregnant by the defendant.34  On the basis of these considerations and the 
facts outlined in the scenario, Zindzi would not have a very strong claim 
under the common law.  Although the facts indicate that Zindzi is in love with 
Marcus and the relationship was consensual, there is no indication that she 
put up much resistance, or that she suffered proprietary damage or a loss of 
marriage prospects.  Namely, on the facts as outlined, it is not clear that 
preserving her virginity was a primary concern for Zindzi.  Hence, it would be 
difficult for her to obtain compensation for this loss. 
 
On the other hand, since the details in the factual scenario are not 
very explicit, it may be that, given Zindzi’s relatively tender age of 20, and the 
																																																								
33 It is acknowledged that there are instances where consent is vital to the power imbalance 
between the two parties.  Although as Zindzi’s tutor, Marcus is in a position of power, the 
facts suggest that consent to the relationship was indeed free and genuine. 
34 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 110. 
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fact that her relationship with Marcus happened very early in her first venture 
away from her family and home village, Zindzi’s consent is somewhat vitiated 
by her naïveté.  Moreover, if Zindzi becomes pregnant as a result of the 
seduction, then she would likely have to suspend her studies (at least for a 
while).  The birth would also result in medical expenses, as well as the loss 
of tuition fees.  In this regard, it must be born in mind that she had embarked 
upon a promising career a few months previously with a scholarship.  These 
considerations now put Zindzi in a much more vulnerable position. 
Consideration should be given as to whether Marcus ever expressed 
any intention to marry Zindzi.  If he did not, when the relationship began, and 
if he never expresses such an intention, even if a child is on the way, then 
not only is his seduction of Zindzi more “harmful”, but Zindzi’s future marriage 
prospects have been further compromised.  All of these factors could 
effectively operate to provide Zindzi with a strong basis for her claim.  In the 
common law assessment of damages for seduction, much is dependent 
upon the contextual position of the woman; and whether this position is 
materially impacted by the seduction (and any consequences thereof, such 
as a pregnancy and loss of future marriage or employment prospects).   
 
(b) Marcus, Zindzi and Seduction under Customary Law 
 
Unlike the common law, any seduction damages in customary law would be 
claimed by Zindzi’s male guardian (in this case, Zindzi’s paternal uncle).  
This particular case (as well as Zindzi’s uncle’s claim for a seduction beast) 
is complicated by the fact that Marcus may be unfamiliar with customary law 
given that he does not live under this system of law.35 The issue is whether 
he can be compelled to answer a claim under customary law, or whether the 
matter would have to be resolved under the common law. 
 This raises the issue as to who determines the applicable law?  It 
could be Zindzi, her uncle, or Marcus.  Under traditional customary law, the 
																																																								
35 Note that the converse could also be true regarding Zindzi and her family and the common 
law. 
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female “victim” has no say.  In fact, she lacks locus standi – in the procedural 
sense – to bring a suit.36  The issue then is whether, under the requirement of 
equal treatment, Zindzi can be excluded from the case.  This question 
requires immediate reference to the constitutional right of equality, as well as 
section 39(2) of the Constitution (which obliges the courts to develop 
customary law in accordance with the spirit and purport of the Bill of Rights), 
an issue which is explored below in part four. 
We also need to recall, from the hypothetical scenario, that Marcus is 
essentially a “foreigner” in South Africa.  Despite being born in and currently 
working and residing in the country, for most of his life he was raised and 
educated elsewhere.  There is no indication that Marcus lives his life in 
accordance with any customary law principles, and there is certainly no 
indication that he is familiar with the elements of Xhosa customary law that 
formed the framework for most of Zindzi’s life and that of her family.  Marcus’ 
lack of familiarity with Xhosa customary law is an important consideration in 
determining which law is most appropriate for deciding this claim.37 
Rather than answer the many problems that arise from the case of 
Marcus and Zindzi, this section has highlighted the questions in an effort to 
demonstrate the complexity of a seduction delict in a pluralistic landscape.  
We can turn now to some of the particular constitutional challenges that arise 
from this hypothetical case of seduction, and present the GRACE model as a 
means of providing some clarity and resolution. 
																																																								
36 See T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) at 252-253. 
37 Ibid 49-69, where Bennett discusses the considerations required to resolve conflicts 
between customary law and common law.  See especially pages 53-54 which discuss the 
influence that the parties’ agreement and intention has in resolving this conflict. Note 
however, that the decision to apply either common law or customary law is for the courts, not 
the parties.  See also A B Edwards “Choice of Law in Delict: Rules or Approach” (1979) 96 
South African Law Journal 64, for a discussion generally on the issue of choice of law for 
delict.  Specific reference is made to seduction, but the options for choice are limited to 
various systems of private international law and do not address a domestic South African 
choice involving customary law as an option.   
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4. Seduction and Constitutional Challenges: GRACE as Remedy 
	
 
In many respects, the delict of seduction is incompatible with the Bill of 
Rights.38  In the first place, customary law violates the woman’s right to 
equality by excluding her from the action altogether.  In the second place, by 
allowing an action for the seduction of women only, both customary and 
common law discriminate against men.  Section 9 of the Constitution requires 
equal treatment of the genders.39  It therefore behoves the courts to take 
cognisance of broader socio-legal contexts when making decisions, 
																																																								
38 For a broader discussion of constitutional incompatibility and customary delict in general, 
and the practice of virginity testing in particular, see T W Bennett C Mills and G Munnick 
“Virginity Testing: A Crime, a Delict or a Genuine Cultural Tradition” (2010) Journal of South 
African Law 256-259.  The position taken here is that the custom of virginity testing may 
potentially violate a girl’s right to dignity and security of her body, in terms of sections 10 and 
12 of the Bill of rights respectively.  See also, E R George “Virginity Testing and South 
Africa’s HIV/AIDS Crisis: Beyond Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism Toward Health 
Capabilities” (2008) 96 California Law Review 1465-1477.   George explains virginity testing 
as a “prenuptial custom traditionally conducted just prior to marriage, [involves] the 
examination of females to ascertain whether or not they are sexually chaste.”  She goes on 
to state that the tests are generally conducted by older women and take the form of “vaginal 
exams to determine if a female’s hymen is intact and assess other physical features held to 
be indicative of the innocence and purity of the individual tested such as her muscle tone 
and firmness of her breasts.”  In the battle to combat HIV/AIDS, virginity testing functions as 
an abstinence only enforcement mechanism.  See E R George “Virginity Testing and South 
Africa’s HIV/AIDS Crisis: Beyond Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism Toward Health 
Capabilities” Ibid 1449-50.  It is not within the scope of this chapter to delve into the fray of 
the debate related to virginity testing.  However, it is interesting to see the resurgence of this 
practice in traditional communities as “promoting a return to traditional culture as a 
preventative public health measure to combat a modem plague.”  See E R George “Virginity 
Testing and South Africa’s HIV/AIDS Crisis: Beyond Rights Universalism and Cultural 
Relativism Toward Health Capabilities” Ibid 1450. 
39 C Rautenbach J C Bekker & N M I Goolan Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 108.  Note also that section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
gives spouses in a customary marriage equal status, including capacity to litigate.  The 
question thus arises as to whether in terms of the equality principle, an unmarried woman 
can institute a claim against a female wrongdoer for committing adultery with the claimant’s 
male partner. 
Furthermore, insofar as courts have a discretion to apply either customary law or 
common law in terms of section 1(1) of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act, the opportunity 
exists for a wife to sue a female wrongdoer for alleged adultery with the former’s husband in 
terms of the common law, or for an unmarried woman to sue the wrongdoer for defloration.  
This interesting idea of reciprocal enforcement of defloration rights by either gender party to 
a marriage is in contrast to the traditional customary law principle in Mayelane where the 
male historically had more power to negotiate the terms in the sense of bringing a new party 
into the marital relationship.  Although contemporary practice seemed to limit this male 
power by requiring the first wife to consent, it still seems that there is little recourse available 
to the first wife if she does not consent and the husband takes on a second wife in any 
event. 
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especially in personal family relationships under customary law.40  Presently, 
the lack of broad contextual analysis not only restricts the seduction action to 
female victims, but also makes no allowance for seduction within same sex 
relationships.  It is not within the scope of this thesis to consider the broad 
development of the scope of seduction to include male victims and same sex 
relationships, but it is important to point out that a full examination of equality 
within the seduction delict must also consider its application to alternative 
and non-traditional relationships. 
The story of Zindzi and Marcus is useful in developing theoretical 
underpinnings on which the legal analysis of seduction in a pluralist 
landscape should be based.  This section will now propose the GRACE 
analysis as a means for remedying those conflicts.  
 
The strength of the GRACE model lies primarily in its emphasis on 
culture.41  Specifically, the analysis of the right to equality must be interpreted 
though a cultural lens.  This does not mean that the net result of equality 
itself changes, but rather that recognition of the fluidity and variation of 
culture (according to time, place, and other social contexts) is the only way to 
give a full and satisfactory meaning to equality.42 
 
a) Seduction, Culture and Legal Pluralism 
 
The choice of law issue and the consideration of seduction in both customary 
and common law contexts arise on account of legal pluralism, which in South 
Africa is mostly concerned with differences of culture.  The analysis below is 
conscious of the pluralistic context, and therefore considers first, which law is 
to be applied – the common law or customary law.  The response to this 
																																																								
40 C Himonga & A Pope “Mayelane v Ngwenyama and Minister for Home Affairs: A 
Reflection on Wider Implications” (2013) Acta Juridica 338.  
41 See Chapter Five, generally, where it is argued that culture is the most pivotal, or 
important identity aspect in any analysis to secure equality rights (which essentially seeks to 
balance the gender equality entitlement with the cultural practice entitlement) in the context 
of legal pluralism. 
42 See Masiya v Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria 2007 (5) SA 30 (CC). 
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initial choice may also involve consideration of which legal system is better 
placed to secure equality for both parties.  For example, from a traditional 
customary law perspective, ought Zindzi’s uncle to lose out on her lobolo 
value simply because Marcus is unfamiliar with customary law practices and 
requirements?  Further, in the context of equality is it appropriate for Zindzi to 
be considered a “victim” and Marcus the “predator” – or is there scope for 
more flexibility within the traditional roles assigned to the parties? 
The choice of law may be determined at the outset of litigation by the 
parties’ choice of forum (subject of course, to the rules governing jurisdiction 
of courts).  For instance, in a traditional court, customary law is almost 
always applied.  Magistrate’s courts and the High Court on the other hand 
are more used to entertaining conflicts of laws with a view to determining 
which law is the most appropriate in terms of the facts of the particular 
case.43 
Under the Constitution, parties are clearly entitled to align themselves 
with the culture of their choice,44 and by implication customary or common 
law – although it should be noted that they should not be allowed to adopt a 
law in order to defeat rights already acquired by a third person or to prejudice 
the broader interests of justice.45   
Where the defendant contests the plaintiff's choice of law, the court 
must investigate the parties’ conduct prior to initiating action, and, from the 
words and deeds out of which the claim arose, it may seek to discover 
whether the parties had a shared expectation as to the applicable law/culture 
in issue.  The nature of a transaction or course of action may prove decisive, 
but if it is known to both systems of law, the courts must delve deeper into 
																																																								
43 See T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 36) 148-149. 
44 See sections 30 and 31 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
45 For that reason, spouses may not conclude antenuptial contracts that evade the 
prohibition on unfair discrimination under section 9 of the Constitution.  See Prior v Battle & 
Others 1999 (2) SA 850 (T).   
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the circumstances of the case in order to discover its general cultural 
orientation.46   
With respect to actions arising out of delict in this hypothetical case, 
the cause of action is known to both common and customary law.  In such 
situations, courts have made reference to the way parties live, and thus their 
overall cultural orientation.  People who adhere to a traditional African way of 
life have been deemed subject to customary law, while those who adopt a 
western way of life have been deemed subject to the common law.47   
In instances where both the parties have the same cultural orientation, 
it is open to the court to infer that the parties would agree as to how to 
address the matter.  It would be much more difficult to impute such a notional 
agreement or expectation if the plaintiff had been associated with one culture 
and the defendant another (as is the case with Zindzi and Marcus).48  
Alternatively, the choice of law issue could be resolved upon consideration of 
all connecting factors related to the issue, and when on balance, most point 
to one system of law, that is the one to apply.  This method, as advocated by 
Bennett,49 acknowledges that people may live their lives across or within 
different cultures.  Even so, there is an attempt to identify a preponderance of 
factors indicating orientation towards a particular system. 
We can turn now to the constitutional issues.  According to an 
objective choice of law, the delict of seduction is to be considered under 
either the common law or under customary law.  Zindzi’s cultural community 
will provide some answers in this regard.  Identification of the applicable law 
																																																								
46 See also part 2 where the conflict of laws is as between common law and customary law 
delict is discussed. 
47 Cultural orientation, as a connecting factor, is essential, although it is obviously an artificial 
conception, because no one, in reality, lives wholly in one culture.  Further, culture does not 
function as a whole, but rather in its various components – being contextually relevant.  See 
J H Van Doorne “Situational Analysis: Its Potential and Limitations for Anthropological 
Research on Social Change in Africa (1981) 21 Cahiers d'Études Africaines 482. 
48 Confronted with this problem, most courts have simply applied the plaintiff’s law (or the 
defendant’s).  This approach is based on an unspecified value judgment, in the sense that 
the plaintiff (or the defendant) is deemed more important for choice of law.  It depends on the 
tactics of litigation, however, which person will take the role of plaintiff in an action, and 
forensic strategy is hardly an appropriate basis for choice of law. 
49 T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (n 36) 56.  
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will in turn identify the rights seeker (whether that is Zindzi herself, as would 
be the case under common law, or her guardian, as is the case under 
customary law).  If customary law has been chosen, however, the question 
arises as to whether it is an infringement on Zindzi’s access to equality to be 
denied standing in the proceedings as the right-seeker.  Even so, the court 
should not ignore the rights of her uncle, as her guardian. 
Consider then, whether, on the basis of customary law discussed in 
the context of Mabena v Letsela in Chapter Seven, it would be appropriate 
and necessary in Zindzi’s case to develop the customary law to permit her to 
bring a cause of action for seduction in her own right, rather than relegating 
this right to her male guardian, or even to shift the claim to the common law.  
Such a development need not change any of the necessary elements of 
customary law seduction, or the factors required to determine compensation. 
Exploration of the constitutional challenge should not end here, 
however.  The court adjudicating the matter between Zindzi and Marcus 
might decide to choose common law as the most appropriate legal system.   
But, even in this case, choice of the common law does not solve all 
constitutional issues arising out of seduction actions.  It poses a further 
question as to whether only women should be entitled to sue for seduction.  
The delict under both common and customary law perpetuates female 
stereotypes and ultimately it amounts to unfair discrimination.50  The 
argument has been put forward that the common law action should be 
abolished as it places a (masculine) value upon the virginity of the girl and 
her future marriage prospects.  This presents a stereotype of women as a 
commodity (an object to be bartered with) as well as perpetuating the image 
of women as victims and prisoners of their own sexuality.51  
For the purposes of this discussion, Zindzi is understood to be the 
symbolic representation of the GRACE model and it is the intersecting 
																																																								
50 N Bohler-Müller “Cultural Practices and Social Justice in a Constitutional Dispensation: 
Some (More) Thoughts on Gender Equality in South Africa” (2001) 22 Obiter 150. 
51 Ibid 151. 
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aspects of Zindzi’s identity that provide the substantive context for the 
analysis of the seduction hypothetical.  But not all identities within the 
GRACE model are given the same consideration for each litigant.  The 
GRACE model is just that – a model.  In Chapter Six of this thesis, the 
GRACE model was applied to the Bhe case to demonstrate the gaps that 
result from the lack of contextual analysis. From this application, it appears 
that the identity aspects of gender, race, age and culture are not the only 
ones that have significant impact on access to equality in all circumstances.52  
Moreover, not all of these intersecting identity factors are of equal weight in 
all circumstances. 
Gender is the primary identity aspect that is at the root of the 
constitutional challenge in seduction cases.  As Bennett et al note: 
The customary action rests on a constitutional right to culture, while the 
common-law action has no particular cultural connotation; the common-
law action is arguably obsolete, while its customary counterpart is still 
very much alive and in use; the common-law action avails only women, 
but the customary action only men. Whichever gender is favoured, both 
the actions now face the possibility of review for infringing the 
constitutional prohibition on sex or gender discrimination, either because 
they allow only one sex the right of action or because they perpetuate 
gender stereotypes.53 
In this way then, gender is interpreted in a cultural context.  Further, as was 
discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, when applying the GRACE model to 
certain Constitutional Court decisions, cultural context often includes the 
applicability of either the common law or customary law, and this was in turn, 
largely dependent upon race.  To say that culture and race can be seen to 
influence one another, almost to the point where they become conflated and 
difficult to disentangle, would not be an exaggeration.  It would, however, be 
an exaggeration to say that one substitutes for the other.  To do so negates 
the reality that there exist many cultural contexts and iterations of customary 
law within one racial group. 
   
																																																								
52 For instance, birth order and legitimacy were also considerations in Bhe. 
53 T W Bennett C Mills & G Munnick “The Anomalies of Seduction: A Statutory Crime to an 
Obsolete, Unconstitutional Delict?” (n 13) 332-3. 
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It is evident that the common law delict of seduction is in conflict with the 
fundamental right to equality before, and equal treatment by, the law (section 
9 of the Constitution), since it is only available to virgin women and not to 
boys or men.  Hence, the delict perpetuates female stereotypes and 
ultimately amounts to unfair discrimination.54 
 
b) Applying GRACE to Customary Law Seduction 
 
The customary law of seduction is not stagnant, but is in a dynamic process 
of adaptation and change.55  Thus, any analysis that would consider the 
proposed facts in a customary law context must reflect the inherent fluidity 
and flexibility of this system of law. The reason for this fluidity is to be 
immediately responsive to, and reflective of, changing social context.  
The very fact that Zindzi is denied the opportunity to seek redress for 
seduction, in her own right, in customary law is indicative of the inherent 
gender inequality in this system.  But the issue remains as to whether 
enhanced gender equality in customary law would immediately lead to Zindzi 
being able to bring her own claim.  Most likely, in view of recent 
developments, such as the rights of girls to inherit from their fathers, the 
rights of daughters to succeed as Hosi, and the recognition of a mother’s 
right to negotiate lobolo, it is probably most reasonable as an initial step, to 
permit Zindzi’s mother an equal claim against Marcus for her daughter’s 
seduction.56  This is not an unreasonable development of the customary law, 
as a portion of the seduction beast/damages was historically given to the 
young woman’s mother in recognition of her efforts to safeguard the girl’s 
virginity.  Although not unreasonable, the prospect of Zindzi’s mother making 
																																																								
54 N Bohler-Müller “Cultural Practices and Social Justice in a Constitutional Dispensation: 
Some (More) Thoughts on Gender Equality in South Africa” (n 50) 150. 
55 C Rautenbach, J C Bekker & N M I Goolam Introduction to Legal Pluralism in South Africa 
(2010) (n 2) 105. 
56 This would be in keeping with the decision in Mabena and Letsoala 1998 (2) SA 1068 (T).  
Further, to immediately provide Zindzi with the right of this claim may be seen as an 
empowering action vis-à-vis the common law.  However, such a step completely overlooks 
the issue of the evolving role of the mother in customary law.  Hence, a recognition of 
Zindzi’s agency ought not to be done at the expense of her mother’s traditional role and 
cultural responsibilities. 
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the seduction claim on her daughter’s behalf need not be the final result of 
the full development of the customary law in the context of the GRACE 
model as applicable to the situation between Zindzi and Marcus.   
As suggested above, a second gender equality issue to consider is 
whether the customary law could be developed such that either parent could 
serve as family head, to whom the seduction damages would be paid.57  
Recall from the facts that Zindzi’s father has died.  In line with the 
developments in Mabena and Fanti v Boto, one consideration is whether 
there is anything to prevent a progressive interpretation of the customary law 
to permit Zindzi’s mother to serve as family head.  This development still 
reflects the deference that is given to the traditional family structure.  It is the 
parent/guardian and not the young woman herself who has a right of action 
for seduction.  It would also maintain the importance of lobolo – given that 
lobolo and a customary law claim for seduction are very closely connected. 
Even though development of the customary law so as to enable the 
mother to make the seduction claim rather than the male guardian – which is 
similar to expanding the mother’s agency in Mabena - this development is 
still somewhat protracted as it permits gender equality only in so far as it is 
applied in the context of parental hierarchy.  In the facts as presented, Zindzi 
has attained adulthood, and consequently, a fulsome and broadly equitable 
development of the customary law in the context of all identity aspects 
contemplated in the GRACE model (including gender and age), would give 
Zindzi the agency to bring the seduction claim in her own right.58 
In considering the details of the GRACE analysis, as has been previously 
noted in this thesis, race is in practice all too often the gateway to culture.  
The specifics of the cultural identity analysis are largely informed, or 
predetermined, by race.  However, one should not assume that race and 
culture are synonymous in all contexts.  With respect to age, in the context of 
																																																								
57 Ibid. 
58 Such development of the GRACE model would reflect the implication of applying the Bill of 
Rights, which, as the product of a Western way of thinking, favours individual rights, rather 
than family rights.  Customary law, on the other hand, might well lean in favour of the 
family’s right to protect the virginity of its female members. 
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the case between Zindzi and Marcus, age is only relevant to Zindzi’s capacity 
to consent to the sexual relationship – particularly in a common law action for 
seduction.  But Zindzi’s age and her ability to offer genuine consent, are 
considerably less important in a customary law claim for seduction, even 
though she is the “seduced party”.  But as expressed earlier, Zindzi’s age 
may be an important factor in considering that she is legally of age to bring a 
seduction claim in her own right, rather than relying on a parent (or other 
family head) as a litigation guardian.59 
Simply put, culture is the primary lens through which the seduction should 
be viewed.  It is culture that is largely influential in the case of the seduction 
delict being characterised as either a common or customary law delict.  
Further, it is the alignment of race and culture which in practice determines 
the choice of forum to characterise the seduction issue. 
 
The GRACE analysis should be rounded off by bearing in mind that not 
only must enhanced equality between the parties be the goal of any claim for 
seduction under either customary or common law, but also that the two legal 
systems must also be considered as equally viable options for the litigant in 
meeting this goal.60 
 
One technical issue to consider is the particular methodology applicable 
when a customary law issue is at stake.  Although, as discussed above, the 
courts are obliged to develop customary law in line with the Constitution, it 
may be helpful to describe the nature of this specific development in the 
context of living and official customary law.  To begin with, any customary 
																																																								
59 It is noted that adherence to the arbitrary age of 18 to reflect the division between child- 
and adulthood is a Western idea.  Customary law might well regard a socially and 
economically immature female, still living with her family as a “minor” and thus incapable of 
interacting with full legal agency.  Hence, in developing customary law in line with the Bill of 
Rights, and its Western-inspired notion of individual rights, there are likely to be 
inconsistencies with the customary law emphasis on group or family rights. 
60 The equal consideration of the common law and customary law is based on the 
characterisation of legal pluralism in South Africa as reflecting a dual legal system.  This 
duality implies a parallel coexistence as opposed to a hierarchy.  See C Rautenbach “Deep 
Legal Pluralism in South Africa: Judicial Accommodation of Non-State Law” (2010) 60 
Journal of Legal Pluralism 143-144.  
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law development engaged in by the courts would refer to official customary 
law, because that is the law which is most readily accessible to the courts 
and (usually) the litigants’ counsel. 
 
The living law as practised and developed by  communities, generally 
becomes relevant when pleaded as an exception to the official law – and it 
must then be proved to the court, although the court itself is entitled to call for 
such proof. 61 A court can, of course, avoid the lengthy – and potentially 
inconclusive search for a definitive statement of the living law – by simply 
“developing” official customary law in such a way that it complies with the Bill 
of Rights.62 
 
It should be noted that, in all these cases, any judicial pronouncement on  
living law has the inevitable effect of creating new official law.   It should be 
further noted that the clear intent behind section 39(2) of the Constitution is 
to place the duty to develop the law on the courts rather than individuals or 





61 See T W Bennett Application of Customary Law in Southern Africa (1985) 31-32. 
62 See Bennett Customary Law in Southern Africa (n 36) 92. 
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Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, 
And sorry I could not travel both 
And be one traveller, long I stood 
And looked down one as far as I could 
To where it bent in the undergrowth; 
Then took the other, as just as fair, 
 
And having perhaps the better claim, 
Because it was grassy and wanted wear; 
Though as for that the passing there 
Had worn them really about the same, 
 
And both that morning equally lay 
In leaves no step had trodden black. 
On, I kept the first for another day! 
 
Yet knowing how way leads on to way, 
I doubted if I should ever come back. 
 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood, and I – 
I took the one less travelled by, 
And that has made all the difference 
 
Robert Frost, “The Road Not Taken”
63 
 
The customary and common-law actions for seduction have marked 
differences.  The former is arguably obsolete, while the latter is still very 
much alive and in use.  Only women can avail themselves of the common 
law action, while its customary law counterpart is available only to men as 
guardians of women. “… [B]oth the actions now face the possibility of review 
for infringing the constitutional prohibition on sex or gender discrimination, 
either on the grounds that they allow only one sex the right of action or 
because they perpetuate gender stereotypes.”64 
																																																								
63 Frost’s poem depicts a choice, not unlike the choice that lays before GRACE in the context 
of legal pluralism and intersectionality as to which will be the most appropriate and 
unobstructed path towards the equality that she seeks.  In this contemporary choice of two 
diverging (though equal) roads, it is contended that with the navigational guidance of the 
GRACE analytical model, the less travelled road with its landmarks of culture is the choice 
for GRACE that will make all the difference. 
64 T W Bennett C Mills & G Munnick “The Anomalies of Seduction: A Statutory Crime to an 
Obsolete, Unconstitutional Delict?” (n 13) 332-3. 
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In the pluralist context of the South African legal system, Dlamini 
notes that, 
[t]he present in South Africa is reminiscent of what Charles Dickens in 
A Tale of Two Cities characterised as the best of times and the worst 
of times, the age of wisdom and the age of foolishness, the spring of 
hope and the winter of despair, the season of light and the season of 
darkness, the epoch of belief and the epoch of incredulity.  That these 
contrasting phenomena exist in the same country at the same time 
may seem strange, but they are typical of societies in transition.  Law 
could be the instrument that forges order out of chaos of these 
contrasts.65 
 
The question is, which system of law will be this instrument. 
Merely because the common-law action is found to constitute unfair 
discrimination does not necessarily mean that its customary law counterpart 
should also be condemned: “a classification which is unfair in one context 
may not necessarily be unfair in a different context”.66  Hence full 
consideration of context must also factor into the determination of the 
appropriate system to apply in light of all of the circumstances. 
Potentially, the customary law of delict is in some respects 
incompatible with the Bill of Rights.  This is not the only customary practice 
where this incompatibility is evident; virginity testing, for example, is seen to 
violate the girl’s rights to dignity and security of her body, in terms of sections 
10 and 12 of the Bill of Rights respectively.67 The constitutionality of the 
continued recognition of seduction as a wrongful act in itself can also be 
questioned.68   
The requirement in subsection 39(2) for courts to develop customary 
law according to the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights, however, 
																																																								
65 C R M Dlamini “Towards a New Legal Order For a New South Africa” (1992) XVI Legal 
Studies Forum 131. 
66 T W Bennett C Mills & G Munnick “The Anomalies of Seduction: A Statutory Crime to an 
Obsolete, Unconstitutional Delict?” (n 13) 345.  Note that this is how pluralism operates: to 
demonstrate that interpretation and impact of a particular legal rule varies from one 
normative context to the other; hence, the choice of law issue must take into consideration 
what the particular implications are of each choice in each system. 
67 E Knoetze “Fathers Responsible for the Sins of Their Children? Notes on the Accessory 
Liability of a Family Head in the Customary Law of Delict” (n 4) 48. 
68 N Bohler-Muller Muller “Of Victims and Virgins: Seduction Law in South Africa” (n 19) 6.  
See also Van Jaarsveld v Bridges, 2010 (4) SA 558 (SCA), as discussed in note 25.  
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






may alleviate the conflict between equality rights and the customary law 
delict of seduction.  In essence, courts would be required to develop 
customary law to align it with constitutional values and principles.  In this 
regard, precedents were set in Mayelane and Justice Ngcobo’s judgment in 
Bhe.69   
The application of the GRACE model of intersectionality analysis to 
landmark customary law cases seeking to balance equality rights, as well as 
the hypothetical of seduction in both a common law and customary law 
context, has served to demonstrate the evolving agency of the female litigant 
on equality issues, and where these may be impacted by cultural 
considerations.   
The GRACE model seeks to demonstrate that in equality claims, the 
identity of the rights seeker generally needs analysis.  For instance, in the 
context of the hypothetical facts presented, as they relate to Zindzi and 
Marcus, it was proposed that customary law could be developed to permit 
Zindzi to raise her own claim for seduction.70  Consider for a moment that the 
law could be similarly developed to permit such a claim if Zindzi were 
seduced by a woman – or if both parties in the seduction scenario were men.  
It is suggested that there ought to be a flexible and in tandem development 
between the scope and applicability of customary law and the scope of 
identity.  As much as the discussions in this thesis have focused on fixed 
aspects of identity for particular named individuals, the GRACE model of 
analysis is flexible, so as to be applicable to the various combinations of 
identities and their intersections. 
 
																																																								
69 Note that some have cautioned that, although the Constitution can be used as a vehicle to 
develop the law of delict, this should be conducted with some caution, given the longevity of 
that regime in Roman legal traditions, when personal rights were protected, whether of 
dignity or the physical self.  See P J Visser “Some Remarks on the Relevance of the Bill of 
Rights in the Field of Delict” (1998) Journal of South African Law 536.  
70 Again, note that such development would be in keeping with the Western-inspired Bill of 
Rights, and perhaps not the traditional community perspective that the right to institute a 
claim properly resides with the family and not the individual.  
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1. Introduction: Overview of the GRACE Analytical Framework 
 
Equality,…has to address the actual conditions of human life and not an 
abstract concept of identical treatment which is equally applicable to all, 
whether black or white, man or woman.1 
 
This thesis explores the contextual realities of the life of a South African girl 
child, as she strives to attain and maintain equality vis-à-vis those who 
appear more privileged than she.  The thesis argues that, if this aim is to be 
achieved, close attention must be paid to various critical and intersecting 
identities of the girl child.  Consideration of these identities through the 
GRACE model performs two useful functions.  First it leads to a full and 
substantive enjoyment of equality for the litigant, rather than merely formal 
equality.  Second, it facilitates the development of the offending laws (in 
keeping with constitutional requirements for implementing the Bill of Rights), 
rather than a simple expungement or invalidation of those laws.2 
																																																								
1 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (1998) 14 South African Journal 
on Human Rights 252. 
2 See C Himonga “African Customary Law in South Africa: The Many Faces of Bhe v 
Magistrate Khayelitsha” in D Cornell & N Muvangua (eds) Ubuntu and the Law: African 
Ideals and Postapartheid Jurisprudence (2012) 398-399.  See also Ex parte Chairperson of 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






In the course of the thesis, a framework is presented within which to 
analyse and construct the right to equality.  This framework was specifically 
designed to consider the situation of a South African girl child living subject to 
customary law.  The acronym GRACE was created to represent the key 
aspects of identity needed for the analysis.  The acronym conveys the impact 
of the intersecting identity aspects of gender, race, age and culture on the 
quest for equality.  
GRACE is a simple analytical tool, one that can function as a baton to 
be passed on to those who will be required to continue the human rights 
journey, in other words, the judiciary.  The litigant raising the spectre of her 
intersecting identity represents the initial leg of the journey.  The judiciary 
then takes the next step in the journey by applying the intersectionality 
analysis tool to arrive at the contextually appropriate remedy of substantive 
equality for the rights seeker. 
The journey towards equality is not linear, but cyclical; it circles back 
on itself and spirals into a deeper level of understanding with each lap.  
Although Chapter Eight presented a hypothetical case of the delict of 
seduction to which the analysis could be applicable, the real value of the 
GRACE model is yet to be evaluated through judicial analysis. Ideally, it will 
have broad practical application for courts in South Africa, as the model 
lends itself to adaptation in order to remain current with changes in social 
context.3 
This thesis explores the contextual realities of the life of a South 
African girl child striving to attain equality vis-à-vis those who are situated in 
more privileged positions of life than she.  In order to clarify the process for 
analysing the claim to equality the thesis presents a framework designed to 
consider the situation of a South African girl child living subject to customary 
																																																																																																																																																													
the Constitutional Assembly: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC) at paragraphs 197 and 230. 
3 Such evolution could include, as was suggested towards the end of Chapter Eight, other 
identity aspects such as sexual orientation.  As the discussion of this identity aspect 
becomes increasingly mainstream, it only makes sense that this also be a consideration in 
judicial analysis. 
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law.  This situation was chosen because it arises quite commonly in South 
Africa and represents a significant proportion of the South African population.  
It also provides an opportunity to analyse the tradition of patriarchy that is 
perceived to govern so many aspects of life in the country, thereby 
determining entitlement to property and status.  
2. The GRACE Model: A Contextual Approach to Equality 
 
Use of the GRACE framework requires a contextual analysis of a claimant 
asserting the right to equal treatment, and this thesis contends that consideration 
of context is critical to obtaining substantive equality.  Once context is taken into 
account the inquiry shifts from an abstract comparison of “similarly situated” 
individuals to an exploration of the actual impact of an alleged rights violation 
within the individual’s existing socio-economic circumstances.  It further requires 
an examination of the individual within, and outside of, different social groups.4 
 
A true contextual approach to equality must be evaluated on its own terms 
by those to whom it is to be applied.  Such an evaluation will consider equality in 
the process of hearing such claims vis-à-vis the litigants, as well as equality in the 
final result (be it a tangible award, a financial compensation, or an appropriate 
change in social status).  Essentially, the ultimate determination as to the 
attainment of equality is made from the perspective of the rights seeker.  The 
GRACE analysis is a tool to better assist the judiciary in being able to identify with 
this perspective. 
The interpretation of equality may differ if a claim is adjudicated under the 
South African common or customary laws.  It is in fact legal pluralism that 
supports these different, but not necessarily divergent or hierarchical 
interpretations, and the different interpretations do not entail a preference for the 
substantive equality of one system over the other. 
In the development and application of the GRACE model, there are two 
principal considerations: first, equality is a comparative concept; and second the 
																																																								
4 C Albertyn & B Goldblatt “Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in the 
Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality” (n 1) 261. 
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contextual framework within which that comparison is applied is a major factor in 
determining the equality being sought.  Hence, without a comparator and without 
a proper appreciation for the context in which the equality is assessed, it is 
impossible to construct a means to decide equality.  That is to say that the 
comparison is most insightful if it is based on a variation of only one contextual 
identity factor at a time. For example, in the case of property succession as 
reflected in Bhe, the girl child living under customary law could be compared to a 
boy living under customary law – and whether the variant of gender impacts the 
equal access to property succession rights.  Further, in the hypothetical seduction 
case involving Zindzi and Marcus as proposed in Chapter Eight, the discussion 
reviewed the differences between the context of customary law or the common 
law.  Similarly, within one particular legal context – customary law for example - a 
comparison could be made between the differences in the sexual orientation 
identity of the rights claimant. 
Equality is a comparative concept.5  The comparison between 
GRACE and another individual who differs from GRACE with respect to one 
or more aspects of identity ought not to be based on arbitrary or irrational 
connections between this difference and the enjoyment of equality.  Rather, 
it is based on a direct nexus between identity and realised equality.  On this 
basis, it is argued that the identity aspects of gender or sexual orientation 
directly impact the context in which the access to equality is sought. 
The inspiration for GRACE was born out of a desire to analyse the 
patriarchy that is perceived to be rooted in some aspects of customary law.  
The model is proposed as a method for re-interpreting and developing 
customary law to bring it into line with the Constitution.6 The core of the 
																																																								
5 See Chapter Two, part 2. 
6 Between the time of this original inspiration for this thesis, notably the Constitutional Court’s 
decision in the case of Bhe v. Khayelitsha Magistrate and its perceived shortcomings with 
respect to developing the customary law so as to promote girl child equality, and the 
completion of this thesis, there has been much progress in diminishing the impact of male 
primogeniture.  Most importantly, the Black Administration Act, 1927, and its attendant 
inequalities for Black South Africans, has been repealed almost entirely, thus paving the 
path for a free and fair consideration of equality rights for the South African girl child subject 
to customary law. 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






equality challenge to customary law is that gender often predetermines 
entitlement to property and status.    
The notion of intersectionality is a key component of the GRACE 
framework of analysis, and it may be construed in different ways.  Chapter 
Five part 3(b) suggested that intersectionality could be described as a two-
dimensional plane with multiple interlocking axes of identity (gender, race, 
age, etc.).7   It was further observed that culture added a third dimension – or 
topography – the street map of intersectionality.  For instance, if one wants 
to observe intersectionality in action, one needs to be aware that the various 
aspects of identity are akin to roads that intersect on a map.8  One avenue is 
used to represent race, another gender, and similarly, there are different 
roadways to reflect age, and the various other aspects of identity that may 
be relevant to analysis within a particular context.  If race and gender are the 
major roadways (with class, age and religion, perhaps crossing these at 
minor intersections), the metaphor can be elaborated by adding culture as 
the mountains and valleys – the height and depth of the intersections.  
Culture could also represent the forests and lakes – in essence, culture is 
then, the landscape on which the intersections occur. 
Although the GRACE framework in this thesis focuses on four identity 
factors (gender, race, age and culture), the broader argument of equality 
rights entitlement in South Africa is grounded in section 9 of the 
Constitution.  This section specifies a total of 17 identity aspects against 
which discrimination impacting access to equality is specifically prohibited.  
These include religion, language, disability, sexual orientation and class.9  
Thus, just as an analysis based on GRACE is presented as being 
																																																								
7 Chapter Five part 3(b). 
8 See A Garry, “Intersectionality, Metaphors, and the Multiplicity of Gender” (2011) 26 
Hypatia 826-831. 
9 Section 9, the Equality provision is located in Chapter 2 of the South African Constitution, 
The Bill of Rights.  Subsection 9(3) reads as follows: 
The state may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or 
more grounds, including, race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, 
language and birth. 
See Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996. 
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transferrable to various situations involving customary (and the common) 
law, it is evident that the particular aspects of identity are fluid and 
transferable, such that the analysis applies to the intersection of any or all of 
the 17 aspects of identity detailed in section 9 (as well as any analogous 
identity not listed, for which a similar argument of discrimination may be 
made).  
In the context of South Africa, race and culture have an unfortunate 
but persistent historical linkage.   Given this linkage, and the fact that under 
the Apartheid regime access to equality was based on racial identity, one 
wonders similarly whether culture is the lens that determines equality. 
Chapter Two iterated the importance of identifying the substantive 
meaning and content of the notion of equality under consideration.  Recall 
further, from Chapter Five, that culture (and usually race) influence the 
contextual parameters of equality.  It would follow that these two factors not 
only set the contextual platform for equality, but also function as interpretive 
tools that help to ascertain attainment of equality.  
 
3. Human Rights in the African Cultural Context: Individual vs Group 
 
Chapter Five of this thesis emphasised the importance of culture in relation 
to GRACE’s predicament.  In many respects, the very word, culture, is a 
marker for customary law.  In fact, culture is not only a primary identity 
consideration in a GRACE based analysis, but also a core feature 
characterising the distinctions between customary law and the common law. 
These distinctions make customary law appear to discriminate against girl 
children in ways that the common law would not.   
The South African Constitution recognises the importance of culture 
and customary law by guaranteeing cultural rights in sections 30 and 31 
and, at the same time, requiring the courts to apply customary law in section 
211(3) whenever that law is applicable, and not in contravention of the Bill of 
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Rights.  This thesis examines the extent to which the general promotion of 
cultural rights can be balanced against securing gender rights for the girl 
child. The analysis applied recognises that access to, and enjoyment of 
rights generally, especially the right to equality, depends on the particular 
cultural context that forms the backdrop for these rights to be realised.   
This difficult question raises, in turn, the relationship of group and individual 
rights. Traditionally, African societies have given preferential treatment to the 
community over the individual.10  According to the well-known maxim umuntu 
ngumuntu ngabantu (translated as ”a person is a person through other 
people”).11  It is only through the community of others that the individual can 
find meaning.  Consider for example, the relevance of ubuntu to communities 
particularly, and humanity in general, as expressed by Justice Mokgoro in S 
v Makwanyane, as follows: 
Generally, ubuntu translates as humaneness.  In its most 
fundamental sense, it translates as personhood and morality.  
Metaphorically, it expresses itself in umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu, describing the significance of group solidarity on 
survival issues so central to the survival of communities.  While 
it envelops the key values of group solidarity, compassion, 
respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and collective 
unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and 
morality.12			
This thesis does not set out to provide definitive answers to the relationship 
between group and individual rights, but it urges due attention be paid to the 
importance of community in realising individual rights in Africa. On the one 
hand, it is true to say that, without the participation of the individual to form 
common bonds, the notion of community, in the form of interaction among 
individuals, would not exist.  On the other hand, it is equally true to say that 
individuals cannot function in complete isolation: we are dependent upon 
																																																								
10 For instance, Gyekey makes reference to the following Akan and Sudanese adages: “The 
left arm washes the right arm and the right arm washes the left arm”; “ A single hand cannot 
clap.”  In this view, “the success and meaning of the individual’s life depend on identifying 
oneself with the group.  This identification is the basis of the reciprocal relationship between 
the individual and the group.”  See K Gyekey An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: 
The Akan Conceptual Scheme (1987) 156. 
11 See S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 at paragraph 308 per Mokgoro J. 
12 1995 (3) SA 391 at paragraph 308.  These elements of humanity and morality suggest 
individuality as evidence by adherence to societal or community norms. 
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social interaction and structure for our survival – the group exists only as the 
composite of individuals. 
In Africa, the latter proposition has greater cogency than in the 
Western world.13  Hence, the girl child forms part of the group.  Like other 
members, she has a particular role to play, and a particular status has been 
assigned to her.  The argument is simply that full consideration be given to 
the individual intersectional identity that is inextricably linked to this role and 
status.14   
The universal human rights system prioritises the individual over the 
group, but this hierarchy is not typically recognised in an African cultural 
context.15  As Banda explains, “from an African woman’s perspective…[they] 
see themselves and are identified as being part of a collective. To say to a 
woman that she has entitlements which may bring her into conflict with the 
rights of others is to present her with a seemingly intractable problem.”16 
If it is a feature of a particular culture that the group should be 
accorded greater importance than the individual, then it follows that there 
are culturally distinct conceptions of human rights.  If this is the case, then 
rights cannot truly be universal.  Similarly, if rights are not truly universal, is 
the content of equality universal?  Certainly there may be a universal regard 
and respect for the principle of equality, but the substantive content of 
equality may vary with situational context – and context is always informed 
																																																								
13 See Article 27 of the Banjul Charter: 
(1) Every individual shall have duties towards his family and society, the State 
and other legally recognised communities and the international community.  
(2) The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due 
regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common 
interest. 
14 Consider that, 
As a people, Africans emphasise groupness, sameness and commonality.  Rather 
than the survival of the fittest and control over nature, the African worldview is 
tempered with the general guiding principle of the survival of the entire community and 
a sense of cooperation, interdependence, and collective responsibility. 
See J A M Cobbah “African Values and the Human Rights Debate: An African Perspective” 
(1987) 9 Human Rights Quarterly 320. 
15 Ibid. 
16 F Banda “Global Standards: Local Values” (2003) 17 International Journal of Law, Policy 
and the Family 15. 
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by culture, its parameters and framework of understanding.  Hence, this 
thesis has sought to demonstrate that the content of equality in any given 
situation, is contextually and culturally specific. 
In any event, what is conventionally touted as “universal” in the 
human rights sphere is in essence a euphemism for “Western”.17  But in the 
effort to establish human rights as being truly universal, it must be 
acknowledged that the interpretation, application and internal hierarchy of 
rights is culturally based.  Thus, culture is not simply an aspect of identity, 
but is rather the medium through which identity operates.  Again, this is to 
emphasise the point made in Chapter Five that culture is the key aspect of 
identity.  Further, in the context of legal pluralism, culture is an important 
fact in choice of laws and the determination as to whether the common law 
or customary law is applicable to particular litigants.18  And, finally, culture is 
the medium through which equality is given substantive content. 
	
 (a) The Culture of Community – GRACE as an Individual vs 
GRACE as a Community Member 
 
In advocating for the value of considering the intersecting identity of GRACE, 
this thesis does not seek to shift the African conception of rights from 
emphasis on the group to the individual (or vice versa in the case of the 
Western perspective).  Instead, the intention is to look at the group not as a 
monolithic whole, but rather as the sum of its unique constituent parts.  
Group rights are given primary importance in the African cultural context of 
human rights.19  However, the rights of the group can only be as strong as 
the collective rights of its individual members.  The relationship between 
																																																								
17 Naryan explains that cultural essentialism establishes sharp and distinct binaries between 
Western culture and other cultures.  See U Naryan “Essence of Culture and a Sense of 
History: A Feminist Critique of Cultural Essentialism” (1998) 13 Hypatia 88. 
18 Recall from Chapter Eight, the determination as to how to address the hypothetical case of 
seduction where one party was unfamiliar with and hence, a non-adherent to customary law.  
See also T W Bennett Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 54, where he states:  
…because the Constitution protects an individual’s freedom to participate in a culture 
of choice, the courts must respect that person’s decision to have customary or 
common law applied in a particular case. 
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individuals and the cultural context in which they exist is therefore one of 
mutual influence.  The group, as a pivotal entity in African cultures, is 
strengthened in the course of acknowledging and appreciating the individual 
identities of its members.  For instance, in the case of GRACE, her access to 
group rights, such as the right to practice and enjoy her culture and tradition, 
is dependent upon her status in the group.  This itself is a factor of her 
identity. 
However, although it is readily accepted that a culture can be seen as 
the context forming the identity of an individual, it can also be said that, over 
time, individuals have a formative impact on the culture in which they exist.  
Thus it is the specificities of identity that give substantive content to equality 
rights for GRACE.  As Eva Brems notes,  
Inclusion of all human beings is precisely what the “human rights” 
concept is all about. It is central to the idea of universality.  What both 
the feminist and cultural relativist critiques of human rights make clear 
is that universality is not synonymous with uniformity.  Real inclusion 
of all human beings requires attentiveness to their specificities.20 
[emphasis added] 
 
Many rights have to be exercised in a group context.21  Yet, it is noted 
that the rights of individuals have often been limited by the rights of the 
communities of which they are members. 
As Ibhawoh further explains, 
[i]ndividuals are actors who can influence their own fate, even if their 
range of choice is circumscribed by the prevalent social structure or 
culture. …  Culture is thus inherently responsive to conflict between 
individuals and social groups.22 
It is this conflict between groups and individuals that enables 
dominant practices and beliefs to emerge, and these dominant themes 
essentially comprise the cultural context.  What is more, “traditional cultural 
																																																								
20 Eva Brems “Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in 
Human Rights Discourse” (1997) 19 Human Rights Quarterly 164. 
21 C R M Dlamini “The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs” (1991) Acta Juridica 
73. 
22 B Ibhawoh “Between Culture and Constitution: Evaluating the Cultural Legitimacy of 
Human Rights in the African State” (2000) 22 Human Rights Quarterly 841-842. 
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beliefs are also neither monolithic nor unchanging.  In fact, they could be – 
and were – changed in response to different internal and external 
pressures.  Cultural change can result from individuals being exposed to 
and adopting new ideas.”23 
In this way then, change is itself a characteristic of culture. Change 
may come about as a result of an ideological tension between groups and 
individuals, or it may be the result of the natural, organic development of a 
culture, which is typically the case in customary law.  The GRACE model is 
a means of ensuring that the organic development also authentically 
acknowledges the intersecting identities of individuals within the context of 
culture, which in the case of the South African legal system manifests itself 
as legal pluralism. 
 It is also this conflict between groups and individuals in the customary 
law context that spurs development and recognition of changes in 
customary law and practices to align with new social mores and attitudes.  
Two noteworthy examples are the development in Shilubana24 permitting 
women to succeed to the office of chief, and the development in Bhe25 
permitting girls to inherit property.  These developments reflect an authentic 
embrace of identity either because of the community’s initiative in the case 
of Shilubana or because of judicial intervention in the case of Bhe. 
 
 (b) Group Culture vs Individual Identity 
 
The group, as a pivotal entity in African cultures, is strengthened in the 
course of acknowledging and appreciating the individual identities of its 
members.  For example, in the case of GRACE, her access to group rights 
is dependent upon her status in the group.  This itself is a factor of her 
identity.   
																																																								
23 Ibid 841. 
24 See Chapter Seven, part 2(b). 
25 See Chapter Six.  Whether this development is considered to be arrived at by broadening 
the reach of the common law, or developing the customary law rule, focus is on the equality 
in the end result. 
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In many ways the discussion about using the analytical frameworks 
of intersectionality and legal pluralism within South Africa has involved a 
tension between individual and group rights.  Some say that there is a 
conflict between group rights and individual rights, because the needs of the 
individual and the group can never be completely ad idem.  “It has often 
been contended that African law is essentially a law of groups in which the 
individual has little or no rights.”26  But individual enjoyment of rights is 
dependent upon specific recognition of said right.  This recognition is in turn 
dependent upon navigating a course of action within the field of culture and 
legal pluralism. 
As was discussed in Chapter Four, the two legal frameworks of 
intersectionality and legal pluralism posit different approaches to the 
interpretation and applicability of rights entitlements.  Each approach has, at 
its core, a different rights holder.  Intersectionality focuses on a method of 
rights interpretation and analysis that is best suited for the circumstances of 
particular individuals.  Legal pluralism, on the other hand, acknowledges the 
existence of different legal systems, but also assumes that, whatever legal 
system is at play is appropriate for all members of the group27 as a whole.   
	  
																																																								
26 C R M Dlamini “The Role of Customary Law in Meeting Social Needs” (n 21) 73.  Dlamini 
further states that “it is well known that customary law is based on a communitarian ethic 
whereas the common law is based on individualism.  See Dlamini at 84. 
27 Note that the specific identity of the “group” may change such that individuals may fit 
within the character identity of different groups at the same time (e.g. group can be based on 
religion, language ethnicity, geographic location (rural vs urban), etc.) 
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4. Conclusion: A Pit Stop in GRACE’s Theoretical Journey to 
Equality 
 
…we should not rest content with the existing theoretical framework on customary 
law.  Theory is not the master of the material.  It is the servant.28 
 
In earlier times, customary law, as inscribed in official texts and supported by 
the former Black Administration Act,29 women had no right to inherit the 
property of their deceased husbands.  This rule existed simply because 
women had no entitlement to hold and dispose of property in their own name.  
What women did have, however, was a right to claim support for themselves 
and their children from the husband’s heir.  The argument for gender equality 
would demand that women have equal right to inherit in their own right – 
without having to rely on the generosity of a male heir.  In practice, this right 
did not always translate into a straightforward right to maintenance.30  The 
journey to equality expounded in this thesis, is really a journey of the 
evolution of full equality rights of the female litigant in customary law.   
The last decade of Constitutional Court equality rights jurisprudence in 
a customary law context, starting with the Bhe case, ushered in a new 
approach to the era of customary laws of succession and marriage 
inheritance in general, and the rights status of women female heirs in 
particular.  Considering Bhe and Shilubana in the context of succession 
inheritance, and Mayelane in the context of a woman’s right, as party to a 
marriage, to make decisions and provide or withhold consent, as a party to a 
marriage contract, there has been a marked movement towards recognising 
women as capable of claiming legal entitlements in their own right.  Hence 
the focus on equality in this thesis, however, is not simply equality of result, 
in that a girl child should be entitled to inherit in equal measure to her male 
																																																								
28 T W Bennett “The Contribution of Legal Theory and Judicial Practice to the Future 
Development of Customary Law” in Graham Glover (ed) Essays in Honour of A J Kerr 
(2006) 199. 
29 Now repealed. 
30 See generally Mthembu v Letsela [2000] 3 All SA 219 (SCA).  See also discussion of this 
case by K A Bentley “Whose Right is it Anyway? Equality, Culture and Conflicts of Rights in 
South Africa” (2003) Human Sciences Research Council, Democracy and Governance 
Research Program, Occasional Paper #4 (Cape Town) 17. 
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sibling, but in addition, the thesis is an attempt to ensure equality in the 
analytical process.  Recognising the comparative nature of equality, the issue 
is not so much that there are comparative differences between two litigants, 
but rather, the issue is the value that is ascribed to these differences.  As 
Albertyn and Goldblatt explain, 
…differences are only problematic where they perpetuate the 
subordination of disadvantaged groups, such as women or black 
people.  The evil is not located in difference, but rather, in any 
negative impact resulting from this differentiation.  The concern is 
not to eradicate differentiation, but to make the effects of this 
differentiation ‘costless’. [footnotes omitted]31 
The theory of intersectionality at the heart of the GRACE model 
requires us to examine individual aspects of identity and how they function 
collectively to place the individual in a position of disadvantage vis-à-vis 
another individual with a different set of intersecting identities.  Although this 
has been the critical message throughout this thesis, it is only a partial 
message.  In the absence of the full picture of how all of the intersecting 
identities of an individual rights claimant are situated within a broader context 
of socio-political forces and legal systems, the point of this thesis rings 
hollow.   Equality is a comparative concept, and thus the attainment of such 
is dependent up a full analysis of comparative identities and cultural contexts. 
The analysis cannot end with the examination of GRACE’s 
intersecting identities in each particular case, for identity aspects on their 
own have no inherent value.32  It is the worth (or entitlement to power) that is 
socially constructed and politically and legally determined, that is of value, 
and that value is ascribed according to the tenets of the power systems at 
play.  The overall conclusion therefore is this: intersectionality is not only a 
tool by which we come to understand and analyse GRACE’s identity, but also 
a gateway to challenging the systems of power that assign entitlement on the 
basis of identity.  
																																																								
 
32 This notion of intersectionality theory as only representing part of the puzzle of access to 
equality is further explored in R Delgado “Rodrigo’s Reconsideration: Intersectionality and 
the Future of Critical Race Theory” (2011) 96 Iowa Law Review 1268-1270; 1285-1288. 
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In this regard, and as previously discussed, it is the flexibility of 
customary law that renders it susceptible to change and progressive 
development, making it constantly relevant and reflective of community 
values and practices as well as the Bill of Rights.  In this sense, the flexibility 
that facilitates transition is the gateway to equality. 
In the wake of the decision in Bhe and the enactment of the Reform of 
the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act, 
2009, as well as the endorsement of community development of customary 
law and judicial notice of contemporary community customary law practice (in 
Shilubana and Mayelane respectively), one wonders whether there is still 
scope for the free reign given to living customary law.  One also questions if 
this seemingly free scope has been stifled by legislative pronouncements33 
and judicial endorsements, which effectively promote a hierarchy that favours 
official customary law over living customary law.34 
This thesis is based on a detailed analysis of intersecting identity 
aspects in order to secure full access to substantive equality. In the course 
of arguing for recognition of the complexity of intersecting identities, it has 
also demonstrated that because complex individuals with intersecting 
identities operate within the landscape of legal pluralism, appreciation must 
also be given to the fact that not only do identities shift and evolve with 
contexts, but also the very cultural landscape which gives these identities 
substance and relevance to one another, is itself constantly shifting.  As the 
role of the female litigant in customary law evolves, we see that women are 
not only participants in culture, but are also agents of culture and, as such, 
engage in its creation, and thereby ultimately shape customary law.  The 
future challenge is not so much to pinpoint the meaning of culture and 
identity at any particular moment, but rather to get a sense of the flexibility 
																																																								
33 See Reform of the Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 
11 of 2009. 
34 This question was thoroughly considered by C Himonga in her chapter “The Future of 
Living Customary Law in African Legal Systems in the Twenty-First Century and Beyond, 
with Special Reference to South Africa”.  See C Himonga in J Fenrich P Galizzi & T Higgins 
(eds) The Future of African Customary Law (2011) 31-57. 
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and fluidity that is needed to interpret and apply the appropriate rules of the 
normative order within these intersecting and shifting contextual realities.35   
The GRACE model is offered as a method of analysis to assist in this 
regard.  If nothing else, the GRACE framework is intended to convey the 
message that context and identity are constantly shifting, just as laws are 
constantly developing in response to these multiple and intersecting shifts.  It 
is the failure to acknowledge and respond to these shifting realities that 
results in inequality.  True progress and development lie in keeping pace with 
the constancy of change.  Part of this process, or more specifically, its 
desired result is increased agency of women in customary law.36 Ideally, such 
an outcome would influence the comparative positioning of those whose 
identities are captured by the GRACE analysis. 
Consider in this context, the work of Spivak and her reference to the 
subaltern.37  Armann takes the discussion of the cultural and legal contexts in 
																																																								
35 S H Williams explains that as much as culture may be determinative or influential, culture 
is itself in an almost constant state of flux, being made and remade.  This fluidity however, 
should not be mistaken for uncertainty.  For in the moment culture meanings always are, or 
can be discernible.  Williams also states that the changes that cultures undergo are often 
influenced by other cultures.  This sphere of influence is also part of the contextual reality in 
which not only group or community culture, but also in which individual identities exist.  
Reference is made to 
…a constructionist approach to culture in which cultural communities are seen neither 
as isolated nor as monolithic: cultures have always interacted with each other and 
shaped one another and they have also always been internally heterogeneous.  Sarah 
Song describes four elements of this constructivist model: 
(1) “cultures are the product of specific and complex historical processes, 
not primordial entities”; 
(2) “cultures are internally contested, negotiated, and reimagined by 
members who are sometimes motivated by their interactions with 
outsiders”; 
(3) “cultures are not isolated but rather overlapping and interactive”; and  
(4) “cultures are loose-jointed…the loss or change of one strand does 
not necessarily bring down the entire culture”. 
See S H Williams “Democracy, Gender Equality, and Customary Law: Constitutionalizing 
Internal Cultural Disruption” (2011) 18 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 70. 
36 In the context of the power of culture in terms of its impact on identity, Williams offers the 
following, particularly in relation to gender: 
Women are not merely the victims of culture: they “act with agency, engaging with 
and reformulating cultural policy … as they work to eliminate discrimination within 
their cultural communities.”  Constructing the problem as culture versus equality, 
where the legal system has to choose a side, casts women as they passive victims 
of culture rather than as its active creators. 
Ibid 69. 
37 See G C Spivak Can the Subaltern Speak? in C Nelson and L Grossberg (eds) Marxism 
and the Interpretation of Culture (1988) 271-316.  See also R Coomaraswamy “Women and 
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this thesis to its ultimate conclusion by extending Spivak’s reference to the 
subaltern such that “not only must the subaltern be permitted to speak, but 
when she does, others must listen, must admit her as an equal to their on 
going conversation, and must, eventually, adjust their behaviour to 
accommodate her place in the world.38  An intersectionality analysis in the 
context of legal pluralism is a means of accommodating the notional GRACE 
in the world. 
The point of this thesis is that not only should the girl child living 
subject to customary law be given an agency equal to others, but also that 
her very existence, as a citizen of South Africa shall open up a unique world 
of shared possibilities as South Africa itself grows into its new and evolving 
identity.39  The relationship between citizen, state (read landscape) and 
identity is evident in the following speech by Thabo Mbeki when he was 
Deputy President. Mbeki references the connection between historical 
existence, identity and landscape, as well as the equal citizenry of all living 
creatures who interact on the land.  In this way the complexity of the identity 
of the nation of South Africa is intersectionality in action. 
The message is a poetically inspirational call to connect Africa’s dark 
and varied past to its bright and future potential.  This rings true to the 
potential of GRACE, the girl child living subject to customary law, to realise 
that her potential for full access to equality is bound up in her intersecting 
identity.  Mbeki eloquently states: 
																																																																																																																																																													
Children: The Cutting Edge of International Law” (2015) 30 American University International 
Law Review 25-26. 
38 D M Amann,“The Postcolonial Woman or Child” (2015) 30 American University 
International Law Review 45-46.  Amann indicates that this process is aptly labelled “dialogic 
pluralism”. 
39 This thesis has developed and applied the GRACE model as a framework for judicial 
analysis in the context of customary law development.  In this sense, the focus has been 
between the female litigant and a challenge to a particular rule or practice, resulting in a 
development or variation of such rule in order to secure equality rights.  This has largely 
meant that the focus of the thesis has been on the action of “authorities” (defined broadly as 
the state, the judiciary, or the leaders of a customary law community).  The discussion has 
not included an analysis of horizontal application of the GRACE analysis, in recognition of 
the capacity for horizontal of the Constitution.  Such an analysis would be an opportunity for 
community members to further develop the equality relationship between themselves. This 
may be the subject of analysis for future work. 
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I Am An African   
 
On an occasion such as this, we should, perhaps, start from the beginning. 
So, let me begin. 
 
I am an African. 
 
I owe by being to the hills and the valleys, the mountains and the glades, the 
rivers, the deserts, the trees, the flowers, the seas and the ever-changing 
seasons that define the face of our native land. 
 
My body has frozen in our frosts and in our latter day snows. It has thawed in 
the warmth of our sunshine and melted in the heat of the midday sun. The 
crack and the rumble of the summer thunders, lashed by startling lightning, 
have been a cause both of trembling and of hope. 
 
The fragrances of nature have been as pleasant to us as the sight of the wild 
blooms of the citizens of the veld. 
 
The dramatic shapes of the Drakensberg, the soil-coloured waters of the 
Lekoa, iGqili noThukela, and the sands of the Kgalagadi, have all been 
panels of the set on the natural stage on which we act out the foolish deeds 
of the theatre of our day. 
 
At times, and in fear, I have wondered whether I should concede equal 
citizenship of our country to the leopard and the lion, the elephant and the 
springbok, the hyena, the black mamba and the pestilential mosquito. 
 
A human presence among all these, a feature on the face of our native land 
thus defined, I know that none dare challenge me when I say - I am an 
African! 
 
I owe my being to the Khoi and the San whose desolate souls haunt the 
great expanses of the beautiful Cape - they who fell victim to the most 
merciless genocide our native land has ever seen, they who were the first to 
lose their lives in the struggle to defend our freedom and dependence and 
they who, as a people, perished in the result. 
 
Today, as a country, we keep an audible silence about these ancestors of 
the generations that live, fearful to admit the horror of a former deed, seeking 
to obliterate from our memories a cruel occurrence which, in its 
remembering, should teach us not and never to be inhuman again. 
I am formed of the migrants who left Europe to find a new home on our 
native land. Whatever their own actions, they remain still, part of me. 
 
In my veins courses the blood of the Malay slaves who came from the East. 
Their proud dignity informs my bearing, their culture a part of my essence. 
The stripes they bore on their bodies from the lash of the slave master are a 
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reminder embossed on my consciousness of what should not be done. 
 
I am the grandchild of the warrior men and women that Hintsa and 
Sekhukhune led, the patriots that Cetshwayo and Mphephu took to battle, the 
soldiers Moshoeshoe and Ngungunyane taught never to dishonour the cause 
of freedom. 
My mind and my knowledge of myself is formed by the victories that are the 
jewels in our African crown, the victories we earned from Isandhlwana to 
Khartoum, as Ethiopians and as the Ashanti of Ghana, as the Berbers of the 
desert. 
 
I am the grandchild who lays fresh flowers on the Boer graves at St Helena 
and the Bahamas, who sees in the mind's eye and suffers the suffering of a 
simple peasant folk, death, concentration camps, destroyed homesteads, a 
dream in ruins. 
 
I am the child of Nongqause. I am he who made it possible to trade in the 
world markets in diamonds, in gold, in the same food for which my stomach 
yearns. 
 
I come of those who were transported from India and China, whose being 
resided in the fact, solely, that they were able to provide physical labour, who 
taught me that we could both be at home and be foreign, who taught me that 
human existence itself demanded that freedom was a necessary condition 
for that human existence. 
 
Being part of all these people, and in the knowledge that none dare contest 
that assertion, I shall claim that - I am an African. 
 
I have seen our country torn asunder as these, all of whom are my people, 
engaged one another in a titanic battle, the one redress a wrong that had 
been caused by one to another and the other, to defend the indefensible. 
 
I have seen what happens when one person has superiority of force over 
another, when the stronger appropriate to themselves the prerogative even 
to annul the injunction that God created all men and women in His image. 
I know what if signifies when race and colour are used to determine who is 
human and who, sub-human. 
 
I have seen the destruction of all sense of self-esteem, the consequent 
striving to be what one is not, simply to acquire some of the benefits which 
those who had improved themselves as masters had ensured that they 
enjoy. 
 
I have experience of the situation in which race and colour is used to enrich 
some and impoverish the rest. 
 
I have seen the corruption of minds and souls as (word not readable) of the 
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pursuit of an ignoble effort to perpetrate a veritable crime against humanity. 
I have seen concrete expression of the denial of the dignity of a human being 
emanating from the conscious, systemic and systematic oppressive and 
repressive activities of other human beings. 
 
There the victims parade with no mask to hide the brutish reality - the 
beggars, the prostitutes, the street children, those who seek solace in 
substance abuse, those who have to steal to assuage hunger, those who 
have to lose their sanity because to be sane is to invite pain. 
Perhaps the worst among these, who are my people, are those who have 
learnt to kill for a wage. To these the extent of death is directly proportional to 
their personal welfare. 
 
And so, like pawns in the service of demented souls, they kill in furtherance 
of the political violence in KwaZulu-Natal. They murder the innocent in the 
taxi wars. 
 
They kill slowly or quickly in order to make profits from the illegal trade in 
narcotics. They are available for hire when husband wants to murder wife 
and wife, husband. 
 
Among us prowl the products of our immoral and amoral past - killers who 
have no sense of the worth of human life, rapists who have absolute disdain 
for the women of our country, animals who would seek to benefit from the 
vulnerability of the children, the disabled and the old, the rapacious who 
brook no obstacle in their quest for self-enrichment. 
 
All this I know and know to be true because I am an African! 
Because of that, I am also able to state this fundamental truth that I am born 
of a people who are heroes and heroines. 
 
I am born of a people who would not tolerate oppression. 
I am of a nation that would not allow that fear of death, torture, imprisonment, 
exile or persecution should result in the perpetuation of injustice. 
 
The great masses who are our mother and father will not permit that the 
behaviour of the few results in the description of our country and people as 
barbaric. 
 
Patient because history is on their side, these masses do not despair 
because today the weather is bad. Nor do they turn triumphalist when, 
tomorrow, the sun shines. 
 
Whatever the circumstances they have lived through and because of that 
experience, they are determined to define for themselves who they are and 
who they should be. 
We are assembled here today to mark their victory in acquiring and 
exercising their right to formulate their own definition of what it means to be 
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The constitution whose adoption we celebrate constitutes and unequivocal 
statement that we refuse to accept that our Africanness shall be defined by 
our race, colour, gender of historical origins. 
 
It is a firm assertion made by ourselves that South Africa belongs to all who 
live in it, black and white. 
It gives concrete expression to the sentiment we share as Africans, and will 
defend to the death, that the people shall govern. 
 
It recognises the fact that the dignity of the individual is both an objective 
which society must pursue, and is a goal which cannot be separated from the 
material well-being of that individual. 
 
It seeks to create the situation in which all our people shall be free from fear, 
including the fear of the oppression of one national group by another, the fear 
of the disempowerment of one social echelon by another, the fear of the use 
of state power to deny anybody their fundamental human rights and the fear 
of tyranny. 
 
It aims to open the doors so that those who were disadvantaged can assume 
their place in society as equals with their fellow human beings without regard 
to colour, race, gender, age or geographic dispersal. 
 
It provides the opportunity to enable each one and all to state their views, 
promote them, strive for their implementation in the process of governance 
without fear that a contrary view will be met with repression. 
 
It creates a law-governed society which shall be inimical to arbitrary rule. 
It enables the resolution of conflicts by peaceful means rather than resort to 
force. 
 
It rejoices in the diversity of our people and creates the space for all of us 
voluntarily to define ourselves as one people. 
As an African, this is an achievement of which I am proud, proud without 
reservation and proud without any feeling of conceit. 
 
Our sense of elevation at this moment also derives from the fact that this 
magnificent product is the unique creation of African hands and African 
minds. 
 
But it also constitutes a tribute to our loss of vanity that we could, despite the 
temptation to treat ourselves as an exceptional fragment of humanity, draw 
on the accumulated experience and wisdom of all humankind, to define for 
ourselves what we want to be. 
 
Together with the best in the world, we too are prone to pettiness, petulance, 
CONSTRUCTING EQUALITY: DEVELOPING AN INTERSECTIONALITY ANALYSIS TO ACHIEVE 






selfishness and short-sightedness. 
 
But it seems to have happened that we looked at ourselves and said the time 
had come that we make a super-human effort to be other than human, to 
respond to the call to create for ourselves a glorious future, to remind 
ourselves of the Latin saying: Gloria est consequenda - Glory must be sought 
after! 
 
Today it feels good to be an African. 
 
It feels good that I can stand here as a South African and as a foot soldier of 
a titanic African army, the African National Congress, to say to all the parties 
represented here, to the millions who made an input into the processes we 
are concluding, to our outstanding compatriots who have presided over the 
birth of our founding document, to the negotiators who pitted their wits one 
against the other, to the unseen stars who shone unseen as the 
management and administration of the Constitutional Assembly, the 
advisers, experts and publicists, to the mass communication media, to our 
friends across the globe - congratulations and well done! 
 
I am an African. 
 
I am born of the peoples of the continent of Africa. 
The pain of the violent conflict that the peoples of Liberia, Somalia, the 
Sudan, Burundi and Algeria is a pain I also bear. 
 
The dismal shame of poverty, suffering and human degradation of my 
continent is a blight that we share. 
The blight on our happiness that derives from this and from our drift to the 
periphery of the ordering of human affairs leaves us in a persistent shadow of 
despair. 
 
This is a savage road to which nobody should be condemned. 
This thing that we have done today, in this small corner of a great continent 
that has contributed so decisively to the evolution of humanity says that 
Africa reaffirms that she is continuing her rise from the ashes. 
Whatever the setbacks of the moment, nothing can stop us now!  
 
Whatever the difficulties, Africa shall be at peace!  
However improbable it may sound to the sceptics, Africa will prosper! 
 
Whoever we may be, whatever our immediate interest, however much we 
carry baggage from our past, however much we have been caught by the 
fashion of cynicism and loss of faith in the capacity of the people, let us err 
today and say - nothing can stop us now! 
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